§3.2#1πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ ὧν πρῶτον εἴπομεν, πότερον μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι πάντα τὰ γένη τῶν αἰτίων.
First, then, concerning those matters which we discussed first: whether it belongs to one science or to several to investigate all the classes of causes.
μιᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης πῶς ἂν εἴη μὴ ἐναντίας οὔσας τὰς ἀρχὰς γνωρίζειν;
For how could it belong to one science to know the principles if they are not contrary to one another?
ἔτι δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων οὐχ ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι·
Further, all causes do not belong to many of the existing things.
τίνα γὰρ τρόπον οἷόν τε κινήσεως ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ἢ τὴν τἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἴπερ ἅπαν ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν τέλος ἐστὶν καὶ οὕτως αἴτιον ὅτι ἐκείνου ἕνεκα καὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἔστι τἆλλα, τὸ δὲ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα πράξεώς τινός ἐστι τέλος, αἱ δὲ πράξεις πᾶσαι μετὰ κινήσεως;
For in what way is it possible for there to be a principle of motion or the nature of the good for unmovable things, if indeed everything that is good in itself and through its own nature is an end, and is a cause in this way, namely, that for the sake of it other things both come to be and exist, and the end and that for the sake of which is the end of some action, and all actions involve motion?
ὥστʼ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο ταύτην εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδʼ εἶναί τι αὐτοαγαθόν.
So that in unmovable things it would not be possible for this principle to exist, nor for there to be any good-in-itself.
διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν οὐθὲν δείκνυται διὰ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, οὐδʼ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐδεμία διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν μέμνηται οὐθεὶς οὐθενὸς τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινὲς οἷον Ἀρίστιππος προεπηλάκιζεν αὐτάς·
Therefore, in mathematics, too, nothing is demonstrated through this cause, nor is there any demonstration because something is "better" or "worse"; indeed, no one makes any mention of any such thing at all.
ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οἷον ἐν τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.
As a result, because of this, some of the sophists, such as Aristippus, used to treat mathematics with contempt; for in the other arts, even the vulgar ones, such as carpentry and shoemaking, everything is said to be "better" or "worse", but the mathematical sciences make no mention of goods and evils.
—ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε πλείους ἐπιστῆμαι τῶν αἰτίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἑτέρα ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς, τίνα τούτων φατέον εἶναι τὴν ζητουμένην, ἢ τίνα μάλιστα τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ ζητουμένου ἐπιστήμονα τῶν ἐχόντων αὐτάς;
—But indeed, if there are several sciences of the causes, and a different one for a different principle, which of these must we say is the one we are seeking, or whom among those who possess them must we say is most of all a knower of the thing we are seeking?
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς τῶν αἰτίων ὑπάρχειν, οἷον οἰκίας ὅθεν μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἡ τέχνη καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος, οὗ δʼ ἕνεκα τὸ ἔργον, ὕλη δὲ γῆ καὶ λίθοι, τὸ δʼ εἶδος ὁ λόγος.
For it is possible for all the modes of causes to belong to the same thing: for example, in the case of a house, the source of motion is the art and the builder, that for the sake of which is the product, the matter is earth and stones, and the form is the definition.
ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν πάλαι διωρισμένων τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν σοφίαν ἔχει λόγον ἑκάστην προσαγορεύειν· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχικωτάτη καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτη καὶ ᾗ ὥσπερ δούλας οὐδʼ ἀντειπεῖν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας δίκαιον, ἡ τοῦ τέλους καὶ τἀγαθοῦ τοιαύτη (τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τἆλλα), ᾗ δὲ τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων καὶ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ διωρίσθη εἶναι, ἡ τῆς οὐσίας ἂν εἴη τοιαύτη·
From what was defined long ago, then, there is a reason to call each of the sciences "wisdom." For insofar as one is most authoritative and commanding, and such that it is not right for the other sciences, like slaves, even to contradict it, the science of the end and of the good is of this character (for the sake of this, indeed, other things exist); but insofar as wisdom was defined as being of the first causes and of that which is most knowable, the science of substance would be of this character.
πολλαχῶς γὰρ ἐπισταμένων τὸ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον μὲν εἰδέναι φαμὲν τὸν τῷ εἶναι γνωρίζοντα τί τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ τῷ μὴ εἶναι, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον, καὶ μάλιστα τὸν τί ἐστιν ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν πόσον ἢ ποῖον ἢ τί ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν πέφυκεν.
