§11.9ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ μόνον τὸ δὲ δυνάμει τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ μὲν ὂν τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τὸ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν.
Some things exist only in actuality, some in potentiality, and some in potentiality and actuality, and this is either substance, or quantity, or one of the others.
οὐκ ἔστι δέ τις κίνησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· μεταβάλλει γὰρ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ὄντος κατηγορίας, κοινὸν δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ οὐδʼ ἐν μιᾷ κατηγορίᾳ.
And there is no movement apart from things; for change is always according to the categories of being, and there is nothing common to these which is in no category.
ἕκαστον δὲ διχῶς ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν (οἷον τὸ τόδε—τὸ μὲν γὰρ μορφὴ αὐτοῦ τὸ δὲ στέρησις—καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν τὸ μὲν λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέλαν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ μὲν τέλειον τὸ δὲ ἀτελές, καὶ κατὰ φορὰν τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω, ἢ κοῦφον καὶ βαρύ)· ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς τοσαῦτʼ εἴδη ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος.
And each category belongs in two ways to all things (for instance, the "this"—for one is its form and the other its privation—and under quality one is white and the other black, and under quantity one is complete and the other incomplete, and under locomotion one is upward and the other downward, or light and heavy); so that there are as many species of movement and change as there are of being.
διῃρημένου δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν δυνάμει τοῦ δʼ ἐντελεχείᾳ, τὴν τοῦ δυνάμει ᾗ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνέργειαν λέγω κίνησιν.
And since in each genus the potential is distinguished from the actual, I call movement the actuality of the potential as such.
ὅτι δʼ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ἐνθένδε δῆλον· ὅταν γὰρ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ λέγομεν εἶναι, ἐνεργείᾳ ᾖ, οἰκοδομεῖται, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο οἰκοδόμησις· ὁμοίως μάθησις, ἰάτρευσις, βάδισις, ἅλσις, γήρανσις, ἅδρυνσις.
That we speak the truth is clear from this: for when the buildable, insofar as we call it such, is in actuality, it is being built, and this is building; similarly with learning, doctoring, walking, leaping, aging, maturing.
συμβαίνει δὲ κινεῖσθαι ὅταν ἡ ἐντελέχεια ᾖ αὐτή, καὶ οὔτε πρότερον οὔθʼ ὕστερον.
And movement happens to occur when this actuality itself is present, and neither before nor after.
ἡ δὴ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν ἐντελεχείᾳ ὂν ἐνεργῇ, οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὸ ἀλλʼ ᾗ κινητόν, κίνησίς ἐστιν.
The actuality of that which exists potentially, then, when existing in complete reality it acts, not as itself but as movable, is movement.
λέγω δὲ τὸ ᾗ ὧδε.
I mean "as such" in this way.
ἔστι γὰρ ὁ χαλκὸς δυνάμει ἀνδριάς· ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐχ ἡ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ χαλκός, κίνησίς ἐστιν.
For bronze is potentially a statue; but nevertheless, the complete reality of bronze, insofar as it is bronze, is not movement.
οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν χαλκῷ εἶναι καὶ δυνάμει τινί, ἐπεὶ εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἁπλῶς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἦν ἂν ἡ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἐντελέχεια κίνησίς τις.
For to be bronze is not the same as to be a certain potentiality, since if it were simply the same in definition, the complete reality of bronze would be a certain movement.
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταὐτό (δῆλον δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαι ὑγιαίνειν καὶ δύνασθαι κάμνειν οὐ ταὐτόν—καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ κάμνειν ταὐτὸν ἦν—τὸ δʼ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὑγιαῖνον καὶ νοσοῦν, εἴθʼ ὑγρότης εἴθʼ αἷμα, ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν).
But it is not the same (as is clear in the case of contraries; for to be capable of being healthy and to be capable of being ill are not the same—for then to be healthy and to be ill would be the same—but the substrate which both becomes healthy and becomes ill, whether it be moisture or blood, is one and the same).
ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χρῶμα ταὐτὸν καὶ ὁρατόν, ἡ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ᾗ δυνατὸν ἐντελέχεια κίνησίς ἐστιν.
