§12.4τὰ δʼ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι δʼ ὡς, ἂν καθόλου λέγῃ τις καὶ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν, ταὐτὰ πάντων.
The causes and principles are in one sense different for different things, but in another sense, if one speaks generally and analogically, they are the same for all.
ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον ἕτεραι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρός τι, καὶ καθʼ ἑκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως.
For one might raise the question whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations are different or the same, and so similarly for each of the categories.
ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον εἰ ταὐτὰ πάντων· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρός τι καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι.
But it is absurd if they are the same for all; for then relations and substances will consist of the same elements.
τί οὖν τοῦτʼ ἔσται;
What then will this be?
παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν, πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν στοιχεῖον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρός τι, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας.
For there is nothing common apart from substance and the other categories, and the element is prior to that of which it is an element; but surely neither is substance an element of relations, nor any of these of substance.
ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται πάντων εἶναι ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα;
Further, how is it possible for all things to have the same elements?
οὐδὲν γὰρ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων τῷ ἐκ στοιχείων συγκειμένῳ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον τῷ ΒΑ τὸ Β ἢ Α (οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ ἕν· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ τῶν συνθέτων).
For none of the elements can be the same as the compound of elements, e.g. B or A cannot be the same as BA. (Nor indeed is any of the intelligible things an element, such as being or unity; for these belong to each of the compound things too).
οὐδὲν ἄρʼ ἔσται αὐτῶν οὔτʼ οὐσία οὔτε πρός τι· ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον.
Therefore none of them will be either a substance or a relation; but it must be so.
οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα πάντων ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα. —ἢ ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ, οἷον ἴσως τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων ὡς μὲν εἶδος τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἡ στέρησις, ὕλη δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ταῦτα πρῶτον καθʼ αὑτό, οὐσίαι δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων, ὧν ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα, ἢ εἴ τι ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ γίγνεται ἕν, οἷον σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν· ἕτερον γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐκείνων εἶναι τὸ γενόμενον.
Therefore, the elements of all things are not the same. — Or, as we say, in one sense they are, and in another sense they are not; e.g. perhaps of sensible bodies, as form is the hot, and in another way the cold is the privation, and matter is that which potentially is these first and in itself, and substances are both these and the things composed of them, of which these are the principles, or whatever becomes one out of hot and cold, such as flesh or bone; for that which comes to be must be different from those.
τούτων μὲν οὖν ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαί (ἄλλων δʼ ἄλλα), πάντων δὲ οὕτω μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνάλογον δέ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ἀρχαὶ εἰσὶ τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη.
Of these things, then, the elements and principles are the same (though different for different things), but we cannot say this of all things, except by analogy; just as if one were to say that the principles are three: form, privation, and matter.
ἀλλʼ ἕκαστον τούτων ἕτερον περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἐστίν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι λευκὸν μέλαν ἐπιφάνεια· φῶς σκότος ἀήρ, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ.
But each of these is different for each genus, e.g. in color they are white, black, and surface; or light, darkness, and air, and from these day and night come to be.
ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς οἷον τὸ κινοῦν, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον, αἴτια δʼ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δʼ ὡς κινοῦν ἢ ἱστὰν ἀρχή τις καὶ οὐσία, ὥστε στοιχεῖα μὲν κατʼ ἀναλογίαν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέτταρες·
And since not only the inherent causes are causes, but also of the external ones, e.g. the mover, it is clear that principle and element are different, though both are causes, and the principle is divided into these; and that which acts as mover or stabilizer is a certain principle and substance.
ἄλλο δʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὡς κινοῦν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ.
So that while analogically the elements are three, the causes and principles are four; but different things have different ones, and the prime cause as mover is different for different things.
ὑγίεια, νόσος, σῶμα· τὸ κινοῦν ἰατρική.
Health, disease, body; the mover is the art of medicine.
εἶδος, ἀταξία τοιαδί, πλίνθοι· τὸ κινοῦν οἰκοδομική.
Form, disorder of a certain kind, bricks; the mover is the art of building.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀνθρώπῳ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίας τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον, τρόπον τινὰ τρία αἴτια ἂν εἴη, ὡδὶ δὲ τέτταρα. ὑγίεια γάρ πως ἡ ἰατρική, καὶ οἰκίας εἶδος ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ·
And since that which moves is, in natural things, man for man, and in things of thought, the form or its contrary, in one way there would be three causes, and in another way four.
ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὡς πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα.
For the art of medicine is in a way health, and the art of building is the form of a house, and man begets man; and besides these there is that which, as the first of all things, moves all things.