§2.8.1ἐχόμενον δʼ ἂν εἴη τούτων εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, περὶ εὐτυχίας.
Following upon these things, it would be appropriate to speak, since our discussion is about happiness, about good fortune.
οἴονται γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον τὸν εὐτυχῆ εἶναι ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ γε εὐτυχίας, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἴσως· ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, ὧν ἡ τύχη ἐστὶ κυρία, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.
For many people think that the happy life is the fortunate one, or at least not without good fortune, and perhaps correctly; for without external goods, over which fortune is master, it is impossible to be happy.
διὸ ῥητέον ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ εὐτυχίας, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ εὐτυχὴς τίς ἐστι καὶ ἐν τίσι καὶ περὶ τί.
Therefore, we must speak about good fortune, and simply who the fortunate person is, and in what things, and concerning what.
§2.8.2πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ ταῦτʼ ἄν τις ἐλθὼν καὶ ἐπιβλέψας ἀπορήσειεν.
First of all, then, if someone approaches these things and inspects them, he might raise a difficulty.
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τις τὴν τύχην ὥς ἐστι φύσις.
For one would not say that fortune is like nature.
ἡ γὰρ φύσις [ἀεὶ] οὖ ἐστιν αἰτία, τούτου ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ∗ ὡσαύτως ποιητικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δέ γε τύχη οὐδέποτε, ἀλλʼ ἀτάκτως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν· διὸ ἡ τύχη ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται.
For nature is productive of that of which it is the cause, for the most part or in the same way, whereas fortune is never so, but disorderly and as it happens; therefore, fortune is spoken of in such things.
οὔτε δὴ νοῦν γέ τινα ἢ λόγον ὀρθόν· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα οὐχ ἧττόν ἐστι τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως, ἡ δὲ τύχη οὔ.
Nor indeed would one say that it is some intellect or right reason; for there, no less, is that which is ordered and always in the same way, whereas fortune is not.
διὸ καὶ οὗ πλεῖστος νοῦς καὶ λόγος, ἐνταῦθα ἐλαχίστη [καὶ] τύχη, οὖ δὲ πλείστη τύχη, ἐνταῦθʼ ἐλάχιστος νοῦς.
Therefore, also, where there is the most intellect and reason, there is the least fortune, and where there is the most fortune, there is the least intellect.
§2.8.3ἀλλʼ ἆρά γε ἡ εὐτυχία ἐστὶν ὡς ἐπιμέλειά τις θεῶν;
But indeed, is good fortune like some care of the gods?
ἢ τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν;
Or would this not seem so?
τὸν γὰρ θεὸν ἀξιοῦμεν κύριον ὄντα τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ἀξίοις ἀπονέμειν καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, ἡ δὲ τύχη καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης ὡς ἀληθῶς ὡς ἂν τύχῃ γίνεται.
For we think it right that God, being master of such things, distributes both good and bad things to the worthy, whereas fortune and things from fortune truly happen as it may chance.
εἰ δέ γε τῷ θεῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπονέμομεν, φαῦλον αὐτὸν κριτὴν ποιήσομεν ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· τοῦτο δʼ οὐ προσῆκόνἐστι [τῷ] θεῷ.
If, however, we attribute such a thing to God, we shall make him a poor judge or an unjust one; and this is not fitting for God.
§2.8.4ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔξω γε τούτων εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὴν τύχην ἄν τις τάξειεν, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τούτων ἄν τι εἴη.
But indeed, outside of these, one could not class fortune under anything else, so that it is clear that it would be one of these.
νοῦς μὲν δὴ καὶ λόγος καὶ ἐπιστήμη παντελῶς ἀλλότριόν τι ἔοικεν εἶναι.
Intellect indeed and reason and science seem to be something completely foreign.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἡ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ἡ εὔνοια παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι εὐτυχία διὰ τὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐγγίγνεσθαι· §2.8.5τὸν δὲ θεὸν τῶν φαύλων οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.
But indeed, neither would care and goodwill from God seem to be good fortune, due to its arising also among the base; and it is not likely for God to care for the base.
λοιπὸν τοίνυν καὶ οἰκειότατον τῆς εὐτυχίας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις.
Therefore, what remains and is most proper to good fortune is nature.
ἔστιν δʼ ἡ εὐτυχία καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὖσιν, μηδʼ ὧν αὐτοὶ κύριοί ἐσμεν καὶ δυνατοὶ πρᾶξαι.
And good fortune and fortune are among those things that are not up to us, nor of which we ourselves are masters and able to do.
διὸ τὸν δίκαιον, δίκαιος, οὐθεὶς λέγει εὐτυχῆ οὐδὲ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον οὐδʼ ὅλως τῶν κατʼ ἀρετὴν οὐδένα· ἐφʼ ἡμῖν γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἔχειν.
Therefore, no one says that the just person, as just, is fortunate, nor the courageous person, nor on the whole any of those in accordance with virtue; for these are up to us both to have and not to have.
ἀλλʼ ἤδη ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰκειότερον τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἐροῦμεν· τὸν γὰρ εὐγενῆ εὐτυχῆ λέγομεν, καὶ ὅλως ᾧ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχει, ὧν μὴ αὐτὸς κύριος ἐστίν.
But we shall speak of good fortune more properly already in the case of such things: for we call the well-born fortunate, and on the whole the one to whom such good things belong, of which he himself is not master.
§2.8.6ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐδʼ ἐνταῦθα κυρίως ἂν ἡ εὐτυχία λέγοιτο.
But yet, not even here would good fortune be spoken of in the strict sense.
ἔστιν δὲ πολλαχῶς ὁ εὐτυχὴς λεγόμενος· καὶ γὰρ ᾧ παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ συνέβη τι ἀγαθὸν πρᾶξαι, εὐτυχῆ φαμέν, καὶ ᾧ κατὰ λόγον ζημίαν ἦν λαβεῖν, τὸν τοιοῦτον κερδάναντα εὐτυχῆ φαμέν.
But the fortunate person is spoken of in many ways; for we call fortunate both the one to whom it happened to do some good thing contrary to his own calculation, and the one who was reasonable to receive a loss, but such a person having gained, we call him fortunate.
§2.8.7ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐτυχία ἐν τῷ ἀγαθόν τι ὑπάρξαι παρὰ λόγον καὶ ἐν τῷ κακὸν μὴ λαβεῖν εὔλογον.
Good fortune, therefore, is in some good thing belonging [to someone] contrary to reason, and in not receiving a bad thing when it was reasonable to do so.
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἡ εὐτυχία ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν καθʼ αὐτὸ δόξειεν ἂν εὐτύχημα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ κακὸν μὴ λαβεῖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐτύχημα.
But good fortune would seem to be more and more properly in receiving a good thing; for receiving a good thing would seem to be a fortunate event in itself, while not receiving a bad thing is a fortunate event by accident.
§2.8.8ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐτυχία ἄλογος φύσις· ὁ γὰρ εὐτυχής ἐστιν ὁ ἄνευ λόγου ἔχων ὁρμὴν πρὸς τἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνων, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ φύσεως· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ψνχῇ ἔνεστιν τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον ᾧ ὁρψῶμεν ἀλόγως πρὸς ἂν εὖ ἔχωμεν, §2.8.9καὶ εἴ τις ἐρωτήσειε τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, διὰ τί τοῦτο ἀρέσκει σοι οὕτω πράτειν; οὐκ οἶδα, φησίν, ἀλλʼ ἀρέσκει μοι, ὅμοιον πάσχων τοῖς ἐνθουσιάζουσιν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἔνθουσιάζοντες ἄνευ λόγον ὁρμὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τι.
Good fortune, therefore, is an irrational nature; for the fortunate person is the one who has, without reason, an impulse towards good things, and attains them, and this is of nature; for there is in the soul by nature such a thing by which we are impelled irrationally towards what we may fare well, and if someone should ask the one in this state, "Why does it please you to act so?", "I do not know," he says, "but it pleases me," suffering something similar to those who are inspired by a god; for those who are inspired by a god also have, without reason, an impulse towards doing something.
§2.8.10τὴν δʼ εὐτυχίαν οὐκ ἔχομεν ρἰκείῳ καὶ ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύειν, ἀλλʼ αἰτίαν πολλάκις φαμὲν εἶναι αὐτήν· ἡ δʼ αἰτἰα ἀλλότριον τοῦ ὀνόματος.
But we are not able to address good fortune by its proper and peculiar name, but we often say that it is a cause; but "cause" is foreign to the name.
ἡ γὰρ αἰτία καὶ οὗ ἐστιν αἰτία ἄλλο ἐστίν, καὶ ἄνευ ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπιτυγχανούσης τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία λεγομένη, οἷον ἡ τοῦ κακὸν μὴ λαβεῖν ἢ πάλιν τοῦ μὴ οἰόμενον ἀγαθὸν λήψοσθαι ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν.
For the cause and that of which it is a cause are different, and [something] is called a cause without an impulse that attains good things, such as the cause of not receiving a bad thing, or again, of receiving a good thing when not expecting to receive it.
§2.8.11ἔσπτιν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη εὐτυχία διάφορος ἐκείνης, καὶ ἔοικεν αὕτη ἐκ τῶν πραγιάτων τῆς μεταπτώσεως γίνεσθαι, καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐτνχία.
Therefore, such good fortune is different from that one, and this seems to arise from the change of circumstances, and is good fortune by accident.
ὥστ’ εἰ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἐστὶν εὐτυχία, ἀλλʼ οὖν πρές γε τὴν εὐδαμονίαν ἡ τοιαύτη ἂν εἴη εὐτυχία οἰκειοτέρα, ἧς ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁρμῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστι τῆς ἐπιτεύξεως.
So that even if such a thing is also good fortune, nevertheless, at least in relation to happiness, such good fortune would be more proper, in which the starting-point of the impulse for attaining good things is in oneself.
§2.8.12ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἄνερ τῶν ἔκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται ἀπὸ τῆς εὐτυχίας, οἷον ἀραίως ἔφαμεν, συνεργὸς ἂν εἴη τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.
Since, therefore, happiness is not without external goods, and these come from good fortune, as we said just now, it would be a helper to happiness.