For since we know the same thing in many ways, we say that he knows more who recognizes what the thing is by its being than by its not-being; and among these very people, one knows more than another, and most of all he who knows what it is, and not he who knows how much or of what sort it is, or what it is naturally active or passive in.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἰδέναι ἕκαστον καὶ ὧν ἀποδείξεις εἰσί, τότʼ οἰόμεθα ὑπάρχειν ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν (οἷον τί ἐστι τὸ τετραγωνίζειν, ὅτι μέσης εὕρεσις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), περὶ δὲ τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν μεταβολὴν ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως·
Further, in other cases, too, we think that knowing each thing, even of those things of which there are demonstrations, belongs to us when we know what it is (for example, what is squaring, namely, the finding of a mean proportional; and similarly in other cases); but concerning generations and actions and all change, we think we know when we know the principle of motion.
τοῦτο δʼ ἕτερον καὶ ἀντικείμενον τῷ τέλει, ὥστʼ ἄλλης ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τὸ θεωρῆσαι τῶν αἰτίων τούτων ἕκαστον. —ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν ἀρχῶν, πότερον μιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης ἢ πλειόνων, ἀμφισβητήσιμόν ἐστιν (λέγω δὲ ἀποδεικτικὰς τὰς κοινὰς δόξας ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες δεικνύουσιν) οἷον ὅτι πᾶν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, καὶ ἀδύνατον ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται προτάσεις, πότερον μία τούτων ἐπιστήμη καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἢ ἑτέρα, κἂν εἰ μὴ μία, ποτέραν χρὴ προσαγορεύειν τὴν ζητουμένην νῦν.
But this is different from and opposite to the end, so that it would seem to belong to a different science to investigate each of these causes.—But indeed, concerning the demonstrative principles also, whether they belong to one science or to several is a matter of dispute (and by demonstrative principles I mean the common opinions from which everyone demonstrates), for example, that it is necessary either to affirm or to deny everything, and that it is impossible at the same time to be and not to be, and all other such propositions: whether there is one science of these and of substance, or a different one; and if not one, which of the two must we call the one we are seeking now?
μιᾶς μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὔλογον εἶναι· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον γεωμετρίας ἢ ὁποιασοῦν περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ ἐπαΐειν;
Now, that they should belong to one science is not reasonable; for why is it more peculiar to geometry or to any other science to understand these?
εἴπερ οὖν ὁμοίως μὲν ὁποιασοῦν ἐστίν, ἁπασῶν δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως οὐδὲ τῆς γνωριζούσης τὰς οὐσίας ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ γιγνώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν.
If, therefore, it belongs equally to any science whatever, but cannot belong to all, just as it does not belong to the others, so it is not peculiar to the science which recognizes substances to know about them.
ἅμα δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμη;
And at the same time, in what way will there be a science of them?
τί μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον τούτων τυγχάνει ὂν καὶ νῦν γνωρίζομεν (χρῶνται γοῦν ὡς γιγνωσκομένοις αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι)·
For what each of these happens to be, we recognize even now (at any rate, other arts use them as being recognized).
εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐστί, δεήσει τι γένος εἶναι ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη τὰ δʼ ἀξιώματʼ αὐτῶν (περὶ πάντων γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι), ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἔκ τινων εἶναι καὶ περί τι καὶ τινῶν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν·
But if there is a demonstrative science of them, there will have to be some underlying genus, and some of them will be properties and others its axioms (for it is impossible for there to be demonstration of all things), since demonstration must proceed from certain things, concern a certain thing, and be of certain things.
ὥστε συμβαίνει πάντων εἶναι γένος ἕν τι τῶν δεικνυμένων, πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀποδεικτικαὶ χρῶνται τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν. —ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἑτέρα ἡ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων, ποτέρα κυριωτέρα καὶ προτέρα πέφυκεν αὐτῶν;
So that it follows that there is some one genus of all the things demonstrated, since all the demonstrative sciences use the axioms.—But indeed, if the science of substance and that concerning these principles are different, which of them is by nature more authoritative and prior?
καθόλου γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ πάντων ἀρχαὶ τὰ ἀξιώματά ἐστιν, εἴ τʼ ἐστὶ μὴ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τίνος ἔσται περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλου τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος;
For the axioms are most universal of all and are principles of all things; and if they do not belong to the philosopher, to what other will it belong to investigate truth and falsehood concerning them?—And in general, is there one science of all substances or several?
—ὅλως τε τῶν οὐσιῶν πότερον μία πασῶν ἐστὶν ἢ πλείους ἐπιστῆμαι; εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ μία, ποίας οὐσίας θετέον τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτην;
If, then, there is not one, of what sort of substance must we posit this science?
τὸ δὲ μίαν πασῶν οὐκ εὔλογον·
But that there should be one of all is not reasonable.