§14.3#1οἱ μὲν οὖν τιθέμενοι τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι, καὶ ἀριθμοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι, τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ἑκάστου παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἕν τι ἕκαστον πειρῶνταί γε λέγειν πως διὰ τί ἔστιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἐπεὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖα οὔτε δυνατὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν διά γε ταῦτα εἶναι λεκτέον·
Now those who posit that the Ideas exist, and that they are numbers, by taking each single thing for each case apart from the many according to the exposition, try at least to explain in some way why they exist; nevertheless, since these things are neither necessary nor possible, one must not say that number exists for these reasons.
οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι διὰ τὸ ὁρᾶν πολλὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθη ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς σώμασιν, εἶναι μὲν ἀριθμοὺς ἐποίησαν τὰ ὄντα, οὐ χωριστοὺς δέ, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ ὄντα·
On the other hand, the Pythagoreans, because they saw many properties of numbers belonging to sensible bodies, made existing things to be numbers, not indeed as separable, but made existing things out of numbers.
διὰ τί δέ;
And why?
ὅτι τὰ πάθη τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις.
Because the properties of numbers exist in harmony, both in the heaven and in many other things.
τοῖς δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀριθμὸν οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον ἐνδέχεται λέγειν κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται αὐτῶν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐλέγετο.
But for those who say that only mathematical number exists, it is not possible to say any such thing according to their hypotheses, but it was said that their sciences would not exist.
ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον.
But we say that they do exist, just as we said before.
καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ μαθηματικά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν κεχωρισμένων τὰ πάθη ὑπῆρχεν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν.
And it is clear that mathematical objects are not separated; for if they were separated, their properties would not exist in bodies.
οἱ μὲν οὖν Πυθαγόρειοι κατὰ μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐθενὶ ἔνοχοί εἰσιν, κατὰ μέντοι τὸ ποιεῖν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, ἐκ μὴ ἐχόντων βάρος μηδὲ κουφότητα ἔχοντα κουφότητα καὶ βάρος, ἐοίκασι περὶ ἄλλου οὐρανοῦ λέγειν καὶ σωμάτων ἀλλʼ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν·
Therefore, while the Pythagoreans are not liable to any charge in this respect, yet in respect of making physical bodies out of numbers, making things that have lightness and weight out of things that have neither weight nor lightness, they seem to be speaking about another heaven and other bodies, and not about the sensible ones.
οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ἀξιώματα, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σαίνει τὴν ψυχήν, εἶναί τε ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ χωριστὰ εἶναι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ μαθηματικά.
But those who make them separate, because the axioms will not be true of sensible things, while the statements made are true and soothe the soul, assume that they both exist and are separate; and similarly with mathematical magnitudes.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἐναντιούμενος λόγος τἀναντία ἐρεῖ, καὶ ὃ ἄρτι ἠπορήθη λυτέον τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσι, διὰ τί οὐδαμῶς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπαρχόντων τὰ πάθη ὑπάρχει αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς.
It is clear, then, that the opposing argument also will say the contrary, and the difficulty which was just raised must be solved by those who speak in this way: why, if they do not exist in sensible things at all, do their properties exist in sensible things?
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ ἐκ τοῦ πέρατα εἶναι καὶ ἔσχατα τὴν στιγμὴν μὲν γραμμῆς, ταύτην δʼ ἐπιπέδου, τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ, οἴονται εἶναι ἀνάγκην τοιαύτας φύσεις εἶναι.
And there are some who, from the fact that points are the limits and extremities of a line, the line of a plane, and the plane of a solid, think that there must be such natures.
δεῖ δὴ καὶ τοῦτον ὁρᾶν τὸν λόγον, μὴ λίαν ᾖ μαλακός.
We must indeed examine this argument too, lest it be too weak.
οὔτε γὰρ οὐσίαι εἰσὶ τὰ ἔσχατα ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πάντα ταῦτα πέρατα (ἑπεὶ καὶ τῆς βαδίσεως καὶ ὅλως κινήσεως ἔστι τι πέρας· τοῦτʼ οὖν ἔσται τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία τις·
For extremities are not substances, but rather all these are limits (since there is also some limit of walking and of motion in general; will this then be a 'this' and some substance?
ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον)·
But that is absurd).
—οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ εἰσί, τῶνδε τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔσονται πάντα (ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ ὁ λόγος εἴρηκεν)· διὰ τί οὖν χωριστὰ ἔσται; —ἔτι δὲ ἐπιζητήσειεν ἄν τις μὴ λίαν εὐχερὴς ὢν περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ παντὸς καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν τὸ μηθὲν συμβάλλεσθαι ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρότερα τοῖς ὕστερον (μὴ ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐθὲν ἧττον τὰ μεγέθη ἔσται τοῖς τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον εἶναι φαμένοις, καὶ τούτων μὴ ὄντων ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὰ σώματα τὰ αἰσθητά·
Nevertheless, even if they do exist, they will all be limits of these sensible things (for the argument was spoken of these); why then will they be separate? — And further, one who is not too credulous might inquire concerning all number and mathematical objects, why the prior contribute nothing to the posterior (for if number does not exist, magnitudes will exist no less for those who say that only mathematical objects exist, and if these do not exist, the soul and sensible bodies will still exist;