§1.8#1ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἕν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν.
Therefore, those who posit the universe as one and some one nature as matter, and this as corporeal and possessing magnitude, are clearly in error in many ways.
τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶν δʼ ἀσωμάτων οὔ, ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων.
For they posit the elements of bodies alone, but not of incorporeal things, even though incorporeal things also exist.
καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἐπιχειροῦντες τὰς αἰτίας λέγειν, καὶ περὶ πάντων φυσιολογοῦντες, τὸ τῆς κινήσεως αἴτιον ἀναιροῦσιν.
And while attempting to state the causes concerning generation and destruction, and treating of nature in all things, they do away with the cause of motion.
ἔτι δὲ τῷ τὴν οὐσίαν μηθενὸς αἰτίαν τιθέναι μηδὲ τὸ τί ἐστι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῷ ῥᾳδίως τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων λέγειν ἀρχὴν ὁτιοῦν πλὴν γῆς, οὐκ ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν πῶς ποιοῦνται, λέγω δὲ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα.
And further, by positing substance as the cause of nothing, nor the "what it is", and in addition to these, by easily speaking of any of the simple bodies except earth as a principle, without having examined how they generate from one another — I mean fire, water, earth, and air.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ συγκρίσει τὰ δὲ διακρίσει ἐξ ἀλλήλων γίγνεται, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τὸ πρότερον εἶναι καὶ ὕστερον διαφέρει πλεῖστον.
For some arise from one another by combination, and others by separation, and this makes the greatest difference with respect to being prior and posterior.
τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἂν δόξειε στοιχειωδέστατον εἶναι πάντων ἐξ οὗ γίγνονται συγκρίσει πρώτου, τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ μικρομερέστατον καὶ λεπτότατον ἂν εἴη τῶν σωμάτων (διόπερ ὅσοι πῦρ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι, μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένως ἂν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ λέγοιεν· τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος ὁμολογεῖ τὸ στοιχεῖον εἶναι τὸ τῶν σωμάτων· οὐθεὶς γοῦν ἠξίωσε τῶν ἓν λεγόντων γῆν εἶναι στοιχεῖον, δηλονότι διὰ τὴν μεγαλομέρειαν, τῶν δὲ τριῶν ἕκαστον στοιχείων εἴληφέ τινα κριτήν, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ οἱ δʼ ὕδωρ οἱ δʼ ἀέρα τοῦτʼ εἶναί φασιν·
For on the one hand, that from which they first arise by combination would seem to be the most elementary of all, and such would be the one with the smallest parts and the rarest of bodies (wherefore those who posit fire as the principle would speak most in agreement with this argument; and indeed everyone of the others agrees that the element of bodies is of this kind; at least none of those who speak of the one has deemed earth to be an element, obviously because of its large parts, but each of the other three elements has received some judge, for some say fire, others water, and others air is this; and yet why indeed do they not speak also of earth, as most men do?
καίτοι διὰ τί ποτʼ οὐ καὶ τὴν γῆν λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πάντα γὰρ εἶναί φασι γῆν, φησὶ δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος τὴν γῆν πρώτην γενέσθαι τῶν σωμάτων· οὕτως ἀρχαίαν καὶ δημοτικὴν συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν ὑπόληψιν)· —κατὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτʼ εἴ τις τούτων τι λέγει πλὴν πυρός, οὔτʼ εἴ τις ἀέρος μὲν πυκνότερον τοῦτο τίθησιν ὕδατος δὲ λεπτότερον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι· εἰ δʼ ἔστι τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ φύσει πρότερον, τὸ δὲ πεπεμμένον καὶ συγκεκριμένον ὕστερον τῇ γενέσει, τοὐναντίον ἂν εἴη τούτων, ὕδωρ μὲν ἀέρος πρότερον γῆ δὲ ὕδατος. —περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μίαν τιθεμένων αἰτίαν οἵαν εἴπομεν, ἔστω ταῦτʼ εἰρημένα· τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ κἂν εἴ τις ταῦτα πλείω τίθησιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τέτταρά φησιν εἶναι σώματα τὴν ὕλην.
