§1.6μετὰ δὲ τὰς εἰρημένας φιλοσοφίας ἡ Πλάτωνος ἐπεγένετο πραγματεία, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦσα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια παρὰ τὴν τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ἔχουσα φιλοσοφίαν.
After the philosophies we have described, the system of Plato appeared, following them in most respects, but also having some features peculiar to it as compared with the philosophy of the Italians.
ἐκ νέου τε γὰρ συνήθης γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις δόξαις, ὡς ἁπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν·
For having from his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean opinions, that all sensible things are ever in flux and that there is no knowledge about them, he held these views even later.
Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκεῖνον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἑτέρων τοῦτο γιγνόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός, ἀεί γε μεταβαλλόντων.
And when Socrates was occupying himself with ethical matters and not at all with nature as a whole, but was seeking the universal in these matters and was the first to fix his thought on definitions, Plato, accepting him for this reason, assumed that this process occurred about other things and not about sensible things; for he thought it impossible that there should be a common definition of any of the sensible things, since they were always changing.
οὗτος οὖν τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε, τὰ δʼ αἰσθητὰ παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι πάντα· κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ ὁμώνυμα τοῖς εἴδεσιν.
He, then, called such entities among things 'ideas,' and said that all sensible things were named besides them and according to them; for it was by participation that the many things homonymous with the forms existed.
τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοὔνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τοὔνομα μεταβαλών.
But he only changed the name 'participation'; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by 'imitation' of numbers, but Plato by 'participation', having changed the name.
τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν ἥτις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.
However, what this 'participation' or 'imitation' of the forms might be, they left to be investigated in common.
ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναί φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δʼ εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλʼ ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον.
Further, besides sensible things and forms, he says that there are mathematical objects which exist as intermediates, differing from sensible things in being eternal and motionless, and from forms in that there are many similar ones, whereas each form itself is only one.
ἐπεὶ δʼ αἴτια τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἄλλοις, τἀκείνων στοιχεῖα πάντων ᾠήθη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα.
And since the forms are causes of other things, he thought that the elements of those forms were the elements of all existing things.
ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὡς δʼ οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν· ἐξ ἐκείνων γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς.
As matter, then, he thought the 'great and small' to be principles, and as substance, the 'one'; for from those, by participation in the one, the numbers exist.
τὸ μέντοι γε ἓν οὐσίαν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἕτερόν γέ τι ὂν λέγεσθαι ἕν, παραπλησίως τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἔλεγε, καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς οὐσίας ὡσαύτως ἐκείνοις·
However, that the one is substance, and is not called one as being something else, he said in a manner very similar to the Pythagoreans, and that numbers are the causes of substance to other things, likewise to them.
τὸ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὡς ἑνὸς δυάδα ποιῆσαι, τὸ δʼ ἄπειρον ἐκ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τοῦτʼ ἴδιον·
But to make a dyad instead of the unlimited as one, and to make the unlimited from the 'great and small', this was peculiar to him.
καὶ ἔτι ὁ μὲν τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, οἱ δʼ ἀριθμοὺς εἶναί φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων οὐ τιθέασιν.
And further, he posits numbers besides sensible things, whereas they say that numbers are the things themselves, and they do not place mathematical objects between them.
τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγὴ διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγένετο σκέψιν (οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον), τὸ δὲ δυάδα ποιῆσαι τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων εὐφυῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννᾶσθαι ὥσπερ ἔκ τινος ἐκμαγείου.
Therefore, to make the one and numbers besides things, and not like the Pythagoreans, and the introduction of forms occurred because of the inquiry in logoi (for the earlier thinkers did not participate in dialectic). And to make the other nature a dyad was because numbers, except the first ones, could be generated from it naturally as from a kind of mold.
καίτοι συμβαίνει γʼ ἐναντίως· οὐ γὰρ εὔλογον οὕτως.
Yet the contrary happens; for this is not reasonable.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πολλὰ ποιοῦσιν, τὸ δʼ εἶδος ἅπαξ γεννᾷ μόνον, φαίνεται δʼ ἐκ μιᾶς ὕλης μία τράπεζα, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἐπιφέρων εἷς ὢν πολλὰς ποιεῖ.
For they make many things out of matter, while the form generates only once, but it is seen that from one matter one table is produced, whereas he who applies the form, though being one, makes many tables.
ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ μιᾶς πληροῦται ὀχείας, τὸ δʼ ἄρρεν πολλὰ πληροῖ· καίτοι ταῦτα μιμήματα τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐκείνων ἐστίν.
And it is similar with the male and the female; for the latter is filled by one copulation, while the male fills many; yet these are imitations of those principles.
Πλάτων μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ζητουμένων οὕτω διώρισεν· φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι δυοῖν αἰτίαιν μόνον κέχρηται, τῇ τε τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην (τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ τί ἐστιν αἴτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δʼ εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν), καὶ τίς ἡ ὕλη ἡ ὑποκειμένη καθʼ ἧς τὰ εἴδη μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ δʼ ἓν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι λέγεται, ὅτι αὕτη δυάς ἐστι, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν τοῖς στοιχείοις ἀπέδωκεν ἑκατέροις ἑκατέραν, ὥσπερ φαμὲν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ἐπιζητῆσαί τινας φιλοσόφων, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν.
Plato, then, defined in this way concerning the matters under inquiry; and it is clear from what has been said that he used only two causes: that of 'what a thing is' and that according to matter (for the forms are causes of 'what a thing is' to other things, and the one is so to the forms), and what the underlying matter is of which the forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and the one in the case of forms, namely that this is a dyad, the 'great and small'. Further, he assigned the cause of well-being and of ill-being to each of the two elements respectively, just as we say some of the earlier philosophers also sought to do, such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras.