§2.6.26ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη ὁρμὴ πρὸς ὀργήν, ἣ δοκεῖ ἀκρασία εἶναιὀργῆς, οὐλίαν ἐπιτιμητέα ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς [τὴν] ἡδονὴν ὁρμὴ ψεκτή γε.
\nTherefore, such an impulse toward anger, which seems to be incontinence of anger, is not very blameworthy, but the impulse toward pleasure is indeed blameworthy.
ἔστιν γὰρ διαφορὰν ἔχουσα πρὸς ταύτην διὰ τὸν λόγον, ὃς ἀποτρέπει τοῦ μὴ πράττειν, ἀλλʼ ὅμως πράττει παρὰ τὸν λόγον· διὸ ψεκτή ἐστι μᾶλλον τῆς διʼ ὀργὴν ἀκρασίας.
For it has a difference in relation to this because of reason, which deters from acting, yet they nevertheless act contrary to reason; hence it is more blameworthy than incontinence because of anger.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ διʼ ὀργὴν ἀκρασία λύπη ἐστίν(οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ λυπεῖται), ἡ δὲ διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν μεθʼ ἡδονῆς· διὸ μᾶλλο ψεκτή· ἡ γὰρ διʼ ἡδονὴν ἀκρασία μεθʼ ὕβρεως δοκεῖ εἶναι. §2.6.27πότερον δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ καρτερία ταὑτόν ἐστιν; ἢ οὔ; ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς ὁ κρατῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἡ δὲ καρτερία περὶ λύπας· ὁ γὰρ καρτερῶν καὶ ὑπομένων τὰς λύπας, οὗτος καρτερικὸς ἐστίν.
For incontinence because of anger is accompanied by pain (for no one who is angry fails to feel pain), while that because of desire is accompanied by pleasure; hence it is more blameworthy, for incontinence because of pleasure seems to be accompanied by insolence.\n\nAre both continence and endurance the same, or not?
§2.6.28πάλιν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ἡ μαλακία οὐκ ἔστιν ταὐτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ μαλακία ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ μαλακὸς ὁ μὴ ὑπομένων πόνους, οὐχ ἅπαντας δὲ ἀλλʼ οὓς ἀναγκαίως ἂν ἄλλος τις ὑπομείνειεν, ὁ δʼ ἀκρατὴς ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ὑπομένειν ἡδονάς, ἀλλὰ καταμαλακιζόμενος καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀγόμενος. §2.6.29ἔστιν αὖ πάλον τις καλούμενος ἀπόλαστος·
For continence is concerned with pleasures, and the continent person is the one who controls pleasures, while endurance is concerned with pains; for the one who endures and withstands pains is enduring.\n\nAgain, incontinence and softness are not the same; for softness is, and the soft person is, the one who does not endure troubles—not all of them, but those which someone else would necessarily endure—while the incontinent person is the one who is unable to withstand pleasures, but is softened and led by them.\n\nAgain, there is also someone called licentious.
πότερον οὖν ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκρατὴς] καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ὁ αὐτός; ἢ οὔ;
Is, then, the licentious person and the incontinent person the same, or not?
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκόλαστος τοιοῦτός τις οἷος οἴεσθαι, ἃ πράττει, ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστα εἶναι αὐτῷ καὶ συμφορώτατα, καὶ λόγον οὐδένα ἔχειν ἐναντιούμενον τοῖς αὐτῷ φαινομένοις ἡδέσιν· ὁ δὲ ἀκράτὴς λόγον ἔχει ὃς ἐναντιοῦται αὐτῷ, ἐφʼ ἃ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἄγει.
For the licentious person is such as to think that what he does is both best and most advantageous for him, and to have no reason opposing what appear pleasant to him; but the incontinent person has reason which opposes him in those things toward which desire leads him.\n\nWhich of the two is easier to cure, the licentious or the incontinent?
§2.6.30πὀτερος δὲ εὐιατότερος, ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἢ ὁ ἀκρατής; οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἴσως οὐχ ὁ ἀκρατής· ὁ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος εὐιατότερος·
In this way, indeed, it might perhaps seem not to be the incontinent; for the licentious person is easier to cure.
εἰ γὰρ αὐτῷ λόγος ἐγγένοιτο ὁ διδάξων ὅτι φαῦλα, οὐκέτι πράξει· τῷ δέ γε ἀκρατεῖ ὑπάρχει ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὅμως πράττει, ὥστε ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἀνίατος εἶναι. —
For if there should come to be in him reason which will teach him that these are bad, he will no longer do them; whereas the incontinent person already possesses reason, and yet acts, so that such a person would seem to be incurable.\n\nBut which of the two is in a worse condition: the one in whom nothing good is present, [or the one in whom some good is present] along with these evils?