For they say that all things are earth, and Hesiod also says that earth was the first of bodies to come into being; so ancient and popular has this assumption happened to be) — therefore, according to this argument, neither if anyone speaks of any of these except fire, nor if anyone posits this as denser than air but rarer than water, would he speak correctly; but on the other hand, if that which is posterior in generation is prior by nature, and that which is concocted and combined is posterior in generation, the contrary of these would be the case, water being prior to air, and earth to water. — Concerning, then, those who posit one cause such as we have mentioned, let these things be said; and the same would apply even if someone posits these as more, as Empedocles says that the matter consists of four bodies.
καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τὰ μὲν ταὐτὰ τὰ δʼ ἴδια συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη.
For it is necessary that for him also some things happen the same, and others in a peculiar way.
γιγνόμενά τε γὰρ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ὁρῶμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀεὶ διαμένοντος πυρὸς καὶ γῆς τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώματος (εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως περὶ αὐτῶν), καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν κινουμένων αἰτίας, πότερον ἓν ἢ δύο θετέον, οὔτʼ ὀρθῶς οὔτε εὐλόγως οἰητέον εἰρῆσθαι παντελῶς.
For we see them generating from one another, as fire and earth do not always remain the same body (and it has been spoken concerning them in our works on nature), and concerning the cause of things in motion, whether one or two must be posited, we must by no means think that it has been spoken either correctly or reasonably at all.
ὅλως τε ἀλλοίωσιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸν οὐδὲ ἐκ ψυχροῦ θερμὸν ἔσται.
And in general, alteration must be done away with for those who speak in this way; for cold will not come from hot, nor hot from cold.
τὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἂν πάσχοι τἀναντία, καὶ τὶς εἴη ἂν μία φύσις ἡ γιγνομένη πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ὃ ἐκεῖνος οὔ φησιν.
For what would those contraries themselves undergo, and what would be that one nature which becomes fire and water, which he denies?
Ἀναξαγόραν δʼ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι δύο λέγειν στοιχεῖα, μάλιστʼ ἂν ὑπολάβοι κατὰ λόγον, ὃν ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ διήρθρωσεν, ἠκολούθησε μέντʼ ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῖς ἐπάγουσιν αὐτόν.
And if anyone should assume that Anaxagoras speaks of two elements, he would assume it most of all in accordance with a reason which, though he himself did not articulate it, he would nevertheless have necessarily followed had others led him to it.
ἀτόπου γὰρ ὄντος καὶ ἄλλως τοῦ φάσκειν μεμῖχθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν πάντα, καὶ διὰ τὸ συμβαίνειν ἄμικτα δεῖν προϋπάρχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι τῷ τυχόντι μίγνυσθαι τὸ τυχόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα χωρίζοιτʼ ἂν τῶν οὐσιῶν (τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν μῖξίς ἐστι καὶ χωρισμός), ὅμως εἴ τις ἀκολουθήσειε συνδιαρθρῶν ἃ βούλεται λέγειν, ἴσως ἂν φανείη καινοπρεπεστέρως λέγων.
For while it is absurd in other respects to say that all things were mixed at the beginning, both because it follows that things must have pre-existed unmixed, and because it is not the nature of any chance thing to mix with any chance thing, and in addition to these, because properties and accidents would be separated from substances (for mixture and separation belong to the same things), yet if anyone should follow him, articulating together what he wishes to say, he would perhaps appear to speak in a more modern way.
ὅτε γὰρ οὐθὲν ἦν ἀποκεκριμένον, δῆλον ὡς οὐθὲν ἦν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης, λέγω δʼ οἷον ὅτι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν ἢ φαιὸν ἢ ἄλλο χρῶμα, ἀλλʼ ἄχρων ἦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· εἶχε γὰρ ἄν τι τούτων τῶν χρωμάτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄχυμον τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν ὁμοίων οὐθέν· οὔτε γὰρ ποιόν τι οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε τί.
For when nothing was separated, it is clear that nothing was true to say of that substance — I mean, for example, that it was neither white nor black or grey or any other color, but it was of necessity colorless; for otherwise it would have had some of these colors; and likewise, by this same argument, it was tasteless, nor had it any other of similar properties; for it was not possible for it to be of any quality, nor of any quantity, nor any specific thing.