And since it is not the same, just as color and the visible are not the same, the complete reality of the potential, and insofar as it is potential, is movement.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστιν αὕτη, καὶ ὅτι συμβαίνει τότε κινεῖσθαι ὅταν ἡ ἐντελέχεια ᾖ αὐτή, καὶ οὔτε πρότερον οὔθʼ ὕστερον, δῆλον (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἕκαστον ὁτὲ μὲν ἐνεργεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ μή, οἷον τὸ οἰκοδομητὸν ᾗ οἰκοδομητόν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ ἐνέργεια ᾗ οἰκοδομητὸν οἰκοδόμησίς ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἡ οἰκοδόμησις, ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἢ οἰκία· ἀλλʼ ὅταν οἰκία ᾖ, οὐκέτι οἰκοδομητόν, οἰκοδομεῖται δὲ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν· ἀνάγκη ἄρα οἰκοδόμησιν τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι, ἡ δʼ οἰκοδόμησις κίνησίς τις, ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων)· ὅτι δὲ καλῶς εἴρηται, δῆλον ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι διορίσαι ἄλλως αὐτήν.
That movement, then, is this, and that movement happens to occur then when this complete reality itself is present, and neither before nor after, is clear (for it is possible for each thing to act at one time and not at another, as for instance the buildable insofar as it is buildable, and the actuality of the buildable insofar as it is buildable is building; for the actuality is either this, building, or the house; but when the house is, it is no longer buildable, but it is the buildable that is being built; therefore, the actuality must be building, and building is a certain movement, and the same account applies to the other movements); and that this is well said is clear from what others say about it, and from the fact that it is not easy to define it otherwise.
οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ τις γένει δύναιτʼ ἂν θεῖναι αὐτήν· δῆλον δʼ ἐξ ὧν λέγουσιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἑτερότητα καὶ ἀνισότητα καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὧν οὐδὲν ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἡ μεταβολὴ οὔτʼ εἰς ταῦτα οὔτʼ ἐκ τούτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων.
For neither could anyone place it in another genus; and this is clear from what they say: for some say that movement is "otherness" and "inequality" and "non-being," none of which of necessity is moved, nor is change either into these or from these any more than from their opposites.
αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ εἰς ταῦτα τιθέναι ὅτι ἀόριστόν τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ κίνησις, τῆς δʼ ἑτέρας συστοιχίας αἱ ἀρχαὶ διὰ τὸ στερητικαὶ εἶναι ἀόριστοι· οὔτε γὰρ τόδε οὔτε τοιόνδε οὐδεμία αὐτῶν οὔτε τῶν λοιπῶν κατηγοριῶν.
And the cause of their placing it in these is that movement seems to be something indefinite, and the principles of the other column of opposites are indefinite because they are privative; for none of them is a "this" or a "of such a sort" or any of the other categories.
τοῦ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν αἴτιον ὅτι οὔτʼ εἰς δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων οὔτʼ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἔστι θεῖναι αὐτήν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν ποσὸν εἶναι κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὔτε τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ποσόν, ἥ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελὴς δέ· αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατὸν οὗ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια.
And the cause of movement seeming to be indefinite is that it cannot be placed either among the potentiality of things or among their actuality; for neither that which is potentially quantitative is of necessity moved, nor that which is actually quantitative, and movement seems indeed to be a certain actuality, but incomplete; and the cause is that the potential, of which it is the actuality, is incomplete.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ εἰς στέρησιν ἀνάγκη θεῖναι ἢ εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἁπλῆν, τούτων δʼ οὐδὲν φαίνεται ἐνδεχόμενον, ὥστε λείπεται τὸ λεχθὲν εἶναι, καὶ ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐνέργειαν τὴν εἰρημένην, ἰδεῖν μὲν χαλεπὴν ἐνδεχομένην δʼ εἶναι.
And because of this it is difficult to grasp what it is; for it must be placed either in privation or in potentiality or in simple actuality, but none of these seems possible, so that there remains only the mentioned way, namely that it is a certain actuality, and the kind of actuality we have described, which is difficult to see but capable of existing.
καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ, δῆλον· ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ.
And that movement is in the movable is clear; for it is the complete reality of this by the motive.
καὶ ἡ τοῦ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἄλλη ἐστίν.
And the actuality of the motive is not other.
δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἐντελέχειαν ἀμφοῖν· κινητικὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῷ δύνασθαι, κινοῦν δὲ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ, ὥσθʼ ὁμοίως μία ἡ ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἓν πρὸς δύο καὶ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ τὸ ἄναντες καὶ τὸ κάταντες, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ἕν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου.
For there must be a complete reality of both; for it is motive by being able to move, and moving by acting, but it is active upon the movable, so that the actuality of both is similarly one, just as the same interval is one to two and two to one, and the uphill and downhill, though their being is not one; and similarly also in the case of the mover and the moved.