§2.7.9ὅμοιον οὖν εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἴεται εἶναι σῶμα, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὔ· ἔστι δέ γε καὶ [ἡ] ψυχή.
Therefore, it is similar to if someone thinks that a human is body, because this is perceptible, but the soul is not; yet indeed there is also soul.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου· ἔστιν γὰρ μόριόν τι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾦ ἡδόμεθα, ὃ ἄμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ἐνεργεῖ.
And similarly also in this case; for there is some part of the soul by which we are pleased, which acts at the same time as the supply.
διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις.
Therefore, no pleasure is becoming.
§2.7.10— καὶ ἀποκατάστασις δέ, φασίν, εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή.
—And they say that pleasure is a perceptible restoration to nature.
καὶ γὰρ μὴ ἀποκαθισταμένοις εἰς φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡδονή· τὸ γὰρ ἀποκαθίστασθαί ἐστι τὸ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς τῇ φύσει, τούτου τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν γενέσθαι, ἔστιν δέ, ὡς φαμέν, μὴ ὄντα ἐνδεᾶ ἥδεσθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔνδεια λύπη, ἄνευ δὲ λύπης καὶ πρὸ λύπης φαμὲν ἥδεσθαι· ὥστʼ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀποκατάστασις τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς· ἐνδεὲς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν οὐδέν. — ὥστε εἰ διότι μὲν γένεσις ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἐδόκει εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις, ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη ἡ ἡδονή.
But indeed there is pleasure also for those who are not being restored to nature; for to be restored is for the replenishment of what is deficient in nature to take place, but it is possible, as we say, to be pleased without being deficient; for indeed deficiency is pain, but we say that we are pleased without pain and prior to pain; so that pleasure would not be a restoration of what is deficient; for in the case of such pleasures, nothing is deficient. —So that if indeed pleasure did not seem to be a good because it is becoming, but indeed no pleasure is becoming, pleasure would be a good.
§2.7.11ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο οὐ πᾶσα, φασίν, ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν.
But after this they say that not all pleasure is a good.
συνίδοι δʼ ἄν τις καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου οὕτως.
And one might understand concerning this also as follows.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τἀγαθόν φαμεν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγεσθαι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι καὶ ποσῷ καὶ πότε καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀπάσαις), ἤδη γʼ ἐκεῖνο φανερόν.
For since we say that the good is spoken of in all the categories (for indeed in substance, and in relation, and in quantity, and in time, and generally in all), that indeed is already clear.
κατὰ πάσας γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργείας ἡδονή τις ἀκολουθεῖ, ὥστʼ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, καὶ ἡδονὴ ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν· ὥστʼ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τούτοις μὲν τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδονή, ἡ δʼ ἀπό τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡδονὴ ἡδονή, ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη πᾶσα ἡδονή. — §2.7.12ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τούτου ὅτι καὶ διάφοροι τῷ εἴδει αἱ ἡδοναὶ εἰσίν.
For in accordance with all activities of the good some pleasure follows, so that since the good is in all the categories, pleasure also would be a good; so that since in these there are goods and pleasure, and the pleasure from goods is pleasure, all pleasure would be a good. — And at the same time it is clear from this that pleasures are also different in species.
διάφοροι γὰρ καὶ αἱ κατηγορίαι, ἐν αἷς ἐστιν ἡδονή.
For the categories in which pleasure is are also different.
οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔχει, οἷον τῆς γραμματικῆς ἢ ἄλλης ἡστινοσοῦν.
For it is not as it is in the case of sciences, for example of grammar or any other whatsoever.
ἐὰν ἔχῃ γὰρ Λάμπρος τὴν γραμματικήν, ὁμοίως [δὲ] διακείσεται ὑπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ταύτης ὁ γραμματικὸς ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ἔχοντι γραμματικήν, οὐ〈-δὲ〉 δύο εἰσὶν διάφοροι αἱ γραμματικαί, ἥ τʼ ἐν Λάμπρῳ καὶ ἐν Ἰλεῖ ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐχʼ οὕτως.
For if Lampros possesses grammar, the grammarian will be disposed by this grammar in the same way as any other person possessing grammar, nor are there two different grammars, the one in Lampros and the one in Ileus; but in the case of pleasure it is not so.
ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς μέθης ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ συγγίνεσθαι οὐχ ὁμοίως διατιθέασιν.
For the pleasure from drunkenness and the pleasure from sexual intercourse do not dispose one in the same way.
διὸ διάφοροι τῷ εἴδει δόξαιεν ἂν εἶναι αἱ ἡδοναί.
Therefore, pleasures would seem to be different in species.
§2.7.13ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ διότι φαῦλαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί τινες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡ ἡδονὴ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.
But indeed also because some pleasures are bad, and for this reason pleasure did not seem to them to be a good.
τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ τοιαὐτη κρίσις οὐκ ἴδιός ἐστιν ἡδονῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ φύσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης.
But such a thing and such a judgment is not peculiar to pleasure, but applies also to nature and to science.
ἔστι γὰρ καὶ φύσις φαύλη, οἷον ἡ τῶν σκωλήκων καὶ ἡ τῶν κανθάρων καὶ ὅλως ἡ τῶν ἀτίμων ζῴων, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ φύσις τῶν φαύλων· §2.7.14ὁμοίως δʼ εἰσὶ καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι φαῦλαι, οἷον αἱ βάναυσοι, ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐ διὰ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλʼ ἀγαθὸν τῷ γένει καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ φύσις.
For indeed there is also a bad nature, such as that of worms and of beetles and generally of dishonored animals, but not for this reason is nature bad; similarly there are also bad sciences, such as the mechanical ones, but nevertheless not for this reason is science bad, but both science and nature are good in genus.
ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδʼ ἀνδριαντοποιὸν θεωρεῖν δεῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἀπέτυχε καὶ κακῶς εἰργάσατο, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὧν εὖ, οὕτως οὐδʼ ἐπιστήμην οὐδὲ φύσιν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν φαύλων, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν σπουδαίων.
For just as one should not judge what sort of person a sculptor is from the things in which he failed and worked badly, but from the things in which he did well, so one should not judge science or nature or anything else what sort of thing it is from the bad, but from the serious.
§2.7.15ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ τῷ γένει ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γέ εἰσιν φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, οὐδὲ ἡμᾶς λανθάνει.
Similarly also pleasure is a good in genus, since that indeed there are bad pleasures does not escape us either.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ καὶ φύσεις τῶν ζῴων εἰσὶν διάφοροι, οἷον καὶ φαύλη καὶ σπουδαία, οἷον ἡ μὲν ἀνθρώπου σπουδαία ἡ δὲ λύκου ἢ τινος ἄλλου θηρίου φαύλη, ὁμοίως δʼ ἑτέρα φύσις ἵππου καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ὄνου καὶ κυνός,
For since also the natures of animals are different, for example bad and serious—as that of a human is serious, while that of a wolf or some other beast is bad—and similarly the nature of a horse, a human, a donkey, and a dog is different,