§2.9.1περὶ μὲν οὖν εὐτυχίας τοσαῦτα·
On good fortune, then, let so much be said.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑκάστης τῶν ἀρετῶν κατὰ μέρος εἰρήκαμεν, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη καθόλου συνθέσας τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα κεφαλαιωσαμένους εἰπεῖν. §2.9.2ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐ κακῶς λεγόμενον τρὔνομα ἐπὶ τοῦ τελέως σπουδαίου, ἡ καλοκἀγαθία.
Since we have spoken about each of the virtues individually, it would remain to speak in general, putting together and summarizing the particulars. Now, the name "nobility and goodness" is not badly applied to the completely excellent person.
καλὸς κἀγαθὸς γάρ, φασίν, ὅταν τελέως σπουδαῖος ᾖ.
For they say a person is "noble and good" when they are completely excellent.
ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν λέγουσιν, οἷον τὸν δίκαιον καλὸν κἀγαθὸν φασί, τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, τὸν σώφρονα, ὅλως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. §2.9.3ἐπειδὴ οὖν εἰς δύο διαιροῦμεν, καὶ τὰ μέν φαμεν εἶναι καλὰ τὰ δὲ [καὶ] ἀγαθά, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ οὔ, καὶ καλὰ μὲν οἷον τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἀπʼ ἀρετῆς πράξεις, ἀγαθὰ δὲ [οἷον] ἀρχὴν πλοῦτον δόξαν τιμὴν τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἔστιν οὖν ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς καλὰ καλὰ ἐστίν. §2.9.4ὁ τοιοῦτος γὰρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.
For they use "noble and good" in the case of virtue; for example, they say that the just person is noble and good, and the courageous, the temperate, and on the whole in the case of the virtues. Since, then, we divide them into two, and say that some are noble and others are good, and of the goods, some are simply good and others are not, and that the noble things are, for example, the virtues and the actions arising from virtue, and the goods are, for example, office, wealth, reputation, honor, and such things; therefore, the noble and good person is the one for whom the simply good things are good and the simply noble things are noble. For such a person is noble and good.
δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ μή ἐστιν ἀγαθά, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὑγιαίνειν ἂν δόξειεν τὰ ἀπλῶς ὑγιεινὰ μὴ ὑγιεινὰ ἐστίν.
But he for whom the simply good things are not good is not noble and good, just as a person would not seem to be healthy for whom the simply healthy things are not healthy.
εἰ γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ παραγινόμενά τινα βλάπτοιεν, οὐκ ἂν αἱρετὰ εἴη, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα αὐτὸν μὴ βλάψει, βουλήσεται αὐτῷ εἶναι. §2.9.5ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷος ὑποστελλόμενός τι τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ἀλλʼ ᾧ τἀγαθὰ πάντα ὄντα ἀγαθά ἐστιν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μὴ διαφθείρεται, οἷον ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ ἀρχῆς, ὁ τοιοῦτος καλὸς κἀγαθός.
For if wealth and office, when they come to someone, should harm him, they would not be desirable, but he will wish to have such things of this kind as will not harm him. But a person who is such as to shrink from any of the goods so that they do not belong to him would not seem to be noble and good; but the one for whom all existing goods are good and who is not corrupted by them, such as by wealth and office, such a person is noble and good.