§12.5ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν χωριστὰ τὰ δʼ οὐ χωριστά, οὐσίαι ἐκεῖνα.
Since some things are separable and others are not separable, the former are substances.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντων αἴτια ταὐτά, ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις.
And for this reason the causes of all things are the same, because without substances there are no affections and movements.
ἔπειτα ἔσται ταῦτα ψυχὴ ἴσως καὶ σῶμα, ἢ νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις καὶ σῶμα. —ἔτι δʼ ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἷον ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις· ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως.
Next, these will be perhaps soul and body, or intellect and desire and body. — And again, in another way, by analogy, the principles are the same, such as actuality and potentiality; but even these are different for different things and in different ways.
ἐν ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἔστιν ὁτὲ δὲ δυνάμει, οἷον οἶνος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ἄνθρωπος (πίπτει δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ εἰρημένα αἴτια· ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, ἐὰν ᾖ χωριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν στέρησις δέ, οἷον σκότος ἢ κάμνον, δυνάμει δὲ ἡ ὕλη· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ δυνάμενον γίγνεσθαι ἄμφω)· ἄλλως δʼ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρει ὧν μὴ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη, ὧν ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀλλʼ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου αἴτιον τά τε στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι ἄλλο ἔξω οἷον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος, οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα οὔτʼ εἶδος οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε ὁμοειδὲς ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα.
For in some cases the same thing is at one time in actuality and at another time in potentiality, e.g. wine or flesh or man (and these also fall into the aforementioned causes; for the form is in actuality, if it is separable, and so is the compound of both, and the privation is so too, such as darkness or a sick person, but the matter is in potentiality; for this is what is capable of becoming both); but in another way, actuality and potentiality differ in things whose matter is not the same, and of which some do not have the same form but a different one, just as the cause of man is the elements, fire and earth as matter and his own form, and besides, something else outside, such as his father, and beyond these, the sun and the oblique circle, which are neither matter nor form nor privation nor of the same species, but are movers.
ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅτι τὰ μὲν καθόλου ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, τὰ δʼ οὔ.
Further, one must observe that some causes can be stated universally, and others cannot.
πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει.
Indeed, the prime principles of all things are the first active thing, this individual, and another which is in potentiality.
ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὖν τὰ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν·
Those universal principles, then, do not exist; for the individual is the principle of the individual.
ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον· ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθόλου, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ Πηλεὺς Ἀχιλλέως σοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ, καὶ τοδὶ τὸ Β τουδὶ τοῦ ΒΑ, ὅλως δὲ τὸ Β τοῦ ἁπλῶς ΒΑ. ἔπειτα, εἰ δὴ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων αἴτια καὶ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῶν μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, χρωμάτων ψόφων οὐσιῶν ποσότητος, πλὴν τῷ ἀνάλογον· καὶ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ εἴδει ἕτερα, οὐκ εἴδει ἀλλʼ ὅτι τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον ἄλλο, ἥ τε σὴ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κινῆσαν καὶ ἡ ἐμή, τῷ καθόλου δὲ λόγῳ ταὐτά.
For 'man' is the universal of 'man', but there is no such universal man; rather, Peleus is the principle of Achilles, and your father of you, and this B is the principle of this BA, and in general B of BA simply. Next, if indeed the causes are those of substances, but different things have different causes and elements, as has been said—namely, those things not in the same genus, such as colors, sounds, substances, and quantity—except by analogy; and even for things in the same species, the causes are different—not in species, but because the individual causes are different (your matter, form, and mover are different from mine)—though in universal definition they are the same.
τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τίνες ἀρχαὶ ἢ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ πρός τι καὶ ποιῶν, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς γε λεγομένων ἔστιν ἑκάστου, διαιρεθέντων δὲ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλʼ ἕτερα, πλὴν ὡδὶ καὶ πάντων, ὡδὶ μὲν ταὐτὰ ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅτι ὕλη, εἶδος, στέρησις, τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ ὡδὶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν αἴτια ὡς αἴτια πάντων, ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων· ἔτι τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχείᾳ· ὡδὶ δὲ ἕτερα πρῶτα ὅσα τὰ ἐναντία ἃ μήτε ὡς γένη λέγεται μήτε πολλαχῶς λέγεται· καὶ ἔτι αἱ ὗλαι.
As for seeking what the principles or elements of substances, relations, and qualities are, and whether they are the same or different, it is clear that since each is spoken of in many ways, if they are distinguished, they are not the same but different, except in a certain way for all things; in this way they are the same or analogously, because there are matter, form, privation, and the mover; and in this way the causes of substances are the causes of all things, because when they are destroyed, all things are destroyed; and further, the first thing in actuality; but in another way, the primary principles are different, namely all those contraries which are neither spoken of as genera nor in many ways; and further, the matters.
τίνες μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς ἕτεραι, εἴρηται.
What and how many the principles of sensible things are, and in what way they are the same and in what way different, has been said.