§1.7συντόμως μὲν οὖν καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐπεληλύθαμεν τίνες τε καὶ πῶς τυγχάνουσιν εἰρηκότες περί τε τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας·
We have, then, gone through briefly and summarily those who have spoken, and how they have spoken, concerning the principles and truth.
ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γʼ ἔχομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅτι τῶν λεγόντων περὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ αἰτίας οὐθεὶς ἔξω τῶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως ἡμῖν διωρισμένων εἴρηκεν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἀμυδρῶς μὲν ἐκείνων δέ πως φαίνονται θιγγάνοντες.
However, we have at least this much from them: that of those who speak about principle and cause, no one has spoken outside of those causes defined by us in our works on nature, but all of them appear, although dimly, to touch upon them in some way.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν, ἄν τε μίαν ἄν τε πλείους ὑποθῶσι, καὶ ἐάν τε σῶμα ἐάν τε ἀσώματον τοῦτο τιθῶσιν (οἷον Πλάτων μὲν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν λέγων, οἱ δʼ Ἰταλικοὶ τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τὴν τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἀπειρίαν· οὗτοί τε δὴ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἡμμένοι εἰσί, καὶ ἔτι ὅσοι ἀέρα ἢ πῦρ ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ πυρὸς μὲν πυκνότερον ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτόν τινες εἰρήκασιν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον στοιχεῖον)· —οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας ἥψαντο μόνον, ἕτεροι δέ τινες ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως (οἷον ὅσοι φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος ἢ νοῦν ἢ ἔρωτα ποιοῦσιν ἀρχήν)·
For some speak of the principle as matter, whether they assume one or many, and whether they posit this as body or as incorporeal (as Plato speaks of the great and small, the Italians of the unlimited, Empedocles of fire, earth, water, and air, and Anaxagoras of the infinity of homoeomerous parts; and indeed all these have touched upon such a cause, as well as all those who posit air or fire or water, or something denser than fire but rarer than air; for some have said that the first element is of this kind). — These, then, have touched upon this cause alone, but certain others have touched upon that from which is the beginning of motion (such as those who make friendship and strife, or intellect, or love a principle).
τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν σαφῶς μὲν οὐθεὶς ἀποδέδωκε, μάλιστα δʼ οἱ τὰ εἴδη τιθέντες λέγουσιν (οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὔθʼ ὡς ἐντεῦθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως γιγνομένην ὑπολαμβάνουσιν—ἀκινησίας γὰρ αἴτια μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ εἶναι φασιν—ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη παρέχονται, τοῖς δʼ εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν)·
But "what it is to be" and the substance no one has clearly rendered, but those who posit the forms speak of it most of all (for they do not assume the forms to be matter for sensible things, nor the one for the forms, nor do they assume that the beginning of motion comes from there — for they say rather that they are causes of motionlessness and of being at rest — but they provide the forms as the "what it is to be" for each of the other things, and the one for the forms).
τὸ δʼ οὗ ἕνεκα αἱ πράξεις καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ καὶ αἱ κινήσεις τρόπον μέν τινα λέγουσιν αἴτιον, οὕτω δὲ οὐ λέγουσιν οὐδʼ ὅνπερ πέφυκεν.
And that "for the sake of which" actions, changes, and motions occur, they speak of as a cause in a certain way, but they do not speak of it in this way, nor as it is by nature.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ νοῦν λέγοντες ἢ φιλίαν ὡς ἀγαθὸν μὲν ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας τιθέασιν, οὐ μὴν ὡς ἕνεκά γε τούτων ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενόν τι τῶν ὄντων ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀπὸ τούτων τὰς κινήσεις οὔσας λέγουσιν·
For those who speak of intellect or friendship posit these causes as a good indeed, yet not as that for the sake of which any of the existing things either is or becomes, but they say that the motions are from these.
ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ οἱ τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ ὂν φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν τῆς μὲν οὐσίας αἴτιόν φασιν εἶναι, οὐ μὴν τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἢ εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι, ὥστε λέγειν τε καὶ μὴ λέγειν πως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς τἀγαθὸν αἴτιον· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγουσιν. —ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς διώρισται περὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ πόσα καὶ ποῖα, μαρτυρεῖν ἐοίκασιν ἡμῖν καὶ οὗτοι πάντες, οὐ δυνάμενοι θιγεῖν ἄλλης αἰτίας, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι ζητητέαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἢ οὕτως ἅπασαι ἢ τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον, δῆλον·
And in the same way, those who assert that the one or the exists is such a nature say indeed that it is a cause of substance, yet not that any thing either is or becomes for the sake of this; so that it happens to them in a way both to say and not to say that the good is a cause; for they speak of it not absolutely but accidentally. — That, then, we have correctly defined concerning the causes, both how many and of what kind they are, all these thinkers also seem to bear witness to us, being unable to touch upon any other cause; and in addition to these, that the principles are to be sought either all of them in this way or in some such manner is clear.
πῶς δὲ τούτων ἕκαστος εἴρηκε καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τὰς ἐνδεχομένας ἀπορίας μετὰ τοῦτο διέλθωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν.
But how each of these has spoken, and how they stand concerning the principles, let us next discuss the possible difficulties concerning them.