§12.6ἐπεὶ δʼ ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία δʼ ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιόν τινα οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον.
Since there were three substances, two physical and one immovable, about this latter we must say that it is necessary that there should be some eternal immovable substance.
αἵ τε γὰρ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων, καὶ εἰ πᾶσαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά· ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι (ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν), οὐδὲ χρόνον.
For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible; but it is impossible that movement should either come into being or be destroyed (for it always was), nor yet time.
οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου· καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος· ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος.
For it is not possible that there should be "before" and "after" if time is not; and movement also, then, is continuous in the same way as time; for time is either the same as movement or some affection of movement.
κίνησις δʼ οὐκ ἔστι συνεχὴς ἀλλʼ ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλῳ.
But there is no continuous movement except movement in place, and of this only circular movement.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν.
But indeed, if there is something capable of moving or of acting, but not active, there will be no movement; for that which has power may not act.
οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδʼ ἐὰν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν ἀϊδίους, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἴδη, εἰ μή τις δυναμένη ἐνέσται ἀρχὴ μεταβάλλειν· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδʼ αὕτη ἱκανή, οὐδʼ ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἴδη· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις.
There is no use, then, even if we make eternal substances, as do those who assume the Ideas, unless there is in them some principle capable of causing change; nor, indeed, will this be sufficient, nor another substance besides the Ideas; for if it does not act, there will be no movement.
ἔτι οὐδʼ εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δʼ οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι.
Further, not even if it acts, but its substance is potentiality; for then there will be no eternal movement; for that which is in potentiality may fail to be.
δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια.
There must then be such a principle whose substance is actuality.
ἔτι τοίνυν ταύτας δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἄνευ ὕλης· ἀϊδίους γὰρ δεῖ, εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀΐδιον.
Further, then, these substances must be without matter; for they must be eternal, if indeed anything else is eternal.
ἐνέργεια ἄρα.
They must, then, be actuality.
καίτοι ἀπορία· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργοῦν πᾶν δύνασθαι τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον οὐ πᾶν ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε πρότερον εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν.
Yet there is a difficulty; for it seems that everything active is capable of acting, but not everything capable of acting is active, so that potentiality is prior.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, οὐθὲν ἔσται τῶν ὄντων· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δύνασθαι μὲν εἶναι μήπω δʼ εἶναι.
But indeed, if this is so, nothing of existing things will be; for it is possible for things to be capable of being and yet not to be.
καίτοι εἰ ὡς λέγουσιν οἱ θεολόγοι οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς γεννῶντες, ἢ ὡς οἱ φυσικοὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματά φασι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον.
And yet, if it is as the theologians say who generate all things from Night, or as the physicists say who say "all things were together", the same impossibility occurs.
πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μὴ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ τι αἴτιον;
For how will they be moved, if there is to be no cause in actuality?
οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε ὕλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπιμήνια οὐδʼ ἡ γῆ, ἀλλὰ τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ἡ γονή.
For matter will not move itself, but the craft of carpentry will; nor will the menses or the earth move themselves, but the seeds and the semen.
διὸ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων· ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί φασι κίνησιν.
Therefore some assume an eternal actuality, as do Leucippus and Plato; for they say that there is always movement.
ἀλλὰ διὰ τί καὶ τίνα οὐ λέγουσιν, οὐδʼ, εἰ ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί, τὴν αἰτίαν.
But why and what it is they do not say, nor, if it is in this way or that, do they state the cause.
οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἕσπερ νῦν φύσει μὲν ὡδί, βίᾳ δὲ ἢ ὑπὸ νοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ὡδί.
For nothing is moved by chance, but there must always be some cause present, just as now it is moved in this way by nature, and in that way by force or by intellect or by something else. (Then, which is first?
(εἶτα ποία πρώτη; διαφέρει γὰρ ἀμήχανον ὅσον).
For this makes an immense difference).
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν ἣν οἴεται ἐνίοτε ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχή, ὡς φησίν.
But indeed, neither is it possible for Plato to state what he sometimes thinks is the principle, namely, that which moves itself; for the soul is subsequent to and contemporary with the heaven, as he says.
τὸ μὲν δὴ δύναμιν οἴεσθαι ἐνεργείας πρότερον ἔστι μὲν ὡς καλῶς ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ (εἴρηται δὲ πῶς)· ὅτι δʼ ἐνέργεια πρότερον, μαρτυρεῖ Ἀναξαγόρας (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνέργεια) καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ λέγοντες κίνησιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ Λεύκιππος· ὥστʼ οὐκ ἦν ἄπειρον χρόνον χάος ἢ νύξ, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἢ περιόδῳ ἢ ἄλλως, εἴπερ πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως.
Now, to think that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another not (and how this is has been said); but that actuality is prior Anaxagoras witnesses (for intellect is actuality) and Empedocles with Love and Strife, and those who say that movement is eternal, such as Leucippus; so that there was no Chaos or Night for an infinite time, but the same things always existed, either in a cycle or otherwise, if indeed actuality is prior to potentiality.
εἰ δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιόδῳ, δεῖ τι ἀεὶ μένειν ὡσαύτως ἐνεργοῦν.
If, then, the same thing is always in a cycle, there must be something that always remains acting in the same way.
εἰ δὲ μέλλει γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ εἶναι, ἄλλο δεῖ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως.
And if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else which is always acting in different ways.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὡδὶ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὡδὶ δὲ κατʼ ἄλλο· ἤτοι ἄρα καθʼ ἕτερον ἢ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον.
It must, then, act in this way by itself, and in that way by another; and either, then, by that other or by the first.
ἀνάγκη δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο αὐτῷ τε αἴτιον κἀκείνῳ.
It must, indeed, be by the first; for that is again the cause of itself and of the other.
οὐκοῦν βέλτιον τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ αἴτιον ἦν ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως· τοῦ δʼ ἄλλως ἕτερον, τοῦ δʼ ἀεὶ ἄλλως ἄμφω δηλονότι.
Therefore the first is better; for that was the cause of the "always in the same way", and the other of the "otherwise", and both of the "always otherwise" obviously.
οὐκοῦν οὕτως καὶ ἔχουσιν αἱ κινήσεις.
Therefore the movements also are in this way.
τί οὖν ἄλλας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀρχάς;
Why then should we seek other principles?