§14.2#1ἁπλῶς δὲ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἆρα δυνατὸν τὰ ἀΐδια ἐκ στοιχείων συγκεῖσθαι; ὕλην γὰρ ἕξει· σύνθετον γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ στοιχείων.
Generally, we must consider whether it is possible for eternal things to be composed of elements; for they will have matter, since everything composed of elements is composite.
εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη, ἐξ οὗ ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστι, κἄν, εἰ ἐγένετο, ἐκ τούτου γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται δὲ πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦτο ὃ γίγνεται (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου οὐδὲ ἦν), τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ μή, εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀεὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο ὕλην ἔχον, ἐνδέχοιτʼ ἂν μὴ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μίαν ἡμέραν ἔχον καὶ τὸ ὁποσαοῦν ἔτη· εἰ δʼ οὕτω, καὶ τὸ τοσοῦτον χρόνον οὗ μὴ ἔστι πέρας.
If, then, it is necessary that a thing be generated from that of which it consists, even if it always exists, and if it were to be generated, it would be generated from this, and if everything that is generated is generated from that which is potentially this which it becomes (for it would not have been generated from the impossible, nor would it have existed), and if that which is potential is capable both of acting and of not acting, then, even if number or anything else that has matter exists ever so much eternally, it would be capable of not being, just like that which has existed for a single day or for any number of years; and if so, then also that which has existed for so long a time that there is no limit.
οὐκ ἂν τοίνυν εἴη ἀΐδια, εἴπερ μὴ ἀΐδιον τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις συνέβη πραγματευθῆναι.
Therefore, they would not be eternal, if indeed that which is capable of not being is not eternal, as it happened to be discussed in other discourses.
εἰ δέ ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον νῦν ἀληθὲς καθόλου, ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἀΐδιος οὐσία ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ ἐνέργεια, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ὕλη τῆς οὐσίας, οὐδεμιᾶς ἂν εἴη ἀϊδίου οὐσίας στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν ἐνυπαρχόντων.
But if what is now said is universally true, namely that no substance is eternal unless it is actuality, and elements are the matter of substance, there would be no elements of any eternal substance out of which, as inherent in it, it is composed.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ δυάδα μὲν ἀόριστον ποιοῦσι τὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς στοιχεῖον, τὸ δʼ ἄνισον δυσχεραίνουσιν εὐλόγως διὰ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀδύνατα·
But there are some who make the indefinite dyad the element along with the one, but object to the unequal with good reason, because of the impossible consequences that result.
οἷς τοσαῦτα μόνον ἀφῄρηται τῶν δυσχερῶν ὅσα διὰ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πρός τι στοιχεῖον ἀναγκαῖα συμβαίνει τοῖς λέγουσιν· ὅσα δὲ χωρὶς ταύτης τῆς δόξης, ταῦτα κἀκείνοις ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, ἐάν τε τὸν εἰδητικὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν ποιῶσιν ἐάν τε τὸν μαθηματικόν. —πολλὰ μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια τῆς ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἐκτροπῆς, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀπορῆσαι ἀρχαϊκῶς.
To these only so many of the difficulties are removed as necessarily happen to those who speak of the unequal and the relative as an element; but as many difficulties as exist apart from this opinion must also necessarily belong to them, whether they make the ideal number from them or the mathematical.— Now the causes of the deviation to these causes are many, but especially their puzzling in an archaic manner.
ἔδοξε γὰρ αὐτοῖς πάντʼ ἔσεσθαι ἓν τὰ ὄντα, αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν, εἰ μή τις λύσει καὶ ὁμόσε βαδιεῖται τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ
"οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα,"
ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὂν δεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστιν· οὕτω γάρ, ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἄλλου τινός, τὰ ὄντα ἔσεσθαι, εἰ πολλά ἐστιν.
For it seemed to them that all things that exist would be one, being itself, unless one should solve and confront the saying of Parmenides: 'For never shall this be forced, that things that are not exist,' but it is necessary to show that that which is not exists; for in this way, from that which is and something else, things that exist would be, if they are many.
