§3.1ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς πρῶτον περὶ ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειλήφασί τινες, κἂν εἴ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνει παρεωραμένον.
With a view to the science which we are seeking, it is necessary for us first to address those questions about which we must first raise difficulties; and these are all the points on which some thinkers have held different views, and anything else besides these that happens to have been overlooked.
ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν, ἀλλʼ ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος·
For those who wish to find a way through, it is advantageous to state the difficulties well; for the subsequent finding of the way is the solution of the previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a knot if one does not know it, but the difficulty of thought reveals this concerning the matter.
ᾗ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ, ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν.
For insofar as thought is in difficulty, it has suffered something similar to those who are bound; for in both cases it is impossible to go forward.
διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδʼ εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν ἢ μὴ γιγνώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον.
Therefore, one must have investigated all the difficulties beforehand, both for these reasons and because those who seek without first stating the difficulties are like those who do not know where they must walk, and in addition to this, they do not even know whether they have ever found what they seek or not; for the end is not clear to the former, but to the one who has previously raised the difficulties, it is clear.
ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρῖναι τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων. —ἔστι δʼ ἀπορία πρώτη μὲν περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πεφροιμιασμένοις διηπορήσαμεν, πότερον μιᾶς ἢ πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας· καὶ πότερον τὰς τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἰδεῖν μόνον ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐξ ὧν δεικνύουσι πάντες, οἷον πότερον ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἢ οὔ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων·
Further, one must necessarily be in a better position to judge if one has heard, as it were, all the opposing and disputing arguments.—And the first difficulty is on the subjects we discussed in the introductory remarks: whether it belongs to one science or to many to investigate the causes; and whether it belongs to science to see only the first principles of substance, or also concerning the principles from which everyone demonstrates—for example, whether it is possible at the same time to affirm and deny the same and single thing or not, and concerning other such matters.
εἴ τʼ ἐστι περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, πότερον μία περὶ πάσας ἢ πλείονές εἰσι, κἂν εἰ πλείονες πότερον ἅπασαι συγγενεῖς ἢ τὰς μὲν σοφίας τὰς δὲ ἄλλο τι λεκτέον αὐτῶν.
And if it is about substance, whether there is one science for all substances or several; and if several, whether they are all akin, or whether some must be called wisdom and others something else.
καὶ τοῦτο δʼ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ ζητῆσαι, πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μόνον φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ πότερον μοναχῶς ἢ πλείονα γένη τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ ποιοῦντες τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν.
And this itself is one of the necessary questions to seek: whether we must say that sensible substances alone exist, or others besides these as well; and whether there is only one kind or several kinds of substances, as is held by those who posit both the Forms and the mathematical objects between these and sensible things.
περί τε τούτων οὖν, καθάπερ φαμέν, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία μόνον ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθʼ αὑτὰ ταῖς οὐσίαις, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίου καὶ ἐναντιότητος, καὶ περὶ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων περὶ ὅσων οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ πειρῶνται σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων μόνων ποιούμενοι τὴν σκέψιν, τίνος ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι περὶ πάντων·
Therefore, as we say, we must investigate these matters, and also whether the inquiry is only about substances or also about the accidents that belong in themselves to substances; and in addition to these, concerning the same and the other, the like and the unlike, and contrariety, and prior and posterior, and all other such terms about which the dialecticians try to inquire, making their investigation from reputable opinions alone—to what science does it belong to investigate all these?
ἔτι δὲ τούτοις αὐτοῖς ὅσα καθʼ αὑτὰ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τί ἐστι τούτων ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἆρα ἓν ἑνὶ ἐναντίον·
Further, we must inquire into the accidental properties of these very things, and not only what each of them is, but also whether one thing has only one contrary.
καὶ πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἕκαστον·
And whether the principles and elements are the genera, or the parts into which each thing is divided and which are inherent in it.
καὶ εἰ τὰ γένη, πότερον ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις λέγεται τελευταῖα ἢ τὰ πρῶτα, οἷον πότερον ζῷον ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἀρχή τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἔστι παρὰ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον.
And if they are the genera, whether they are those which are predicated last of the individuals, or the first—for example, whether "animal" or "man" is the principle and exists to a greater degree apart from the individual.
μάλιστα δὲ ζητητέον καὶ πραγματευτέον πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὴν ὕλην αἴτιον καθʼ αὑτὸ ἢ οὔ, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστὸν ἢ οὔ, καὶ πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον (λέγω δὲ τὸ σύνολον, ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ τι τῆς ὕλης) ἢ οὐθέν, ἢ τῶν μὲν τῶν δʼ οὔ, καὶ ποῖα τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων.
Most of all, we must investigate and discuss whether there is any cause in itself besides matter or not, and whether this is separable or not, and whether it is one or more in number; and whether there is anything besides the concrete whole (and I mean by the concrete whole, when something is predicated of the matter) or nothing, or is there for some but not for others, and what sort of existing things these are.
ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ πότερον ἀριθμῷ ἢ εἴδει ὡρισμέναι, καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ;
Further, are the principles limited in number or in species, both those in the definitions and those in the substrate?
καὶ πότερον τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ ἀφθάρτων αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, καὶ πότερον ἄφθαρτοι πᾶσαι ἢ τῶν φθαρτῶν φθαρταί;
And are those of perishable and of imperishable things the same or different, and are they all imperishable, or are those of perishable things themselves perishable?
ἔτι δὲ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώτατον καὶ πλείστην ἀπορίαν ἔχον, πότερον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἀλλʼ οὐσία τῶν ὄντων; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶ φιλίαν ἄλλος δέ τις πῦρ ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα·
And most difficult of all and causing the greatest perplexity is whether "the one" and "being", as the Pythagoreans and Plato said, are not something else but the substance of existing things; or is this not so, but is the substrate something else—as Empedocles says "love", and another says "fire", and another "water" or "air"?
καὶ πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔτι πότερον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ κίνησιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν ἂν παράσχοι πολλήν.
And whether the principles are universal or like individual things, and whether they exist in potentiality or in actuality; further, whether they exist in any other way than in relation to movement; for these questions also would present great difficulty.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινές εἰσιν ἢ οὔ, κἂν εἰ οὐσίαι πότερον κεχωρισμέναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τούτοις;
In addition to these, are numbers, lengths, figures, and points certain substances or not? And if they are substances, are they separated from sensible things or inherent in them?
περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥᾴδιον καλῶς.
For concerning all these matters, it is not only difficult to find the truth, but it is not even easy to state the difficulties well in argument.