§14.2#2ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ ὅπως μὲν πολλὰ τὸ ὂν τὸ τί ἐστι ζητῆσαι, πῶς δὲ ἢ ποιὰ ἢ ποσά, μή.
Indeed, it is absurd to inquire how being in the sense of 'what it is' is many, but not how it is many in the sense of quality or quantity.
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ δυὰς ἡ ἀόριστος αἰτία οὐδὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ δύο λευκὰ ἢ πολλὰ εἶναι χρώματα ἢ χυμοὺς ἢ σχήματα· ἀριθμοὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ταῦτα ἦσαν καὶ μονάδες.
For surely the indefinite dyad or the great and small is not the cause of there being two white things, or many colors or flavors or shapes; for then these too would be numbers and units.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ταῦτʼ ἐπῆλθον, εἶδον ἂν τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνοις· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον αἴτιον.
But indeed, if they had gone into these things, they would have seen the cause in those cases as well; for the cause is the same and analogous.
αὕτη γὰρ ἡ παρέκβασις αἰτία καὶ τοῦ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ζητοῦντας τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῷ ἑνί, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τούτων τὰ ὄντα, τὸ πρός τι καὶ τὸ ἄνισον ὑποθεῖναι, ὃ οὔτʼ ἐναντίον οὔτʼ ἀπόφασις ἐκείνων, μία τε φύσις τῶν ὄντων ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί καὶ τὸ ποῖον.
For this deviation is the cause of their positing, while seeking the opposite of being and the one, from which along with them existing things arise, the relative and the unequal, which is neither the contrary nor the negation of those, but is a single nature among existing things, just like 'what' and 'what quality'.
καὶ ζητεῖν ἔδει καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς πολλὰ τὰ πρός τι ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕν· νῦν δὲ πῶς μὲν πολλαὶ μονάδες παρὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἓν ζητεῖται, πῶς δὲ πολλὰ ἄνισα παρὰ τὸ ἄνισον οὐκέτι.
And they ought to have inquired into this too, how relatives are many and not one; but as it is, they inquire how there are many units besides the first one, but no longer how there are many unequals besides the unequal.
καίτοι χρῶνται καὶ λέγουσι μέγα μικρόν, πολὺ ὀλίγον, ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἀριθμοί, μακρὸν βραχύ, ἐξ ὧν τὸ μῆκος, πλατὺ στενόν, ἐξ ὧν τὸ ἐπίπεδον, βαθὺ ταπεινόν, ἐξ ὧν οἱ ὄγκοι· καὶ ἔτι δὴ πλείω εἴδη λέγουσι τοῦ πρός τι· τούτοις δὴ τί αἴτιον τοῦ πολλὰ εἶναι; —ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ὑποθεῖναι τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ἑκάστῳ (τοῦτο δὲ προσαπεφήνατο ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, τί τὸ δυνάμει τόδε καὶ οὐσία, μὴ ὂν δὲ καθʼ αὑτό, ὅτι τὸ πρός τι, ὥσπερ εἰ εἶπε τὸ ποιόν, ὃ οὔτε δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ ὂν οὔτε ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλʼ ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων), πολύ τε μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, εἰ ἐζήτει πῶς πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, μὴ τὰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ κατηγορίᾳ ζητεῖν, πῶς πολλαὶ οὐσίαι ἢ πολλὰ ποιά, ἀλλὰ πῶς πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα·
And yet they employ and speak of great and small, much and few, from which numbers come; long and short, from which length comes; wide and narrow, from which plane comes; deep and shallow, from which volumes come; and they even speak of still more species of the relative; what, then, is the cause of these being many? — Therefore, as we say, it is necessary to assume that which is potentially for each category (and the one who says these things further declared what is potentially 'this' and substance, yet is non-being in itself, namely that it is the relative, just as if he had said quality, which is neither potentially the one or being, nor a negation of the one nor of being, but a single one of existing things), and much more, as was said, if he was inquiring how existing things are many, he should not inquire into those in the same category, how there are many substances or many qualities, but how existing things are many; for some are substances, some affections, and some relatives.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίαι τὰ δὲ πάθη τὰ δὲ πρός τι. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἔχει τινὰ καὶ ἄλλην ἐπίστασιν πῶς πολλά (διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ χωριστὰ εἶναι τῷ τὸ ὑποκείμενον πολλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ εἶναι ποιά τε πολλὰ καὶ ποσά· καίτοι δεῖ γέ τινα εἶναι ὕλην ἑκάστῳ γένει, πλὴν χωριστὴν ἀδύνατον τῶν οὐσιῶν)· ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῶν τόδε τι ἔχει τινὰ λόγον πῶς πολλὰ τὸ τόδε τι, εἰ μή τι ἔσται καὶ τόδε τι καὶ φύσις τις τοιαύτη· αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖθεν μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπορία, πῶς πολλαὶ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐσίαι ἀλλʼ οὐ μία.
