§2.10.1ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὀρθῶς πράττειν εἴρηται μέν, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δέ.
Regarding acting rightly in accordance with the virtues, though it has been said, it has not been said sufficiently.
ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράτττειν·
For we said that it is to act in accordance with right reason.
ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἄν τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν ἐρωτήσειεν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τί ποτʼ ἐστί, καὶ ποῦ ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος; ἔστιν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, §2.10.2ὅταν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ κωλύῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐνεργεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν.
But perhaps someone, being ignorant of this very thing, might ask: "What on earth is it to act in accordance with right reason, and where is right reason?" To act in accordance with right reason, then, is when the irrational part of the soul does not prevent the rational part from exercising its own activity.
τότε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ἔσται κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.
For then the action will be in accordance with right reason.
ἐπειδὴ γάρ τι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔχομεν τὸ δὲ βέλτιον, ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν, καὶ τότʼ ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καλῶς, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥστε μὴ κωλύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβάλλεσθαι καὶ συμπαρορμᾶν πρὸς τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιτελεῖν τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον (τὸ γὰρ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν, πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν τῷ βελτίονι)· §2.10.3ὅταν οὖν τὰ πάθη μὴ κωλύωσι τὸν νοῦν τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον ἐνεργεῖν, τότʼ ἔσται τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον γινόμενον.
For since we have in the soul one part that is worse and another that is better, and the worse is always for the sake of the better, just as in the case of body and soul, the body is for the sake of the soul, and we shall say that the body is in a good state then, when it is in such a condition as not to prevent, but even to contribute and to urge along with the soul toward its accomplishing its own work (for the worse is for the sake of the better, in order to cooperate with the better); when, therefore, the passions do not prevent the intellect from exercising its own work, then what happens will be in accordance with right reason.
ναί, ἀλλʼ ἴσως εἴπτοι τις ἄν, ὅταν πῶς ἔχωσι τὰ πάθη, οὐ κωλύουσι, καὶ πότε οὕτως ἔχουσιν;
Yes, but perhaps someone might say: "When the passions are in what condition do they not prevent, and when are they in this condition?
οὐ γὰρ οἶδα. §2.10.4τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ῥᾴδιον.
For I do not know." Now, such a thing is not easy to say.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἰατρός· ἀλλʼ ὅταν εἴπτῃ τῷ πυρέττοντι πτισάνην προσφέρεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ πυρέττειν πῶς αἰσθάνομαι; ὅταν, φησίν, ὁρᾷς ὠχρὸν ὄντα· τὸ δʼ ὠχρὸν πῶς εἰδήσω ἐνταῦθα δὴ συνιέτω ὁ ἰατρός· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔχεις παρὰ σαυτῷ, φησί, τῶν γε τοιούτων αἴσθησιν, οὐκ ἔτι. ὡσαύτως ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων κοινός ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων ὁ λόγος.
For neither is it for the physician; but when he tells the one who has a fever to take barley-gruel, and [the other asks] "But how do I perceive his having a fever?"—"When," he says, "you see him being pale."—"And how shall I know the pale?" Here indeed let the physician make him understand; for he says, "If you do not have in yourself a perception of such things, no further [can I go]." In the same way, regarding other such things, the account is common.
§2.10.5ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παθῶν τοῦ γνωρίζειν· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς αἴσθησίν τι.
And it is similar also in the case of recognizing the passions; for one must himself contribute something toward perception.
§2.10.6ἐπιζητήσειε δʼ ἄν τις ἴσως καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἆρά γε ἔργῳ εἰδήσας ταῦτα καὶ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσομαι; οἴονται γάρ. τὸ δʼ ἐστὶν οὐ τοιοῦτον.
And perhaps someone might also inquire into this kind of thing: "Will I indeed be happy by knowing these things in practice?" For they think so; but it is not so.
οὐδεμία γὰρ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλωον ἐπιστημῶν παραδίδωσι τῷ μανθάνοντι τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἕξιν μόνον· οὕτωος οὐδʼ ἐνταῦθα παραδίδωοσιν τὸ εἰδῆσαι ταῦτα τὴν χρῆσιν (ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ὡς φαμέν), ἀλλὰ τὴν ἕξιν, οὐδʼ ἐν τῷ εἰδέναι ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλʼ ἐν τὸν τούτmμις χρήσαεθαι.
For neither does any other of the sciences hand over to the learner its use and activity, but only the state; so neither here does knowing these things hand over the use (for happiness is an activity, as we say), but rather the state, nor does it consist in knowing the things from which happiness is constituted, but in using them.
§2.10.7τὴν δὲ χρῆσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργωκαν τούτων οὐκ ἄστι τώmης τἧς π??ς τὸ παραὰιδόνε??· οὐδὲ γὰρ?? ἐπιστήκῃ οὐδεμία ιὴν χρῆτιν παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἕ??ιν.
And to hand over the use and the activity of these is not the task of this science; for neither does any science hand over the use, but rather the state.