§12.1περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται.
Our inquiry is about substance; for the principles and causes of substances are what is sought.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν, ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος· καὶ εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς, κἂν οὕτως πρῶτον ἡ οὐσία, εἶτα τὸ ποιόν, εἶτα τὸ ποσόν.
For if the universe is a kind of whole, substance is its first part; and if they are in succession, even so substance is first, then quality, then quantity.
ἅμα δὲ οὐδʼ ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ποιότητες καὶ κινήσεις, ἢ καὶ τὸ οὐ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ εὐθύ· λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα, οἷον ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν.
But at the same time these other things are not even, so to speak, beings in an unconditional sense, but are qualities and movements, or else even the 'not-white' and the 'not-straight'; at any rate we say that these also are, as when we say 'there is a not-white'.
ἔτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν.
Further, none of the other things can exist apart.
μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἔργῳ· τῆς γὰρ οὐσίας ἐζήτουν ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἴτια.
And the ancients also bear witness to this in fact; for they sought the principles, elements, and causes of substance.
οἱ μὲν οὖν νῦν τὰ καθόλου οὐσίας μᾶλλον τιθέασιν (τὰ γὰρ γένη καθόλου, ἅ φασιν ἀρχὰς καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητεῖν)· οἱ δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ κοινόν, σῶμα.
Now the moderns tend to posit universals as substance (for genera are universals, which they say are principles and substances rather because they inquire dialectically); but the ancients posited particular things, like fire and earth, but not the common thing, body.
οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθητή—ἧς ἡ μὲν ἀΐδιος ἡ δὲ φθαρτή, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα —ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά· ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασί τινες εἶναι χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες, οἱ δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων.
And there are three substances: one is sensible—of which one part is eternal and another destructible, which all admit, like plants and animals—of which we must grasp the elements, whether one or many; another is unmoved, and this some say exists apart, some dividing it into two, others putting the Ideas and the mathematical objects into one nature, and others admitting only the mathematical objects among these.
ἐκεῖναι μὲν δὴ φυσικῆς (μετὰ κινήσεως γάρ), αὕτη δὲ ἑτέρας, εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή.
The former substances, then, belong to physics (for they involve movement), but the latter to another science, if they have no principle in common.
ἡ δʼ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή.
Sensible substance is changeable.
εἰ δʼ ἡ μεταβολὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ πάντων (οὐ λευκὸν γὰρ ἡ φωνή) ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει.
And if change is from opposites or from intermediates, and not from all opposites (for voice is 'not-white') but from the contrary, there must be something underlying which changes into the contrariety; for the contraries themselves do not change.
§12.2ἔτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει· ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία, ἡ ὕλη.
Further, the one persists, but the contrary does not persist; therefore, there is a third thing besides the contraries, namely matter.
εἰ δὴ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τέτταρες, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ πόσον ἢ ποῦ, καὶ γένεσις μὲν ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ ἡ κατὰ τὸ τόδε, αὔξησις δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὸ πάθος, φορὰ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἂν εἶεν τὰς καθʼ ἕκαστον αἱ μεταβολαί.
If, then, changes are four in number, either in respect of 'what' or of 'of what quality' or 'how much' or 'where', and simple generation and destruction are in respect of 'this', and increase and decrease are in respect of quantity, and alteration is in respect of affection, and motion is in respect of place, then the changes must be into the corresponding contrarieties.
ἀνάγκη δὴ μεταβάλλειν τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην ἄμφω· ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν (οἷον ἐκ λευκοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λευκόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπʼ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως), ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεται πάντα, δυνάμει μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ.
It is necessary, then, that the matter should change, having the potentiality for both; and since 'being' is double, everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually (for instance, from potentially white to actually white, and similarly in the case of increase and decrease), so that not only is it possible for something to come to be accidentally from non-being, but also all things come to be from being, but from being potentially, and from non-being actually.
καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἕν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ
"ὁμοῦ πάντα"
—καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν—"ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δʼ οὔ"· ὥστε τῆς ὕλης ἂν εἶεν ἡμμένοι·
And this is Anaxagoras' 'one'; for this is better than 'all things together'—and Empedocles' mixture, and Anaximander's, and as Democritus says: 'all things were together potentially, but not actually'; so that they would have laid hold of matter.
πάντα δʼ ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα μεταβάλλει, ἀλλʼ ἑτέραν· καὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων ὅσα μὴ γενητὰ κινητὰ δὲ φορᾷ, ἀλλʼ οὐ γενητὴν ἀλλὰ ποθὲν ποί.
And all things that change have matter, but different matter; and of the eternal things, those which are not generable but are movable in space have matter, yet not matter for generation, but for motion from one place to another.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις· τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν.
One might raise the question, from what kind of non-being generation takes place; for non-being has three senses.
εἰ δή τι ἔστι δυνάμει, ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλʼ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου· οὐδʼ ἱκανὸν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα· διαφέρει γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ἄπειρα ἐγένετο ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕν;
If, then, something is potentially, yet it does not come from anything whatsoever, but different things come from different things; nor is it sufficient that 'all things were together'; for they differ in their matter, since otherwise why did they become infinitely many and not one?
ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἷς, ὥστʼ εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη μία, ἐκεῖνο ἐγένετο ἐνεργείᾳ οὗ ἡ ὕλη ἦν δυνάμει.
For Mind is one, so that if matter also were one, that would have been produced in actuality which the matter was potentially.
τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη.
There are, then, three causes and three principles: two being the contrariety, of which one is the formula or form and the other the privation, and the third being the matter.