§2.6.36ἔτι τέ ἐστιν τῷ λόγῳ προλαβόντα μηθὲν παθεῖν, ὅτι ἥξει γυνὴ εὐπρόσωπος, δεῖ οὖν κατασχεῖν αὐτόν.
Furthermore, it is possible, by anticipating with reason that "a beautiful woman will come, so one must restrain oneself," to experience nothing.
τῷ δὴ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ προκαταλαβὼν ὁ ἐκ τῆς προσφάτου φαντασίας ἀκρατὴς οὐδὲν πείσεται οὐδὲ πράξει οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.
By anticipating with such a reason, the person who is incontinent from a recent appearance will experience nothing and will do nothing shameful.
ὁ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μὲν εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδιδοὺς καὶ καταμαλακιζόμενος, ὁ τοιοῦτος ψεκτότερος.
But the one who knows by reason that he ought not, yet gives in to pleasure and is softened—such a person is more blameworthy.
οὔτε γὰρ ὁ σπουδαῖος οὐδέποτε οὕτω γένοιτʼ ἂν ἀκρατής, ὅ τε λόγος προκαταλαβὼν οὐκ ἂν ἰάσαιτο.
For neither would a serious person ever become incontinent in this way, nor could the anticipating reason cure him.
ἡγεμὼν γὰρ οὗτος ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ᾧ οὔτι πειθαρχεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἡδονῇ. ἐνδίδωσιν, καὶ καταμαλακίζεται καὶ ἐξασθενεῖ πώς.
For this ruler is present in him, yet he does not obey it at all, but gives in to pleasure, and is softened and somehow weakened.
§2.6.37πότερον δʼ ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς ἐστίν, ἠπορήθη μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν.
Whether the temperate person is continent was questioned in the preceding parts, but let us discuss it now.
ἔστιν γὰρ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ἐγκρατής· ὁ γὰρ ἐγκρατής ἐστιν οὐ μόνον ὁ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐνουσῶν ταύτας κατέχων διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷος καὶ μὴ ἐνουσῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος εἰ ἐγγένοιντο κατέχειν.
For the temperate person is indeed also continent; for the continent person is not only the one who restrains desires by reason when they are present, but also one who, even when desires are not present, is such as to restrain them if they should arise.
§2.6.38ἔστιν δὲ σώφρων ὁ μὴ ἔχων ἐπιθυμίας φαύλας τόν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν, ὁ δʼ ἐγκρατὴς ὁ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχων φαύλας τόν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν·
But the temperate person is the one who does not have bad desires and has correct reason concerning these things, while the continent person is the one who has bad desires and has correct reason concerning these things.
ὥστ ἀκολουθήσει τῷ σώφρονι ὁ ἐγκρετής, καὶ ἔσται 〈ὁ〉 σώφρων 〈ἐγκρατής, ἀλλʼ οὐχʼ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων〉.
So the continent person will follow the temperate person, and the temperate person will be continent, but the continent person will not be temperate.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ σώφρων ὁμὴ πάσχων, ὁ δʼ ἐγκρατὴς ὁ πάσχων καὶ τούτων κρατῶν ἢ οἷός τε ὢν πάσχειν· οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων τῷ σώφρονι ὑπάρχει· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων.
For the temperate person is the one who does not experience [bad desires], while the continent person is the one who experiences them and overcomes them, or is capable of experiencing them; but neither of these belongs to the temperate person, and therefore the continent person is not temperate.
§2.6.39πότερον δὲ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκρατὴς ἐστίν, ἢ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἀκόλαστος;
And is the licentious person incontinent, or the incontinent person licentious?
ἢ οὐδετέρῳ ἕτερος ἀκολουθεῖ;
Or does neither follow the other?
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατής ἐστιν οὗ ὁ λόγος τοῖς πάθεσι μάχεται, ὁ δʼ ἀκόλαστος οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλʼ ὁ τῷ πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα ἅμα τὸν λόγον σύνψηφον ἔχων·
For the incontinent person is the one whose reason fights against his passions, whereas the licentious person is not like that, but is the one who, in doing bad things, at the same time has his reason agreeing with them.
