§11.6#2καὶ εἰ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν συνεχῶς τὰ δεῦρο ῥεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, καί τις τοῦτο θείη καίπερ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὄν, διὰ τί κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν οὐ μενεῖ;
And even if things here are continually flowing and moving in respect of quantity, and even if someone should assume this although it is not true, why should they not remain constant in respect of quality?
φαίνονται γὰρ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιφάσεις ταὐτοῦ κατηγορεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ ποσὸν ὑπειληφέναι μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων, διὸ καὶ εἶναι τετράπηχυ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ εἶναι.
For it seems that they assert contradictory things of the same object not least because they have assumed that quantity does not remain constant in bodies, and therefore that the same thing both is four cubits long and is not.
ἡ δʼ οὐσία κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ὡρισμένης φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τῆς ἀορίστου.
But substance depends on quality, and this belongs to a determinate nature, whereas quantity belongs to an indeterminate nature.
ἔτι διὰ τί προστάττοντος τοῦ ἰατροῦ τοδὶ τὸ σιτίον προσενέγκασθαι προσφέρονται;
Furthermore, when the doctor orders them to take this food, why do they take it?
τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἄρτος ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;
For why is this rather bread than not?
ὥστʼ οὐθὲν ἂν διέχοι φαγεῖν ἢ μὴ φαγεῖν· νῦν δʼ ὡς ἀληθεύοντες περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ὄντος τοῦ προσταχθέντος σιτίου τούτου προσφέρονται τοῦτο·
So it would make no difference whether they eat it or not; but as it is, they take it as though they were speaking the truth about it and as though this were indeed the food ordered.
καίτοι γʼ οὐκ ἔδει μὴ διαμενούσης παγίως μηδεμιᾶς φύσεως ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ πασῶν κινουμένων καὶ ῥεουσῶν.
Yet they ought not to do so if no nature remains constant in sensible things, but all are always moving and flowing.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ μὲν ἀλλοιούμεθα ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε διαμένομεν οἱ αὐτοί, τί καὶ θαυμαστὸν εἰ μηδέποθʼ ἡμῖν ταὐτὰ φαίνεται καθάπερ τοῖς κάμνουσιν (καὶ γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι τὴν ἕξιν καὶ ὅθʼ ὑγίαινον, οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται τὰ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς διά γε τοῦτο μεταβολῆς κοινωνοῦντα τὰ αἰσθητά, αἰσθήματα δʼ ἕτερα ποιοῦντα τοῖς κάμνουσι καὶ μὴ τὰ αὐτά·
Furthermore, if we are always changing qualitatively and never remain the same, what wonder is it if things never appear the same to us, just as is the case with those who are sick?
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἔχειν καὶ τῆς εἰρημένης μεταβολῆς γιγνομένης ἴσως ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν); εἰ δὲ μὴ μεταβάλλομεν ἀλλʼ οἱ αὐτοὶ διατελοῦμεν ὄντες, εἴη ἄν τι μένον. —πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐκ λόγου τὰς εἰρημένας ἀπορίας ἔχοντας οὐ ῥᾴδιον διαλῦσαι μὴ τιθέντων τι καὶ τούτου μηκέτι λόγον ἀπαιτούντων·
(For to these, because their disposition is not in the same state as when they were healthy, things presented to their senses do not appear the same, though the sensible things themselves do not share in any change on this account, but produce different and not the same sensations in those who are sick; and in the same way, surely, it must also be if the aforementioned change takes place.) But if we do not change, but continue being the same, there must be something that remains constant. — Now, as for those who have the aforementioned difficulties because of an argument, it is not easy to resolve them unless they posit something and no longer demand a reason for this; for it is in this way that every argument and every demonstration comes to be; for by positing nothing they destroy discussion and argument altogether.
οὕτω γὰρ πᾶς λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις γίγνεται· μηθὲν γὰρ τιθέντες ἀναιροῦσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ὅλως λόγον,—ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς διαποροῦντας ἐκ τῶν παραδεδομένων ἀποριῶν ῥᾴδιον ἀπαντᾶν καὶ διαλύειν τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς·
Hence, with such people there is no argument, but as for those who are in doubt because of the difficulties handed down, it is easy to meet them and resolve the causes of their difficulty.
δῆλον δʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ὥστε φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.
This is clear from what has been said.
ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθʼ ἕνα χρόνον ἀληθεύειν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐναντία, διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι κατὰ στέρησιν πᾶσαν ἐναντιότητα· δῆλον δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν τοὺς λόγους ἀναλύουσι τοὺς τῶν ἐναντίων.
Thus, it is manifest from these things that contradictory assertions cannot be true of the same thing at one time, nor can contraries, because every contrariety is stated in terms of privation; and this is clear to those who analyze the definitions of contraries back to their origin.
ὁμοίως δʼ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον οὐδὲν οἷόν τε κατηγορεῖσθαι καθʼ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ·
Likewise, no intermediate can be predicated of one and the same thing.
λευκοῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λέγοντες αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε μέλαν οὔτε λευκὸν ψευσόμεθα· συμβαίνει γὰρ εἶναι λευκὸν αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ εἶναι· θάτερον γὰρ τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων ἀληθεύσεται κατʼ αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἀντίφασις τοῦ λευκοῦ.
For if the subject is white, we shall speak falsely if we say it is neither black nor white; for it follows that it is both white and not white, since one of the two combined assertions will be true of it, and this is the contradiction of white.
οὔτε δὴ καθʼ Ἡράκλειτον ἐνδέχεται λέγοντας ἀληθεύειν, οὔτε κατʼ Ἀναξαγόραν· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τἀναντία τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατηγορεῖν·
It is, therefore, impossible for those who speak according to Heraclitus to speak the truth, nor according to Anaxagoras; otherwise, it will follow that contraries are predicated of the same thing.
ὅταν γὰρ ἐν παντὶ φῇ παντὸς εἶναι μοῖραν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναί φησι γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁποιανοῦν ἐναντιώσεων, εἴπερ ἐν ἅπαντι πᾶν ὑπάρχει μὴ δυνάμει μόνον ἀλλʼ ἐνεργεία ι ικαὶ ἀποκεκριμένον.
For when he says that in everything there is a portion of everything, he says that it is no more sweet than bitter, or than any of the other contrarieties, if indeed everything is present in everything, not potentially only, but actually and distinctly.
ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ πάσας ψευδεῖς οὐδʼ ἀληθεῖς τὰς φάσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι, διʼ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ τῶν συναχθέντων ἂν δυσχερῶν διὰ ταύτην τὴν θέσιν, καὶ διότι ψευδῶν μὲν οὐσῶν πασῶν οὐδʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτό τις φάσκων ἀληθεύσει, ἀληθῶν δὲ ψευδεῖς εἶναι πάσας λέγων οὐ ψεύσεται.
Likewise, it is not possible that all assertions are false, nor that all are true, both because of many other difficulties that would follow from this position, and because if all are false, even the one who asserts this very thing will not be speaking the truth, and if all are true, the one who says that all are false will not be speaking falsely.