§2.7.1μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον ἂν εἴη περὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, τὴν δʼ εὐδαιμονίαν οἴονται πάντες ἤτοι ἡδονὴν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ γε ἡδονῆς.
After these things, we should discuss pleasure, since our discourse is about happiness, and everyone thinks that happiness is either pleasure and living pleasantly, or at least not without pleasure.
οἱ δὲ καὶ τῇ ἡδονῇ δυσχεραίνοντες καὶ οὐκ οἰόμενοι δεῖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐναριθμεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἀλλὰ τό γε ἄλυπονπροστιθέασιν· §2.7.2ἐγγὺς οὖν τὸ ἀλύπως τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστίν.
And even those who are displeased with pleasure and do not think that pleasure should be numbered among goods, at least add freedom from pain; therefore, freedom from pain is close to pleasure.
διόπερ λεκπέον ὑπὲρ ἧδονῆς, οὐ μόνον δὲ διότι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἴονται δεῖν, ἀλλὰ δὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἐστιν λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἡδονῆς.
For this reason, we must speak about pleasure, not only because others also think they must, but indeed because it is necessary for us to speak about pleasure.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, τὴν δʼεὐδαιμονίαν διωρέκαμεν καὶ φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ, ἡ δʼἀρετή ἐστι περὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· ὑπὲρ ἡδονῆς ἂν εἴη ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄνευ ἡδονῆς.
For since our discourse is about happiness, and we have defined happiness and say that it is the activity of virtue in a complete life, and virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain, it would be necessary to speak about pleasure, since happiness is not without pleasure.
§2.7.3πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴπωμεν ἅ τινες λέγοντες οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἐν ἀγαθοῦ μέρει λαμβάνειν.
First, then, let us state what some people say when they do not think that pleasure should be taken as a part of the good.
— πρῶτον μὲν γάρ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν ἀτελές τι, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν οὐδέποτε τὴν τοῦ ἀτελοῦς χώραν ἔχειν·
First, they say that pleasure is a process of becoming (genesis), and becoming is something incomplete, and the good never has the place of the incomplete.
δεύτερον δʼ ὅτι εἰσί τινες φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, τὸ δʼ ἀγαθὸν οὐδέποτε ἐν φαυλότητι εἶναι.
Second, that there are some bad pleasures, and the good is never in badness.
πάλιν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ φαύλῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ καὶ ἐν θηρίῳ καὶ ἐν βοσκήματι· τὸ δʼ ἀγαθὸν ἀμιγές ἐστι τοῖς φαύλοις καὶ οὐ πολύκοινον. ∗∗.
Again, that it occurs in all things; for it occurs in the bad and in the serious person, and in wild beasts and in cattle; but the good is unmixed with the bad and is not widely shared. [lacuna].
καὶ ὅτι οὐ κράτιστονἡδονή, τὸ δʼἀγαθὸν κράτιστον.
And that pleasure is not the best thing, while the good is the best thing.
καὶ ὅτι ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πράττειν τὰ καλά, τὸ δὲ κωλυτικὸν τῶν καλῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀμαθόν.
And that it is an obstacle to doing noble things, and what hinders noble things could not be a good.
§2.7.4πρῶτον μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἂν εἲη λεκτέον, πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ πειρατέον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λύειν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀληθῆ εἶναι.
First, then, we should speak against the first point, against becoming, and try to refute this argument because it is not true.
ἔστι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις.
For first, not all pleasure is becoming.
ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἡδονὴ γινομένη οὐκ ἔστιν γένεσις, οὐδʼ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ 〈ἰδεῖν καὶ〉 ὀσφρανθῆναι.
For the pleasure arising from contemplation is not becoming, nor is that from hearing, <seeing, and> smelling.
οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδείας γινομένη, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν.
For it does not arise from deficiency, as in the other cases, such as eating or drinking.
αὗται μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς γίνονται, τῷ ἢ τὴν ἔνδειαν ἀναπληροῦσθαι ἢ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι·
For these indeed arise from deficiency and excess, by either the deficiency being filled up or the excess being removed; which is why it seems to be becoming.
§2.7.5διὸ γένεσις δοκεῖ εἶναι. ἡ δʼ ἔνδεια καὶ ὑπερβολὴ λύπη.
And deficiency and excess are pain.
λύπη οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἔνθα ἡδονῆς γένεσις.
Therefore, pain is present where there is a becoming of pleasure.
ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῦ ἰδεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐκ ἔστιν προλυπηθῆναι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡδόμενος τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ τῷ ὀσφραίνεσθαι προελυπήθη.
But in the case of seeing, hearing, and smelling, there is no prior experiencing of pain; for no one who is pleased by seeing or smelling has experienced pain beforehand.
§2.7.6ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διανοίας ἔστι θεωροῦντά τι ἥδεσθαι ἄνευ τοῦ προλυπηθῆναι.
Similarly, in the case of the intellect, it is possible for one contemplating something to be pleased without prior experiencing of pain.
ὥστʼ εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονή ἣ οὐκ ἔστι γένεσι εἰ οὖν ἡ μὲν ἡδονή, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν ἔφη, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι γένεσις, ἔστι δὲ τις ἡδονή, ἣ οὔκ ἐστιν γένεσις, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν.
So there would be some pleasure which is not becoming. If, then, pleasure is not a good for this reason, as their argument said, because it is becoming, and there is indeed some pleasure which is not becoming, this pleasure would be a good.
§2.7.7— τὸ δʼὅλον οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ φαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν ἡδοναὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ γενέσεις, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ταύτας φάσκοντες εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς γενέσεις.
—But on the whole, no pleasure is becoming; for not even these pleasures from eating and drinking are becomings, but those who assert that these pleasures are becomings are mistaken.
οἴονται γάρ, ἐπειδὴ τῆς προσφορᾶς γινομένης γίνεται ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτο γένεσιν εἶναι· ἔστι δʼ οὔ.
For they think, because pleasure occurs when the supply is being introduced, that for this reason it is becoming; but it is not.
§2.7.8ἐπειδὴ γάρ ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς τι μέρος ᾧ ἡδόμεθα ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ὧν ἐσμεν ἐνδεεῖς, τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ κίνησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἡδονή· διὰ δὴ τὸ ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μόριον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν, οἴονται γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τῷ τὴν προσφορὰν δήλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μόριον ἄδηλον.
For since there is some part of the soul by which we are pleased at the same time as the supply of what we are deficient in, this part of the soul acts and is moved, and its movement and activity is pleasure; and indeed, because that part of the soul acts at the same time as the supply, or because of its activity, they think that pleasure is becoming, because the supply is obvious, but the part of the soul is non-obvious.