§11.8ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἁπλῶς ὂν κατὰ πλείους λέγεται τρόπους, ὧν εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι λεγόμενος, σκεπτέον πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος.
Since being simply is said in many ways, of which one is that which is said to be as an accident, we must first consider being in this way.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία τῶν παραδεδομένων ἐπιστημῶν πραγματεύεται περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δῆλον (οὔτε γὰρ οἰκοδομικὴ σκοπεῖ τὸ συμβησόμενον τοῖς τῇ οἰκίᾳ χρησομένοις, οἷον εἰ λυπηρῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον οἰκήσουσιν, οὔθʼ ὑφαντικὴ οὔτε σκυτοτομικὴ οὔτε ὀψοποιική, τὸ δὲ καθʼ αὑτὴν ἴδιον ἑκάστη τούτων σκοπεῖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μόνον, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τέλος· οὐδὲ τὸν ὄντα μουσικὸν ὅτι γενόμενος γραμματικὸς ἅμα ἔσται τὰ ἀμφότερα, πρότερον οὐκ ὤν, ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ ὂν ἔστιν, ἐγένετο τοῦτο, ὥσθʼ ἅμα μουσικὸς ἐγένετο καὶ γραμματικός,—τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμία ζητεῖ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως οὐσῶν ἐπιστημῶν πλὴν ἡ σοφιστική· περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ αὕτη μόνη πραγματεύεται, διὸ Πλάτων οὐ κακῶς εἴρηκε φήσας τὸν σοφιστὴν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν διατρίβειν)·
That none of the handed-down sciences, then, busies itself about the accidental is clear (for neither does building-art consider what will happen to those who will use the house, as for instance whether they will live in it painfully or the opposite, nor does weaving nor shoemaking nor cooking; but each of these sciences considers only what is its own proper end, and this is its own proper end; nor is it investigated how a musical man, having become grammatical, will be both at once, not having been so before, and what is not always is what became so, so that he became at once musical and grammatical—and this no acknowledged science seeks except sophistry; for this alone busies itself about the accidental, wherefore Plato did not speak badly in saying that the sophist spends his time about non-being).
ὅτι δʼ οὐδʼ ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστιν εἶναι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐπιστήμην, φανερὸν ἔσται πειραθεῖσιν ἰδεῖν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός.
And that it is not even possible for there to be a science of the accidental will be clear if we try to see what the accidental is.
πᾶν δή φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (ἀνάγκης δʼ οὐ τῆς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγομένης ἀλλʼ ᾗ χρώμεθα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις), τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δʼ οὔθʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὔτʼ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἔτυχεν· οἷον ἐπὶ κυνὶ γένοιτʼ ἂν ψῦχος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ οὔτʼ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔθʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται, συμβαίη δέ ποτʼ ἄν.
For we say that everything is either always and of necessity (necessity not in the sense of forced, but as we use it in demonstrations), or for the most part, or neither for the most part nor always and of necessity, but as it happens; as for instance cold might arise under the dog-star, but this happens neither always and of necessity nor for the most part, though it might happen as an accident.
ἔστι δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὃ γίγνεται μέν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δʼ οὐδʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
The accidental, then, is that which indeed comes to be, but not always nor of necessity nor for the most part.
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, εἴρηται, διότι δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τοιούτου, δῆλον· ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τούτων ἐστίν.
What the accidental is, then, has been said, and why there is no science of such a thing is clear; for every science is of that which is always or for the most part, but the accidental is in neither of these.
ὅτι δὲ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος οὐκ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται οἷαίπερ τοῦ καθʼ αὑτὸ ὄντος, δῆλον· ἔσται γὰρ ἅπαντʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
And that of accidental being there are no such causes and principles as there are of essential being, is clear; for otherwise everything would be of necessity.