Now in the case of the other categories, the question of how they are many admits of some other consideration (for because they are not separable, it is by the substratum becoming and being many that many qualities and quantities exist; although there must be some matter for each genus, except that it is impossible for it to be separable from substances); but in the case of 'this', the question of how 'this' is many has some reason, unless there is to be some 'this' and some nature of this kind; and this is rather the difficulty from that other quarter, how there are many actual substances and not just one.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ μὴ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ τόδε καὶ τὸ ποσόν, οὐ λέγεται πῶς καὶ διὰ τί πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πῶς ποσὰ πολλά.
Moreover, even if 'this' and 'quantity' are not the same, it is not explained how and why existing things are many, but only how quantities are many.
ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς ποσόν τι σημαίνει, καὶ ἡ μονάς, εἰ μὴ μέτρον καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον.
For all number signifies some quantity, and so does the unit, unless it is a measure and that which is indivisible in respect of quantity.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὐ λέγεται τὸ τί ἐστιν ἐκ τίνος οὐδὲ πῶς πολλά· εἰ δὲ ταὐτό, πολλὰς ὑπομένει ὁ λέγων ἐναντιώσεις. —ἐπιστήσειε δʼ ἄν τις τὴν σκέψιν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πόθεν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὴν πίστιν ὡς εἰσίν.
If, then, quantity and 'what it is' are different, it is not explained from what 'what it is' comes, nor how it is many; but if they are the same, the one who says so must undergo many contradictions. — One might also direct one's attention to the inquiry concerning numbers, as to whence one should obtain the conviction that they exist.
τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἰδέας τιθεμένῳ παρέχονταί τινʼ αἰτίαν τοῖς οὖσιν, εἴπερ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέα τις ἡ δʼ ἰδέα τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ὃν δή ποτε τρόπον (ἔστω γὰρ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς τοῦτο)· τῷ δὲ τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον οὐκ οἰομένῳ διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐνούσας δυσχερείας ὁρᾶν περὶ τὰς ἰδέας ὥστε διά γε ταῦτα μὴ ποιεῖν ἀριθμούς, ποιοῦντι δὲ ἀριθμὸν τὸν μαθηματικόν, πόθεν τε χρὴ πιστεῦσαι ὡς ἔστι τοιοῦτος ἀριθμός, καὶ τί τοῖς ἄλλοις χρήσιμος;
For to the one who posits Ideas, they provide some cause for existing things, if indeed each of the numbers is some Idea, and the Idea is the cause of being to other things in whatever way that may be (for let this be assumed for them); but to the one who does not think in this way, because he sees the difficulties inherent in the Ideas so that at least for these reasons he does not make numbers, but who posits mathematical number, from what source must we believe that such a number exists, and of what use is it to other things?
οὐθενὸς γὰρ οὔτε φησὶν ὁ λέγων αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ὡς αὐτήν τινα λέγει καθʼ αὑτὴν φύσιν οὖσαν, οὔτε φαίνεται ὢν αἴτιος· τὰ γὰρ θεωρήματα τῶν ἀριθμητικῶν πάντα καὶ κατὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπάρξει, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη.
For the one who says it exists does not say it is the cause of anything, but speaks of it as being some nature in itself, nor does it appear to be a cause; for all the theorems of arithmeticians will hold good also of sensible things, as was said.