§2.6.31ἀλλὰ πότερος διάκειται χεῖρον, ᾧ μηδὲν ἀγαθόν τι ὑπάρχει, ⟨ἢ ᾧ ἀγαθόν τέ τι ὑπάρχει〉 καὶ τὰ κακὰ ταῦτα; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖνος, καὶ ὅσῳ γε τιμιώτερον κακῶς διάκειται.
Or is it clear that it is the former, and all the more so in proportion as the more honorable thing is in a bad condition?
ἔστι τοίνυν ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς ἀγαθὸν ἔχων τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα· ὁ δὲ ἀκόλαστος οὐκ ἔχει. §2.6.32ἔτι ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ἑκάστου ἀρχή· τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἀκρατοῦς ἡ ἀρχὴ τιμιώτατον ὂν εὖ διάκειται, τοῦ δὲ ἀκολάστουκακῶς· ὥστε χείρων ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀκόλαστος τοῦ ὠκρατοῦς.
Thus, the incontinent person possesses a good in that his reason is correct, but the licentious person does not possess it.\n\nFurthermore, reason is the principle of each; in the incontinent person, then, the principle, which is the most honorable thing, is in a good condition, but in the licentious person it is in a bad condition, so that the licentious person would be worse than the incontinent.\n\nFurthermore, just as in the case of beastliness, which we said was a vice, it is not to be seen as being in a beast, but in a human; for beastliness is the name for excessive vice—why?
§2.6.33ἔτι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θηριότητος ἧς ἐλέγομεν κακίας οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐν θηρίῳ οὖσαν, ἀλλʼ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἡ γὰρ θηριότης ὄνομά ἐστιν τῇ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ κακίᾳ — διὰ τί; διʼ οὐδὲν ὅτι ἀρχὴ φαύλη ἐν θηρίῳ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ ὁ λόγος.
For no other reason than that a bad principle is not in a beast; and the principle is reason.
ἐπεὶ πότερος ἂν πλείω κακὰ ποιήσειεν, λέων, ἢ Διονύσιος ἢ Φάλαρις ἢ Κλέαρχος ἢ τις τούτων τῶν μοχθηρῶν;
For which of the two would do more evils, a lion, or Dionysius, or Phalaris, or Clearchus, or one of these wicked men?
δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι;
Is it not clear that these men would?
ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐνοῦσα φαύλη μεγάλα συμβάλλεται, ἐν δὲ θηρίῳ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή. §2.6.34ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἔνεστιν ἀρχὴ φαύλη. γὰρ πράττει φαῦλα ὄντα καὶ ὁ λόγος σύμφησιν ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δεῖν πράττειν, ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔνεστιν οὐχ ὑγιής.
For a bad principle present within contributes greatly [to evil], whereas in a beast there is no principle at all.\n\nIn the licentious person, then, a bad principle is present; for since he does things that are bad and reason agrees with this and it seems to him that he must do these things, an unhealthy principle is present in him.
διὸ βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ ἀκολάστου. §2.6.35ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀκρασίας δύο εἴδη, ἣ μὲν προπετική τις καὶ ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἐξαίφνης γινομένη (οἷον ὅταν ἴδωμεν καλὴν γυναῖκα, εὐθέως τι ἐπάθομεν, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους ὁρμὴ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸ πρᾶξαί τι ὧν ἴσως οὐ δεῖ), ἡ δʼ ἑτέρα οἷον ἀσθενική τις, ἡ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου οὖσα τοῦ ἀποτρέποντος.
Therefore, the incontinent person would seem to be better than the licentious.\n\nAnd there are also two kinds of incontinence: the one is a sort of impetuous and unforesighted and suddenly occurring kind (as when we see a beautiful woman, we immediately experience something, and from that passion an impulse arose to do something which perhaps we ought not), and the other is a sort of weak kind, which exists along with the reason that deters.
ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν οὐδʼ ἂν λίαν δόξειεν εἶναι ψεκτή· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐγγίνεται, ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς καὶ εὐφυέσιν· δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι ψεκτοί.
That former kind, then, would not even seem to be very blameworthy; for such a kind occurs even in serious people, among those who are hot-tempered and naturally gifted; but the latter kind occurs in the cold and melancholic, and such people are blameworthy.