εἰ γὰρ τόδε μὲν ἔστι τοῦδε ὄντος τόδε δὲ τοῦδε, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται καὶ οὗ τοῦτʼ ἦν αἴτιον ἕως τοῦ τελευταίου λεγομένου αἰτιατοῦ (τοῦτο δʼ ἦν κατὰ συμβεβηκός), ὥστʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπαντʼ ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ὁποτέρως ἔτυχε καὶ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ παντελῶς ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται.
For if this is when that is, and that when another is, and this not as it happens but of necessity, that of which this was the cause will also be of necessity, down to the last-mentioned effect (and this was accidental), so that everything will be of necessity, and the "whichever way it happens" and the possibility of both being and not coming to be are completely abolished from things that come to be.
κἂν μὴ ὂν δὲ ἀλλὰ γιγνόμενον τὸ αἴτιον ὑποτεθῇ, ταὐτὰ συμβήσεται· πᾶν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενήσεται.
And even if the cause is hypothesized not to be existing but coming to be, the same things will result; for everything will come to be of necessity.
ἡ γὰρ αὔριον ἔκλειψις γενήσεται ἂν τόδε γένηται, τοῦτο δʼ ἐὰν ἕτερόν τι, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἂν ἄλλο· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἀπὸ πεπερασμένου χρόνου τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν μέχρι αὔριον ἀφαιρουμένου χρόνου ἥξει ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ὑπάρχον, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ἅπαντʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μετὰ τοῦτο γενήσεται, ὥστε πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι.
For tomorrow's eclipse will come to be if this comes to be, and this if something else, and this if another; and in this way, by subtracting time from the finite time from now until tomorrow, one will at some point arrive at what is already present, so that since this is, everything after this will come to be of necessity, so that all things come to be of necessity.
τὸ δʼ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἐν συμπλοκῇ διανοίας καὶ πάθος ἐν ταύτῃ (διὸ περὶ μὲν τὸ οὕτως ὂν οὐ ζητοῦνται αἱ ἀρχαί, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἔξω ὂν καὶ χωριστόν)· τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλʼ ἀόριστον, λέγω δὲ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοῦ τοιούτου δʼ ἄτακτα καὶ ἄπειρα τὰ αἴτια.
On the other hand, as for being as truth and being as accident, the former is in a combination of thought and is an affection in it (wherefore the principles are not sought for being in this way, but for being which is outside and separate); but the latter is not necessary but indefinite, I mean the accidental; and of such a thing the causes are unordered and infinite.
—τὸ δὲ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐστίν, τύχη δέ ἐστιν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὄν ἐστι τὸ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω καὶ αἴτιον.
And that which is for the sake of something is in things that come to be by nature or from thought, and luck is when any of these comes to be accidentally; for just as being is either essential or accidental, so also is a cause.
ἡ τύχη δʼ αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του γιγνομένοις, διὸ περὶ ταὐτὰ τύχη καὶ διάνοια· προαίρεσις γὰρ οὐ χωρὶς διανοίας.
And luck is an accidental cause in things that come to be for the sake of something according to choice, wherefore luck and thought are about the same thing; for choice is not without thought.
τὰ δʼ αἴτια ἀόριστα ἀφʼ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, διὸ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ καὶ αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὐδενός.
But the causes from which things of luck might come to be are indefinite, wherefore it is obscure to human reasoning and is an accidental cause, but simply of nothing.
ἀγαθὴ δὲ τύχη καὶ κακὴ ὅταν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἀποβῇ· εὐτυχία δὲ καὶ δυστυχία περὶ μέγεθος τούτων.
And it is good luck and bad luck when a good or bad result comes to be; and fortune and misfortune when these are of large size.
ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐθὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς πρότερον τῶν καθʼ αὑτό, οὐδʼ ἄρʼ αἴτια· εἰ ἄρα τύχη ἢ τὸ αὐτόματον αἴτιον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, πρότερον νοῦς αἴτιος καὶ φύσις.
And since nothing accidental is prior to what is essential, neither are causes; if therefore luck or spontaneity is the cause of the heavens, prior to it intellect and nature are the cause.