οὔτε δὴ ὁ ἀκόλαστος οἷος ὁ ἀκρατὴς οὔθʼ ὁ ἀκρατὴς οἷος ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
Therefore, neither is the licentious person like the incontinent, nor is the incontinent like the licentious.
§2.6.40ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαυλότερος ὁ ἀκόλαστος τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.
Furthermore, the licentious person is also worse than the incontinent.
δυσιατότερα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ τῶν ἐξ ἔθους γενομένων (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔθος διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι εἰς φύσιν καθίστησιν)·
For things that are natural are harder to cure than those that arise from habit (and indeed habit seems to be strong for this reason, that it establishes itself into nature).
§2.6.41ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος αὐτὸς τοιρῦτός ἐστιν οἷος φαῦλός τις τῇ φύσει εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ὁ λόγος φαῦλος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστί·
Therefore, the licentious person himself is such as to be bad by nature, and because of this and from this, the reason in him is bad.
ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ ἀκρατὴς οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, ὁ λόγος οὐ σπουδαῖος (φαῦλον γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔδει εἶναι, εἰ αὐτὸς τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτος ἦν οἷος ὁ φαῦλος)·
But the incontinent person is not like this; for it is not because he himself is such that his reason is not excellent (for he would have to be bad, if he himself were by nature such as the bad person is).
§2.6.42ὁ μὲν [οὖν] ἄρα ἀκρατὴς ἔθει ἔοικε φαῦλος εἶναι, ὁ δὲ ἀκόλαστος φύσει· δυσιατότερος δὴ ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
So then, the incontinent person seems to be bad by habit, but the licentious by nature; therefore, the licentious person is harder to cure.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔθος ἄλλῳ ἔθει ἐκκρούεται, ἡ δὲ φύσις οὐδενὶ ἐκκρούεται.
For habit is driven out by another habit, but nature is driven out by nothing.
§2.6.43πὀτερον δὲ ἐπείπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοιοῦτος [τις] οἶος εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ διεψεῦσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὁ φρόνιμός τοιοῦτος ὁ τῷ λόγῳ τῷὀρθῷἕκασταθεωρῶν,πότερον[δʼ]ἐνδέχεταιτὸν φρόνιμον ἀκρατῆ εἶναι, ἢ οὔ;
Since the incontinent person is such as to know and not be deceived in his reason, and the prudent person is also such as to contemplate each thing by correct reason, is it possible for the prudent person to be incontinent, or not?
ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις τὰ εἰρημένα· ἐὰν δὲ παρακολουθήσωμεν τοῖς ἔμπροσθενεἰρημένοις,οὐκἔσται ὁ φρόνιμος ἀκρατής.
For one might raise a puzzle from what has been said; but if we follow what was said before, the prudent person will not be incontinent.
ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον εἶναι οὐχ ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος μόνον ὑπάρχει, ἀλλʼ ᾧ καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον φαινόμεναβέλπιστα·
For we said that the prudent person is not merely one in whom correct reason is present, but one for whom there is also the doing of what, according to reason, appear to be the best things.
εἰ δὲπράττει τὰβέλτιστα ὁ φρόνιμος, οὐδʼ ἂν ἀκρατὴς εἴη ὁ φρόνιμος, ἀλλʼ ὁ τοιοῦτος δεινὸς μὲν ἐστίν.
And if the prudent person does the best things, the prudent person would not be incontinent, but such a person is clever.
§2.6.44διῃρήμεθα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω τόν τε δεινὸν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων.
For we distinguished in the preceding parts both the clever person and the prudent person as being different.
περὶ μὲν γὰρ ταὐτά· ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν πρακτικὸς περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ὃ δʼ οὐ πρακτικός.
For they are concerned with the same things, but the one is practical regarding what is necessary, while the other is not practical.
τὸν οὖν δεινὸν ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ πρακτικὸς περὶ ἃ καὶ δεῖ), τὸν φρόνιμον δʼ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατῆ εἶναι.
Therefore, it is possible for the clever person to be incontinent (for he is not practical regarding what is also necessary), but it is not possible for the prudent person to be incontinent.