§12.7ἐπεὶ δʼ οὕτω τʼ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως, ἐκ νυκτὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, λύοιτʼ ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δʼ ἡ κύκλῳ (καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ δῆλον), ὥστʼ ἀΐδιος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός.
Since, then, this is possible, and if it were not so, all things would come from Night or from "all things together" or from non-being, these difficulties may be solved, and there is something that is always moved with an unceasing movement, and this is circular movement (and this is plain not only in theory but in fact), so that the first heaven must be eternal.
ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ.
There is, therefore, also something which moves it.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν μέσον, †τοίνυν† ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα.
And since that which is moved and moves is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.
κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα.
And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved.
τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά.
The primary objects of these are the same.
ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὂν καλόν· ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις.
For the object of appetite is the apparent good, and the primary object of wish is the real good; but we desire a thing because it seems good rather than it seems good because we desire it; for the thinking is the starting-point.
νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθʼ αὑτήν· καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν (ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν μέτρον σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ ἁπλοῦν πὼς ἔχον αὐτό).
And intellect is moved by the object of thought, and the other series of the co-ordinate columns is object of thought in itself; and of this series, substance is first, and of this, that which is simple and exists in actuality (the one and the simple are not the same; for the "one" signifies a measure, but the "simple" signifies that the thing itself is in a certain state).
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ διʼ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ· καὶ ἔστιν ἄριστον ἀεὶ ἢ ἀνάλογον τὸ πρῶτον.
But indeed the beautiful and that which is desirable for its own sake are in the same series; and the first is always best or analogous to the best.
ὅτι δʼ ἔστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῖ· ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τινός, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἔστι.
And that the "that for the sake of which" exists among the unmovable things, the division shows; for the "that for the sake of which" is for someone and of something, of which the one exists and the other does not.
κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ.
And it moves as an object of love, and while moving other things, it moves them.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστʼ εἰ φορὰ πρώτη ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ᾗ κινεῖται ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατʼ οὐσίαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς.
If, then, something is moved, it is possible for it also to be otherwise, so that if the first movement is the actuality, in so far as it is moved, in this respect at least it is possible for it to be otherwise, namely in place, even if not in substance; but since there is something which moves while being itself immovable, existing in actuality, this cannot in any way be otherwise.
φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ.
For locomotion is the first of changes, and of this, circular movement; and this the immovable mover moves.
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν· καὶ ᾗ ἀνάγκῃ, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή.
Of necessity, then, it exists; and in so far as it exists of necessity, its existence is good, and in this way it is a principle.
τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς. —ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.
For "necessary" has these meanings: first, that which is by force because it is contrary to impulse; second, that without which the good cannot be; and third, that which cannot be otherwise but is absolutely.—On such a principle, then, depend the heaven and nature.
διαγωγὴ δʼ ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο· ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα).
And its life is like the best which we enjoy for a short time (for it is always in this state, which for us is impossible), since its actuality is also pleasure (and for this reason waking, perception, and thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so because of these).
ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθʼ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα.
And thinking in itself is of that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the highest degree is of that which is best in the highest degree.
αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν.
And the intellect thinks itself by participation in the object of thought; for it becomes object of thought by touching and thinking, so that intellect and the object of thought are the same.
τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστʼ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον.
For that which is receptive of the object of thought and of substance is intellect, and it acts when it possesses it, so that the latter rather than the former is the divine element which intellect seems to possess, and contemplation is the most pleasant and best.
εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον.
If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this is wonderful; and if in a better state, this is yet more wonderful.
ἔχει δὲ ὧδε.
And He is in this state.
καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθʼ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος.
And life also belongs to Him; for the actuality of intellect is life, and He is that actuality; and His self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal.
φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.
We say, then, that God is a living being, eternal and most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.
ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται.
And those who suppose, like the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, that the most beautiful and best is not in the beginning, because the principles of both plants and animals are indeed causes but the beautiful and perfect is in the things that come from these, do not think correctly.
τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον ἀλλʼ ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα.
For the seed comes from other prior perfect things, and the first thing is not the seed but the perfect; just as one would say that a man is prior to the seed, not the man who comes from it, but another from whom the seed comes.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλʼ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δʼ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον· ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν μέγεθος ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον, πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος, ἄπειρον δʼ ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον μέγεθος)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον.
That, therefore, there is a substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things is clear from what has been said; and it has also been shown that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it moves during an infinite time, and nothing finite has infinite power; and since every magnitude is either infinite or finite, for this reason it cannot have a finite magnitude, nor an infinite magnitude because there is absolutely no infinite magnitude); but indeed also that it is impassive and unalterable; for all other movements are subsequent to locomotion.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δῆλα διότι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.
These things, then, are clear, why they are in this way.