§2.7.24ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔστιν γε μὴ λυπούμενον ἢ ἡδόμενον τὰ κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράττειν· τὸ δʼ ἀνὰ μέσον οὐκ ἔστιν.
But indeed, it is impossible to act in accordance with virtue without being either pained or pleased; and there is no middle state.
διὰ τί;
Why?
ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐν πάθει, τὸ δὲ πάθος ἐν λύπῃ καὶ ἡδονῇ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀνὰ μέσον οὐκ ἔστιν·
Because virtue is in passion, and passion is in pain and pleasure, and there is no middle state.
δῆλον οὖν ὡς καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μετὰ λύπης ἢ ἡδονῆς.
It is clear, then, that virtue also is with pain or pleasure.
εἰ μὲν οὖν λυπούμενός τίς τὰ καλὰ πράττει, οὐ σπουδαῖος.
If, therefore, someone acts what is noble being pained, he is not serious.
ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ μετὰ λύπης· μεθʼ ἡδονῆς ἄρα.
So virtue would not be with pain; with pleasure, then.
§2.7.25οὐ μόνον ἄρα οὐκ ἐμπόδιόν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ καὶ προτρεπτικὸν πρὸς τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ἡδονῆς εἶναι τῆς ἀπʼ αὐτῆς γινομένης.
Therefore, pleasure is not only not an impediment, but also a promotional force towards acting, and as a whole, it is not possible [for virtue] to exist without the pleasure arising from the action itself.
§2.7.26ἄλλος ἦν λόγος ὅτι οὐδεμία ποιεῖ ἐπιστήμη ἡδονήν.
There was another argument, that no science produces pleasure.
ἔστιν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές.
But neither is this true.
οἱ γὰρ δειπνοποιοὶ καὶ σττεφανοποιοὶ καὶ [οἰ] μυρεψοὶ ἡδονῆς εἰσιν ποιητικοί. [ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ ὡς τέλος, ἀλλὰ μεθʼ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς. ] ἔστιν οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμη ποιητικὴ ἡδονῆς. ∗
For cooks, wreath-makers, and perfumers are producers of pleasure. [But indeed for other sciences, pleasure is not as an end, but is with pleasure and not without pleasure.] Therefore, there is also a science that produces pleasure.
§2.7.27ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος ἐλέγετο, ὅτι οὐκ ἄριστον.
Furthermore, another was also said, that it is not the best.
ἀλλʼ οὕτως μὲν καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ ἀναιρήσεις καὶ τὰς καθʼ ἕκαστα λεγομένας ἀρετάς.
But in this way, even by such an argument, you will also destroy the virtues spoken of individually.
ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία οὐκ ἔστιν ἄριστον· ἆῤ οὖν διὰ τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἀγαθόν;
For courage is not the best; is it therefore not a good because of this?
ἢ τοῦτʼ ἄτοπον;
Or is this absurd?
ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Similarly also in the case of the others.
οὐδὲ ἡδονὴ διὰ τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄριστον.
Nor is pleasure not a good for this reason, because it is not the best.
§2.7.28ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις μεταβὰς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.
But someone might raise a difficulty, shifting the discussion also to the virtues, about such a thing.
οἷον ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος κρατεῖ ποτε τῶν παθῶν (φαμὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς), καὶ τὰ πάθη δὲ πάλιν ἀντεστραμμένως τοῦ λόγου κρατεῖ (οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν συμβαίνει), ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχον τὴν κακίαν κρατεῖ τοῦ λόγου εὖ διακειμένου (ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς τοιοῦτος), καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως φαύλως διακείμενος κρατήσει τῶν παθῶν εὖ διακειμένων καὶ ἐχόντων τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔσται, συμβήσεται τῇ ἀρετῇ κακῶς χρῆσθαι (ὁ γὰρ λόγος φαύλως διακείμενος καὶ χρώμενος τῇ ἀρετῇ κακῶς αὐτῇ χρήσεται)·
For example, since reason sometimes rules over the passions (for we speak of this in the case of the self-controlled person), and the passions again, conversely, rule over reason (as happens in the case of the uncontrolled), since, therefore, the irrational part of the soul, having vice, rules over reason when it is well-disposed (for the uncontrolled person is of this kind), will reason, likewise when it is poorly disposed, rule over the passions when they are well-disposed and possess their proper virtue?
τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἄτοπον ἂν συμβαίνειν δόξειεν.
And if this is to be, it will happen that virtue is used badly (for reason, being poorly disposed and using virtue, will use it badly); and indeed such a thing would seem absurd to happen.
§2.7.29πρὸς δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν ῥᾴδιον ἀντειπεῖν καὶ λῦσαι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς.
Against such a difficulty, it is easy to reply and solve it from what has been said by us previously concerning virtue.
τότε γάρ φαμεν εἶναι ἀρετήν, ὅταν ὁ λόγος εὖ διακείμενος τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχουσι τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν σύμμετρος ᾖ, καὶ τὰ πάθη τῷ λόγῳ· οὕτω γὰρ διακείμενα συμφωνήσουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὥστε τὸν μὲν λόγον προστάττειν ἀεὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, τὰ δὲ πάθη ῥᾳδίως εὖ διακείμενα ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν ὁ λόγος προστάττῃ·
For we say that virtue exists then, when reason, being well-disposed, is commensurate with the passions when they possess their proper virtue, and the passions with reason; for being disposed in this way, they will harmonize with one another, so that reason always commands what is best, and the passions, being well-disposed, easily do whatever reason commands.
§2.7.30ἂν οὖν ὁ λόγος φαύλως διακείμενος, τὰ δὲ πάθη εὖ, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετὴ ἐκλείπ τοντος τοῦ λόγου (ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἡ ἀρετή)· ὥστʼ οὐδὲ κακῶς χρῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ἀρετῇ. — ἀπλῶς δʼ οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἴονται οἱ ἄλλοι, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡγεμών ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὰ πάθη.
If, therefore, reason is poorly disposed, but the passions are well-disposed, virtue will not exist, since reason is failing (for virtue is from both); so that it is not even possible to use virtue badly. — Absolutely indeed, it is not, as others think, that reason is the starting-point and leader of virtue, but rather the passions.
δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὁρμὴν ἄλογόν τινα πρῶτον ἐγγίνεσθαι (ὃ καὶ γίνεται), εἶθʼ οὕτως τὸν λόγον ὕστερον ἐπωψηφίζοντα εἶναι καὶ διακρίνοντα.
For there must first arise some irrational impulse toward the noble (which also happens), and then in this way reason later must be casting its vote and distinguishing.
ἴδοι δʼ ἄν τις τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν παιδίων καὶ τῶν ἄνευ λόγου ζώντων· ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου ἐγγίνονται ὁρμαὶ τῶν παθῶν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν πρότερον, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὕστερος ἐπιγινόμενος καὶ σύμψηφος ὢν ποιεῖ πράττειν τὰ καλά.
And one might see this from children and those who live without reason; for in these, without reason, impulses of the passions toward the noble arise first, and reason, coming later and voting with them, makes them act what is noble.
ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀρχὴν λάβῃ πρὸς τὰ καλά, οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ πάθη ὁμογνωμονοῦντα, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐναντιοῦται·
But it is not the case that, if it takes its starting-point from reason toward noble things, the passions do not follow in agreement, but rather they often oppose.
διὸ μᾶλλον ἀρχῇ ἔοικεν πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν τὸ πάθος εὖ διακείμενον ἢ ὁ λόγος.
Therefore, the passion being well-disposed seems to be more of a starting-point toward virtue than reason.