§3.3περί τε τούτων οὖν ἀπορία πολλὴ πῶς δεῖ θέμενον τυχεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν πότερον δεῖ τὰ γένη στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἢ μᾶλλον ἐξ ὧν ἐνυπαρχόντων ἐστὶν ἕκαστον πρώτων, οἷον φωνῆς στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ταῦτʼ ἐξ ὧν σύγκεινται αἱ φωναὶ πρώτων, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ κοινὸν ἡ φωνή·
Therefore, concerning these matters, there is much difficulty as to how one should position oneself to attain the truth, and also concerning the principles, whether one should assume the genera to be elements and principles, or rather those primary things from whose immanent presence each thing is constituted; for example, the elements and principles of speech seem to be those primary things from which speech is composed, and not the common term, "speech".
καὶ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ταῦτα στοιχεῖα λέγομεν ὧν αἱ ἀποδείξεις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδείξεσιν ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ οἱ πλείω λέγοντες εἶναι στοιχεῖα καὶ οἱ ἕν, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται καὶ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀρχὰς λέγουσιν εἶναι, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τούτων στοιχεῖά φησιν εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα ἐνυπαρχόντων, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς γένη λέγει ταῦτα τῶν ὄντων.
And of geometrical diagrams we call those "elements" whose proofs are immanent in the proofs of the others, either of all or of most of them; further, of bodies, both those who say there are several elements and those who say there is one, say that the principles are those things from which they are composed and of which they are constituted, as Empedocles says that fire and water and the things with them are the immanent elements from which existing things are, but he does not speak of them as the genera of existing things.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τις ἐθέλει τὴν φύσιν ἀθρεῖν, οἷον κλίνην ἐξ ὧν μορίων συνέστηκε καὶ πῶς συγκειμένων, τότε γνωρίζει τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς. —ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν λόγων οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη τῶν ὄντων· εἰ δʼ ἕκαστον μὲν γνωρίζομεν διὰ τῶν ὁρισμῶν, ἀρχαὶ δὲ τὰ γένη τῶν ὁρισμῶν εἰσίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν ὁριστῶν ἀρχὰς εἶναι τὰ γένη.
In addition to these, if one wishes to examine the nature of other things, for instance a bed, it is when he knows of what parts it is constituted and how they are put together that he then knows its nature. —From these arguments, then, the principles would not be the genera of existing things; but if we know each thing through its definitions, and the genera are the principles of the definitions, it is necessary that the genera are also the principles of the definable things.
κἂν εἰ ἔστι τὴν τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην τὸ τῶν εἰδῶν λαβεῖν καθʼ ἃ λέγονται τὰ ὄντα, τῶν γε εἰδῶν ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη εἰσίν.
And if to acquire the science of existing things is to acquire the forms according to which existing things are spoken of, the genera are at least the principles of the forms.
φαίνονται δέ τινες καὶ τῶν λεγόντων στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ὡς γένεσιν αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι. —ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀμφοτέρως γε οἷόν τε λέγειν τὰς ἀρχάς.
And some of those who call the One or Being or the Great and Small elements of existing things seem to use them as genera. —Yet indeed, it is not possible to speak of the principles in both ways.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας εἷς· ἕτερος δʼ ἔσται ὁ διὰ τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἐνυπαρχόντων. —πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη εἰσί, πότερον δεῖ νομίζειν τὰ πρῶτα τῶν γενῶν ἀρχὰς ἢ τὰ ἔσχατα κατηγορούμενα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων;
For the definition of the substance is one; but the definition through the genera will be different from that which states the immanent components of which it consists. —In addition to these, even if the genera are principles in the highest degree, should one consider the primary genera to be principles, or the ultimate ones predicated of individuals?
καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν.
For this too is open to dispute.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἀρχαί, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἀνωτάτω τῶν γενῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ πάντων.
For if the universal is always more of a principle, it is clear that the highest genera are the principles; for these are spoken of concerning all things.
τοσαῦται οὖν ἔσονται ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων ὅσαπερ τὰ πρῶτα γένη, ὥστʼ ἔσται τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ἀρχαὶ καὶ οὐσίαι· ταῦτα γὰρ κατὰ πάντων μάλιστα λέγεται τῶν ὄντων.
Therefore, there will be as many principles of existing things as there are primary genera, so that both Being and the One will be principles and substances; for these are spoken of in the highest degree concerning all existing things.
οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἓν εἶναι γένος οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὄν· ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ τὰς διαφορὰς ἑκάστου γένους καὶ εἶναι καὶ μίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην, ἀδύνατον δὲ κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ εἴδη τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκείων διαφορῶν ἢ τὸ γένος ἄνευ τῶν αὐτοῦ εἰδῶν, ὥστʼ εἴπερ τὸ ἓν γένος ἢ τὸ ὄν, οὐδεμία διαφορὰ οὔτε ὂν οὔτε ἓν ἔσται.
But it is not possible for either the One or Being to be a single genus of existing things; for it is necessary for the differences of each genus both to be and for each to be one, but it is impossible for either the species of the genus to be predicated of their own differences, or the genus to be predicated without its own species, so that if the One or Being is a genus, no difference will be either Being or One.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ γένη, οὐδʼ ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη.
But indeed, if they are not genera, they will not be principles either, if indeed the genera are principles.
ἔτι καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ συλλαμβανόμενα μετὰ τῶν διαφορῶν ἔσται γένη μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων (νῦν δὲ τὰ μὲν δοκεῖ τὰ δʼ οὐ δοκει)· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραὶ ἀρχαὶ ἢ τὰ γένη· εἰ δὲ καὶ αὗται ἀρχαί, ἄπειροι ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀρχαὶ γίγνονται, ἄλλως τε κἄν τις τὸ πρῶτον γένος ἀρχὴν τιθῇ.
Further, the intermediates also, taken together with their differences, will be genera down to the individuals (though at present some are thought to be so and others are not); in addition to these, the differences are even more principles than the genera; and if these also are principles, the principles become, so to speak, infinite, especially if one posits the primary genus as a principle.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ μᾶλλόν γε ἀρχοειδὲς τὸ ἕν ἐστιν, ἓν δὲ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ἀδιαίρετον δὲ ἅπαν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ κατʼ εἶδος, πρότερον δὲ τὸ κατʼ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ γένη διαιρετὰ εἰς εἴδη, μᾶλλον ἂν ἓν τὸ ἔσχατον εἴη κατηγορούμενον· οὐ γάρ ἐστι γένος ἅνθρωπος τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων.
But indeed, if the One is more of the nature of a principle, and the indivisible is one, and everything is indivisible either in quantity or in form, and that which is indivisible in form is prior, and the genera are divisible into species, the ultimate predicate would be more of a One; for "man" is not the genus of particular men.
ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναί τι παρὰ ταῦτα (οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δυάς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ σχῆμα παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν σχημάτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων, σχολῇ τῶν γε ἄλλων ἔσται τὰ γένη παρὰ τὰ εἴδη· τούτων γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι γένη)· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀτόμοις οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δʼ ὕστερον.
Further, in those things in which there is a prior and a posterior, it is not possible that what is predicated of them should exist as something besides them (for example, if the dyad is the first of numbers, there will not be any number besides the species of numbers; and similarly, neither will there be a figure besides the species of figures; and if not of these, hardly will there be genera besides the species for other things; for it is of these that there seem in the highest degree to be genera); but among individuals there is not one that is prior and another posterior.
ἔτι ὅπου τὸ μὲν βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, ἀεὶ τὸ βέλτιον πρότερον· ὥστʼ οὐδὲ τούτων ἂν εἴη γένος. —ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων μᾶλλον φαίνεται τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορούμενα ἀρχαὶ εἶναι τῶν γενῶν· πάλιν δὲ πῶς αὖ δεῖ ταύτας ἀρχὰς ὑπολαβεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν.
Further, where one thing is better and another worse, the better is always prior; so that of these also there would be no genus. — From these considerations, then, it appears more that the predicates of individuals are principles rather than the genera; but again, how on the other hand one should assume these to be principles is not easy to say.
τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν δεῖ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ὧν ἀρχή, καὶ δύνασθαι εἶναι χωριζομένην αὐτῶν· τοιοῦτον δέ τι παρὰ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον εἶναι διὰ τί ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι, πλὴν ὅτι καθόλου κατηγορεῖται καὶ κατὰ πάντων;
For the principle and the cause must exist besides the things of which they are the principle, and must be able to exist separate from them; but why should one assume any such thing to exist besides the individual, except that it is predicated universally and of all of them?
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ διὰ τοῦτο, τὰ μᾶλλον καθόλου μᾶλλον θετέον ἀρχάς· ὥστε ἀρχαὶ τὰ πρῶτʼ ἂν εἴησαν γένη.
But indeed, if for this reason, the more universal must be posited more as principles; so that the primary genera would be the principles.