§3.4#1ἔστι δʼ ἐχομένη τε τούτων ἀπορία καὶ πασῶν χαλεπωτάτη καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτη θεωρῆσαι, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν.
There is an difficulty adjoining to these, which is both the most difficult of all and the most necessary to examine, with which our discussion is now concerned.
εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, τὰ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα ἄπειρα, τῶν δʼ ἀπείρων πῶς ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην;
For if there is nothing apart from individuals, and individuals are infinite, how is it possible to acquire science of what is infinite?
ᾗ γὰρ ἕν τι καὶ ταὐτόν, καὶ ᾗ καθόλου τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτῃ πάντα γνωρίζομεν. —ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι καὶ δεῖ τι εἶναι παρὰ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὰ γένη εἶναι παρὰ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, ἤτοι τὰ ἔσχατα ἢ τὰ πρῶτα· τοῦτο δʼ ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄρτι διηπορήσαμεν. —ἔτι εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ τι τῆς ὕλης, πότερον, εἰ ἔστι, παρὰ πάντα δεῖ εἶναί τι, ἢ παρὰ μὲν ἔνια εἶναι παρὰ δʼ ἔνια μὴ εἶναι, ἢ παρʼ οὐδέν;
For it is in so far as there is some one and the same thing, and in so far as some universal is present, that we know all things. —But indeed, if this is necessary, and there must be something apart from individuals, it would be necessary for the genera to exist apart from individuals, either the ultimate or the primary ones; but that this is impossible, we have just now argued as a difficulty. —Further, even if it is granted in the highest degree that there is something apart from the concrete whole when something is predicated of the matter, if there is, must there be something apart from all of them, or apart from some but not apart from others, or apart from none?
εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη νοητὸν ἀλλὰ πάντα αἰσθητὰ καὶ ἐπιστήμη οὐδενός, εἰ μή τις εἶναι λέγει τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην.
If, then, there is nothing apart from individuals, nothing would be intelligible, but all things would be sensible, and there would be science of nothing, unless one says that sensation is science.
ἔτι δʼ οὐδʼ ἀΐδιον οὐθὲν οὐδʼ ἀκίνητον (τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ πάντα φθείρεται καὶ ἐν κινήσει ἐστίν)· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀΐδιον μηθέν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γένεσιν εἶναι δυνατόν.
Further, there would be nothing eternal or immovable (for all sensible things perish and are in motion); but indeed, if there is nothing eternal, neither is it possible for there to be generation.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τι τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται καὶ τούτων τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγένητον, εἴπερ ἵσταταί τε καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον·
For there must be something that is generated and something from which it is generated, and the ultimate of these must be ungenerated, if indeed the series stops and it is impossible for something to be generated from non-being.
ἔτι δὲ γενέσεως οὔσης καὶ κινήσεως ἀνάγκη καὶ πέρας εἶναι (οὔτε γὰρ ἄπειρός ἐστιν οὐδεμία κίνησις ἀλλὰ πάσης ἔστι τέλος, γίγνεσθαί τε οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι· τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκη εἶναι ὅτε πρῶτον γέγονεν)·
Further, if there is generation and motion, there must also be a limit (for no motion is infinite, but of every motion there is an end, and it is impossible for that to be generated which cannot have been generated; and that which has been generated must exist when it first has been generated).
ἔτι δʼ εἴπερ ἡ ὕλη ἔστι διὰ τὸ ἀγένητος εἶναι, πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον εὔλογον εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅ ποτε ἐκείνη γίγνεται· εἰ γὰρ μήτε τοῦτο ἔσται μήτε ἐκείνη, οὐθὲν ἔσται τὸ παράπαν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον, τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος. —εἰ δʼ αὖ τις τοῦτο θήσει, ἀπορία ἐπὶ τίνων τε θήσει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τίνων οὔ.
Further, if indeed matter exists because of its being ungenerated, much more still is it reasonable for the substance to exist, which that matter at some time becomes; for if neither this nor that is to exist, nothing at all will exist; and if this is impossible, there must be something apart from the concrete whole, namely the shape and the form. —But if, on the other hand, someone posits this, there is a difficulty as to in what cases he will posit this and in what cases not.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων οὐχ οἷόν τε, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν θείημεν εἶναί τινα οἰκίαν παρὰ τὰς τινὰς οἰκίας.
For that it is not possible in all cases is clear; for we would not posit that there is some house apart from the particular houses.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πότερον ἡ οὐσία μία πάντων ἔσται, οἷον τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
In addition to these, will the substance of all things be one, for instance of all men?
ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον· ἓν γὰρ πάντα ὧν ἡ οὐσία μία.
But that is absurd; for all things of which the substance is one are one.
ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα;
But are they many and different?
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλογον.
But this too is unreasonable.
ἅμα δὲ καὶ πῶς γίγνεται ἡ ὕλη τούτων ἕκαστον καὶ ἔστι τὸ σύνολον ἄμφω ταῦτα; —ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τόδε ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις.
And at the same time, how does matter become each of these, and how is the concrete whole both of these? —Further, concerning the principles one might also raise this difficulty.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἴδει εἰσὶν ἕν, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀριθμῷ ἕν, οὐδʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν· καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι πῶς ἔσται, εἰ μή τι ἔσται ἓν ἐπὶ πάντων; —ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἀριθμῷ ἓν καὶ μία ἑκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄλλαι ἄλλων (οἷον τῆσδε τῆς συλλαβῆς τῷ εἴδει τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἴδει αἱ αὐταί· καὶ γὰρ αὗται ὑπάρχουσιν ἀριθμῷ ἕτεραι),—εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἀλλʼ αἱ τῶν ὄντων ἀρχαὶ ἀριθμῷ ἕν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα οὐθὲν ἕτερον· τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἢ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον λέγειν διαφέρει οὐθέν· οὕτω γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον, τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἕν, καθόλου δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων.
For if they are one in form, nothing will be one in number, not even the One itself and Being; and how will knowing be possible, if there is not to be some one thing over all things? —But indeed, if each of the principles is one in number, and not as in the case of sensible things, different for different things (for example, while this syllable is the same in form as another, its principles are also the same in form; for these also exist as different in number), —if it is not so, but the principles of existing things are one in number, there will be nothing else apart from the elements; for to say "one in number" or "individual" makes no difference; for this is how we speak of the individual, as "one in number", and of the universal as "over these".
ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἀριθμῷ ἦν στοιχεῖα ὡρισμένα, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἂν τοσαῦτα εἶναι τὰ πάντα γράμματα ὅσαπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, μὴ ὄντων γε δύο τῶν αὐτῶν μηδὲ πλειόνων.
Just as, then, if the elements of speech were limited in number, it would be necessary that all the letters should be as many as the elements, since there are not two or more of the same.