§2.7.16ἡ δὲ ἡδονή ἐστι κατάστασις ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν εἰς φύσιν ἑκάστῳ τὴν αὐτοῦ· ὥστε τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον, τῇ γε φαύλῃ φύσει ἡ φαύλη ἡδονή.
And pleasure is a restoration from what is contrary to nature to nature, for each to their own; so that this would be peculiar, namely the bad pleasure to the bad nature.
οὐ γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁμοίως οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἀλλʼ ἐπείπερ αἱ φύσεις διάφοροι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ διάφοροι.
For it is not the same for both horse and human, and similarly not for the others; but since indeed natures are different, pleasures also are different.
ἡ γὰρ ἡδονὴ ἦν ἀποκατάστασις, καὶ ἡ ἀποκατάστασις, φασίν, εἰς φύσιν καθίστη, ὥστε τῆς μὲν φαύλης φύσεως ἡ κατάστασις φαύλη, τῆς δὲ σπουδαίας σπουδαία.
For pleasure was a restoration, and restoration, they say, settles one into nature, so that the restoration of a bad nature is bad, and that of a serious one is serious.
§2.7.17ἀλλʼ οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐ σπουδαίαν πεπόνθασιν οἷον οἱ μὴ εἰδότες τὸ νέκταρ οἴονται τοὺς θεοὺς οἶνον πίνειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τούτου ἥδιον οὐδέν.
But those who assert that pleasure is not serious have suffered like those who, not knowing nectar, think that the gods drink wine and that there is nothing sweeter than this.
τοῦτο δὲ πάσχουσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.
And they suffer this because of ignorance.
οἷς ὅμοιον πεπόνθασιν οἱ πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς γενέσεις φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἀλλʼ ἢ τὰς σωματικάς, ταύτας τε ὁρᾶν γενέσεις τε οὔσας καὶ μὴ σπουδαίας, ὅλως οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν.
Those who assert that all pleasures are becomings and not a good have suffered similarly to them; for because of not knowing other pleasures than the bodily ones, and seeing these to be both becomings and not serious, they do not think at all that pleasure is a good.
§2.7.18ἐπεὶ δʼ οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ καθισταμένης τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, οἷον καθισταμένης μὲν αἱ ἐξ ἐνδείας ἀναπληρώσεις, καθεστηκυίας δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὖσαι, βελτίους ἂν εἴησαν αἱ καθεστηκυίας τῆς φύσεως ἐνέργειαι·
But since indeed there is pleasure both when nature is being restored and when it has been established—such as, on the one hand, when being restored, the replenishments from deficiency, and on the other hand, when established, those from sight and hearing and such things—the activities of the established nature would be better.
αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ κατʼ ἀμφοτέρους λεγόμεναι τοὺς τρόπους ἐνέργειαι εἰσίν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι αἱ ἀπὸ τὴς ὄψεως ἡδοναὶ καὶ τὴς ἀκοῆς καὶ τοῦ διανοεῖσθαι βέλτισται ἂν εἴησαν, ἐπεὶ αἵ γε σωματικαὶ ἐξ ἀναπληρώσεως.
For the pleasures spoken of in both ways are activities; so that it is clear that the pleasures from sight, hearing, and thinking would be the best, since those of the body are from replenishment.
§2.7.19ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο ἐλἐγετο, ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν οὐκ ἀγαθόν.
Furthermore, this also was said, that it is not a good; for that which is in all and common to all is not a good.
τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ φιλοτίμου μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτιμίας οἰκεῖον ἐστίν.
But such a thing is more peculiar to an ambitious person and ambition.
ὁ γὰρ φιλότιμός ἐστιν ὁ μόνος βουλόμενος ἔχειν καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν· καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν οὖν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τοιοῦτον δεῖν εἶναι.
For the ambitious person is the one who wishes alone to possess and by such a thing to surpass others; and therefore pleasure also, if it is to be a good, must be of such a kind.
§2.7.20ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον διὰ τοῦτο ἂν δόξειεν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ὅτι πάντα τούτου ἐφίεται;
Or is it not so, but rather on the contrary would it seem to be a good for this reason, because all things aim at it?
τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ πάντα πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι, ὥστʼ εἰ τῆς ἡδονῆς πάντʼ ἐφίεται, ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη τῷ γένει ἡ ἡδονή.
For all things are by nature suited to aim at the good, so that if all things aim at pleasure, pleasure would be a good in genus.
§2.7.21πάλιν καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐμπόδιον ἡ ἡδονή, οὐκ ἔφασαν αὐτὴν ἀγαθὸνεἶναι.
Again, also because pleasure is an impediment, they said that it is not a good.
τὸ δʼ ἐμπόδιον φάσκειν εἶναιδιὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς σκοπεῖν φαίνετʼ αὐτοῖς.
But to assert that it is an impediment seems to occur to them because of not examining correctly.
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐμπόδιον ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ πραττομένου ἡδονή· ἐὰν μέντοι ἄλλη, ἐμπόδιον, οἷον ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς μέθης ἡδονὴ ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι τοῦ πράττειν,
For the pleasure from the action being done is not an impediment; if however it is another pleasure, it is an impediment, such as the pleasure from drunkenness is an impediment to acting.
§2.7.22ἀλλʼ οὕτω μὲν καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης ἐμπόδιον ἔσται· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἅμα ἀμφοτέραις ἐνεργεῖν.
But in this way indeed even science will be an impediment to science; for it is not possible to active in both at the same time.
ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἂν ποιῇ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡδονήν;
But why is science not a good, if it produces the pleasure from science?
καὶ πότερον ἐμπόδιον ἔσται;
And will it be an impediment?
ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πράξει;
Or not, but rather will it promote action?
§2.7.23ἡ γὰρ ἡδονὴ παρορμᾷ πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον πράττειν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ γινομένη, ἐπεὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ποίησον πράττειν τὰ κατʼ ἀρετήν, καὶ ἡδέως ταῦτα πράττειν· ἆρα οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐνεργήσει κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν;
For the pleasure arising from the action itself stimulates one to act more, since make the serious person act in accordance with virtue, and act pleasantly; will he not active much more in accordance with the action?
καὶ ἐὰν μέν γε ἡδόμενος πράττῃ, σπουδαῖος ἔσται, ἂν δὲ λυπούμενος τὰ καλὰ πράττῃ, οὐ σπουδαῖος.
And if indeed he acts being pleased, he will be serious, but if he acts what is noble being pained, he is not serious.
ἡ γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τοῖς διʼ ἀνάγκην ἐστίν, ὥστʼ εἰ λυπεῖταί τις τὰ καλὰ πράττων, ἀναγκαζόμενος πράττει· ὁ δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης πράττων οὐ σπουδαῖος.
For pain is in the case of things done by necessity, so that if someone is pained while doing noble things, he acts being forced; but the one who acts from necessity is not serious.