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Aristotle · Metaphysics §11.12#2

Three Kinds of Motion and Definitions of Continuity Terms

Passage 122 of 159 · Greek

Summary

Reconfirms the goal and types of movement (quality, quantity, place) and defines fundamental terms related to continuity, such as 'together,' 'apart,' 'touching,' 'between,' 'contrary in place,' 'next,' 'contiguous,' and 'continuous.'

§11.12#2καὶ ἔτι τί εἰς ὃ κινοῦνται;
And further, what is that into which they are moved?
δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν τοῦδε ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν.
For there must be a movement or generation of this, from this, into this.
πῶς οὖν;
How then?
οὐ γὰρ ἔσται μάθησις τῆς μαθήσεως, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ γένεσις γενέσεως.
For there will be no learning of learning, and so no generation of generation.
ἐπεὶ δʼ οὔτʼ οὐσίας οὔτε τοῦ πρός τι οὔτε τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, λείπεται κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ ποσὸν καὶ τόπον κίνησιν εἶναι (τούτων γὰρ ἑκάστῳ ἐναντίωσις ἔστιν), λέγω δὲ τὸ ποιὸν οὐ τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ ποιόν) ἀλλὰ τὸ παθητικόν, καθʼ ὃ λέγεται πάσχειν ἢ ἀπαθὲς εἶναι.
Since, then, there is no movement of substance, nor of relation, nor of acting and being acted upon, it remains that there is movement in respect of quality, quantity, and place (for to each of these there is a contrariety); and by quality I mean not that which is in the substance (for the difference also is a quality), but the passive, in respect of which a thing is said to be acted upon or to be unaffected.
τὸ δὲ ἀκίνητον τό τε ὅλως ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι καὶ τὸ μόλις ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ ἢ βραδέως ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν κινεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον μὴ κινούμενον δὲ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ οὗ καὶ ὥς· ὃ καλῶ ἠρεμεῖν τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον· ἐναντίον γὰρ ἠρεμία κινήσει, ὥστε στέρησις ἂν εἴη τοῦ δεκτικοῦ.
And that which is unmoved is either that which is altogether impossible to be moved, or that which is scarcely moved after a long time or begins slowly, or that which is naturally adapted to be moved and able to be moved, but is not moved when, where, and as it is naturally adapted; which alone of unmoved things I call being at rest; for rest is contrary to movement, so that it would be a privation in that which is receptive.
ἅμα κατὰ τόπον ὅσα ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ πρώτῳ, καὶ χωρὶς ὅσα ἐν ἄλλῳ·
Those things are 'together in place' which are in one primary place, and 'apart' which are in different places.
ἅπτεσθαι δὲ ὧν τὰ ἄκρα ἅμα·
And things 'touch' whose limits are together.
μεταξὺ δʼ εἰς ὃ πέφυκε πρότερον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον μεταβάλλει κατὰ φύσιν τὸ συνεχῶς μεταβάλλον.
And 'between' is that at which that which changes continuously naturally arrives before it arrives at that into which it changes last according to nature.
ἐναντίον κατὰ τόπον τὸ κατʼ εὐθεῖαν ἀπέχον πλεῖστον·
The 'contrary in place' is that which is most distant in a straight line.
ἑξῆς δὲ οὗ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄντος, θέσει ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀφορισθέντος, μηθὲν μεταξύ ἐστι τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει καὶ οὗ ἐφεξῆς ἐστίν, οἷον γραμμαὶ γραμμῆς ἢ μονάδες μονάδος ἢ οἰκίας οἰκία (ἄλλο δʼ οὐθὲν κωλύει μεταξὺ εἶναι).
And 'next' is that which, being after the starting-point, determined by position or form or in some other way, has nothing of the same genus between itself and that which it is next to (though nothing prevents something of another genus from being between).
τὸ γὰρ ἑξῆς τινὸς ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὕστερόν τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἓν ἑξῆς τῶν δύο οὐδʼ ἡ νουμηνία τῆς δευτέρας.
For 'next' is next to something and is posterior; for one is not next to two, nor is the new moon next to the second day.
ἐχόμενον δὲ ὃ ἂν ἑξῆς ὂν ἅπτηται.
And 'contiguous' is that which, being next, touches.
ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα μεταβολὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις, ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἐναντία καὶ ἀντίφασις, ἀντιφάσεως δʼ οὐδὲν ἀνὰ μέσον, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὸ μεταξύ.
And since all change is between opposites, and these are contraries and contradictories, and there is nothing between contradictories, it is clear that the 'between' is in contraries.
τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς ὅπερ ἐχόμενόν τι.
And the 'continuous' is a kind of contiguous.
λέγω δὲ συνεχὲς ὅταν ταὐτὸ γένηται καὶ ἓν τὸ ἑκατέρου πέρας οἷς ἅπτονται καὶ συνέχονται, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ συνεχὲς ἐν τούτοις ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναψιν.
And I call it continuous when the limit of each of the two, at which they touch and are held together, becomes the same and one; so that it is clear that the continuous is among those things from which some one thing is naturally adapted to come into being by their union.
καὶ ὅτι πρῶτον τὸ ἐφεξῆς, δῆλον (τὸ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς οὐχ ἅπτεται, τοῦτο δʼ ἐφεξῆς· καὶ εἰ συνεχές, ἅπτεται, εἰ δʼ ἅπτεται, οὔπω συνεχές· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἁφή, οὐκ ἔστι σύμφυσις ἐν τούτοις)· ὥστʼ οὐκ ἔστι στιγμὴ μονάδι ταὐτόν· ταῖς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἅπτεσθαι, ταῖς δʼ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐφεξῆς· καὶ τῶν μὲν μεταξύ τι τῶν δʼ οὔ.
And that the 'next' is first is clear (for that which is next does not touch, but this is next; and if it is continuous, it touches, but if it touches, it is not yet continuous; and in those things in which there is no contact, there is no organic union); so that a point is not the same as a unit; for contact belongs to points, but to units it does not, but only being next; and of the former there is something between, but of the latter there is not.

Notes

  1. §11.12#2τί εἰς ὃ κινοῦνται — The antecedent `ἐκεῖνο` is omitted, to be understood as `τί [ἐκεῖνο] εἰς ὃ κινοῦνται;` ('what is that [goal] into which they are moved?'), referring to the destination or term of the movement.
  2. ¦15¦ἐπεὶ δʼ οὔτʼ οὐσίας οὔτε τοῦ πρός τι οὔτε τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν — In the `ἐπεὶ` clause, based on the preceding arguments, the governing noun `κίνησις` (movement) and the verb of existence `ἔστι` are omitted. It should be supplied as 'since there is no movement of substance...'.
  3. ¦30¦ἑξῆς δὲ οὗ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄντος, θέσει ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀφορισθέντος — The definition of 'next' (`ἑξῆς`). The adverb `ἑξῆς` governs the genitive relative pronoun `οὗ` ('next to which'). The participles `ὄντος` and `ἀφορισθέντος` are genitives absolute, describing the condition under which the prior object is situated.
  4. ¦10¦τὸ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς οὐχ ἅπτεται, τοῦτο δʼ ἐφεξῆς — Explains the inclusion relation between 'being next' (`ἐφεξῆς`) and 'touching' (`ἅπτεσθαι`). The pronoun `τοῦτο` in the second clause refers to 'that which touches', meaning 'that which touches is next,' thereby proving the conceptual priority of 'next.'

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Metaphysics §11.12#2. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:11.12%232

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