§11.7πᾶσα δʼ ἐπιστήμη ζητεῖ τινὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑφʼ αὑτὴν ἐπιστητῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἑκάστη τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ μαθηματικῶν.
Every science seeks certain principles and causes for each of its objects of knowledge, as for instance medicine and gymnastics, and each of the remaining productive and mathematical sciences.
ἑκάστη γὰρ τούτων περιγραψαμένη τι γένος αὑτῇ περὶ τοῦτο πραγματεύεται ὡς ὑπάρχον καὶ ὄν, οὐχ ᾗ δὲ ὄν, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρα τις αὕτη παρὰ ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.
For each of these, having circumscribed some genus for itself, busies itself about this as something existing and being, yet not qua being, but this is another science distinct from these.
τῶν δὲ λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἑκάστη λαβοῦσά πως τὸ τί ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει πειρᾶται δεικνύναι τὰ λοιπὰ μαλακώτερον ἢ ἀκριβέστερον.
And of the mentioned sciences, each having somehow grasped the "what it is" in each genus, tries to demonstrate the rest more roughly or more precisely.
λαμβάνουσι δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν αἱ μὲν διʼ αἰσθήσεως αἱ δʼ ὑποτιθέμεναι· διὸ καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς ὅτι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστι τις ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πρακτικῆς ἑτέρα καὶ ποιητικῆς ἔσται.
And some grasp the "what it is" through sensation, and others by hypothesizing it; hence it is also clear from such induction that there is no demonstration of substance and of the "what it is." Since there is a science of nature, it is clear that it will be different from both practical and productive science.
ποιητικῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιουμένῳ τῆς κινήσεως ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν εἴτε τέχνη τις εἴτʼ ἄλλη τις δύναμις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς πρακτικῆς οὐκ ἐν τῷ πρακτῷ μᾶλλον δʼ ἐν τοῖς πράττουσιν ἡ κίνησις.
For in productive science the principle of motion is in the producer and not in the product, and this is either some art or some other power; and likewise in practical science the motion is not in the thing done but rather in the doers.
ἡ δὲ τοῦ φυσικοῦ περὶ τὰ ἔχοντʼ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχήν ἐστιν.
But the science of the natural philosopher is about those things which have in themselves a principle of motion.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὔτε πρακτικὴν οὔτε ποιητικὴν ἀλλὰ θεωρητικὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιστήμην, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων (εἰς ἓν γάρ τι τούτων τῶν γενῶν ἀνάγκη πίπτειν)·
That the science of nature must, therefore, be neither practical nor productive but theoretical is clear from these things (for it must fall into one of these genera).
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον ἑκάστῃ πως τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἰδέναι καὶ τούτῳ χρῆσθαι ἀρχῇ, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς ὁριστέον τῷ φυσικῷ καὶ πῶς ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος ληπτέος, πότερον ὡς τὸ σιμὸν ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς τὸ κοῖλον.
And since it is necessary for each of the sciences to know somehow the "what it is" and to use this as a principle, we must not fail to notice how the natural philosopher must define and how the definition of substance is to be taken, whether as the snub or rather as the concave.
τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ σιμοῦ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης λέγεται τῆς τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ δὲ τοῦ κοίλου χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης· ἡ γὰρ σιμότης ἐν ῥινὶ γίγνεται, διὸ καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς μετὰ ταύτης θεωρεῖται· τὸ σιμὸν γάρ ἐστι ῥὶς κοίλη.
For of these, the definition of the snub is stated with the matter of the thing, but that of the concave without the matter; for snubness arises in a nose, wherefore also its definition is studied with this; for the snub is a concave nose.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ σαρκὸς καὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν μορίων μετὰ τῆς ὕλης ἀεὶ τὸν λόγον ἀποδοτέον.
It is manifest, then, that of flesh and eye and the remaining parts we must always give the definition with the matter.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν καὶ χωριστόν, σκεπτέον πότερόν ποτε τῇ φυσικῆ ι ιτὴν αὐτὴν θετέον εἶναι ταύτην ἢ μᾶλλον ἑτέραν.
Since there is a science of being qua being and separate, we must consider whether this is to be set as the same as the science of nature or rather as different.
ἡ μὲν οὖν φυσικὴ περὶ τὰ κινήσεως ἔχοντʼ ἀρχὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ μαθηματικὴ θεωρητικὴ μὲν καὶ περὶ μένοντά τις αὕτη, ἀλλʼ οὐ χωριστά.
Now the science of nature is about things that have in themselves a principle of motion, while mathematics is theoretical and about things that remain constant indeed, but not separate.
περὶ τὸ χωριστὸν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἑτέρα τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔστι τις, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη, λέγω δὲ χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ὅπερ πειρασόμεθα δεικνύναι.
Therefore, about that being which is separate and immovable there is another science distinct from both of these, if indeed exists any such substance, I mean separate and immovable, which we shall endeavor to demonstrate.
καὶ εἴπερ ἔστι τις τοιαύτη φύσις ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἐνταῦθʼ ἂν εἴη που καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη ἀρχή.
And if there is any such nature among beings, here also surely would be the divine, and this would be the first and most sovereign principle.
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔστι, φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική.
It is clear, then, that there are three genera of theoretical sciences: physical, mathematical, theological.
βέλτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ τῶν θεωρητικῶν γένος, τούτων δʼ αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα· περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, βελτίων δὲ καὶ χείρων ἑκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστητόν.
The genus of theoretical sciences, then, is the best, and of these themselves, the one last mentioned; for it is about the most honorable of beings, and each science is called better or worse according to its proper object of knowledge.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις πότερόν ποτε τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ἐπιστήμην καθόλου δεῖ θεῖναι ἢ οὔ.
But one might raise the question whether the science of being qua being should be set as universal or not.
τῶν μὲν γὰρ μαθηματικῶν ἑκάστη περὶ ἕν τι γένος ἀφωρισμένον ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ καθόλου κοινὴ περὶ πάντων.
For each of the mathematical sciences is about some one circumscribed genus, but the universal science is common to all.
εἰ μὲν οὖν αἱ φυσικαὶ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, κἂν ἡ φυσικὴ πρώτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη· εἰ δʼ ἔστιν ἑτέρα φύσις καὶ οὐσία χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἑτέραν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῆς εἶναι καὶ προτέραν τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ καθόλου τῷ προτέραν.
If, then, physical substances are the first of beings, physical science would also be the first of sciences; but if there is another nature and substance, separate and immovable, it is necessary that the science of it also be different and prior to physical science, and universal by being prior.