καίτοι πρῶτον μέν, εἰ τὸ ὂν πολλαχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίαν σημαίνει, τὸ δʼ ὅτι ποιόν, τὸ δʼ ὅτι ποσόν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δὴ κατηγορίας), ποῖον οὖν τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἕν, εἰ μὴ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται;
And yet, first of all, if being is spoken of in many ways (for one signifies substance, another quality, another quantity, and indeed the other categories), in what way are all things that exist one, if that which is not is not to be?
πότερον αἱ οὐσίαι, ἢ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ πάντα, καὶ ἔσται ἓν τὸ τόδε καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε καὶ τὸ τοσόνδε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα ἕν τι σημαίνει;
Whether are the substances one, or the affections and the other categories likewise, or all of them, so that 'this', 'such', 'so much' and all other categories that signify a single thing will be one?
ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον, τὸ μίαν φύσιν τινὰ γενομένην αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὲν τόδε εἶναι τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε τὸ δὲ πού.
But it is absurd, or rather impossible, that some single nature should become the cause of the fact that of being, one part is 'this', another 'such', another 'so much', and another 'somewhere'.
ἔπειτα ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος καὶ ὄντος τὰ ὄντα;
Next, from what kind of non-being and being do existing things come?
πολλαχῶς γὰρ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ὄν· καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι σημαίνει τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοδί, τὸ δὲ μὴ εὐθὺ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοιονδί, τὸ δὲ μὴ τρίπηχυ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοσονδί.
For non-being also is spoken of in many ways, since being is so; and 'not being a man' signifies 'not being this', 'not being straight' signifies 'not being such', 'not being three cubits' signifies 'not being so much'.
ἐκ ποίου οὖν ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα;
From what kind of being and non-being, then, are the many existing things?
βούλεται μὲν δὴ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ταύτην τὴν φύσιν λέγειν τὸ οὐκ ὄν, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, διὸ καὶ ἐλέγετο ὅτι δεῖ ψεῦδός τι ὑποθέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὸ ποδιαίαν εἶναι τὴν μὴ ποδιαίαν·
To be sure, they wish to mean by 'that which is not' the false and this nature, from which and that which is, the many existing things are generated; wherefore it was also said that it is necessary to assume something false, just as geometers assume that which is not a foot long to be a foot long.
ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχειν, οὔτε γὰρ οἱ γεωμέτραι ψεῦδος οὐθὲν ὑποτίθενται (οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἡ πρότασις), οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ οὕτω μὴ ὄντος τὰ ὄντα γίγνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται.
But this cannot be so; for neither do geometers assume any falsehood (for the premise is not in the syllogism), nor do existing things come to be or perish from that which in this sense is not.
ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὰς πτώσεις μὴ ὂν ἰσαχῶς ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγεται, παρὰ τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ὡς ψεῦδος λέγεται μὴ ὂν καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν, ἐκ τούτου ἡ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀνθρώπου δυνάμει δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ λευκοῦ δυνάμει δὲ λευκοῦ λευκόν, ὁμοίως ἐάν τε ἕν τι γίγνηται ἐάν τε πολλά. —φαίνεται δὲ ἡ ζήτησις πῶς πολλὰ τὸ ὂν τὸ κατὰ τὰς οὐσίας λεγόμενον· ἀριθμοὶ γὰρ καὶ μήκη καὶ σώματα τὰ γεννώμενά ἐστιν.
But since non-being in respect of the cases is spoken of in as many ways as the categories, and besides this there is that which is spoken of as false and that which is in respect of potentiality, it is from the latter that generation takes place — from that which is not a man but is potentially a man, a man comes to be, and from that which is not white but is potentially white, a white thing comes to be, and likewise whether it is some one thing that comes to be or many.— But their inquiry seems to be how being, which is spoken of in respect of substances, is many; for the things that are generated are numbers and lengths and bodies.