Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Great Ethics §2.6.18-2.6.25

Incontinence in Bodily Pleasures and in Anger

Passage 51 of 71 · Greek

Summary

The text discusses the conditions under which continence and incontinence properly operate, clarifying that incontinence is essentially concerned with bodily pleasures. It also explains how incontinence in anger differs from that in pleasures, using the analogy of eager servants.

§2.6.18ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος τις λόγος ἐπὶ τῇς ἀκρασίας ὃς παρεῖχεν ἀπορίαν, ὡς ἐπαινετοῦ ποτε τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς ἐσομένου καὶ ψεκτοῦ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς.
There was also another argument concerning incontinence which presented a difficulty, as though the incontinent person would sometimes be praised and the continent person blamed.
οὐ συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο.
But this does not happen.
οὐ γάρ ἐφπτιν οὔτʼ ἐγκρανὴς οὔτʼ ἀκρατὴς ὁ τῷ λόγῳ διεψευσμένος, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγον ἔχων ὀρθὸν καὶ τούτῳ τὰ φαῦλα ὄντα κρίνων καὶ τὰ καλά, κσὶ ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὁ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγω ἀπενθὢν', ἐγκραπτὴς δὲ ὁ πειθόμενος καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀγόμενος·
For the one who is deceived in their reason is neither continent nor incontinent; rather, it is the one who possesses correct reason and judges by this what things are bad and what are noble, and the incontinent person is the one who disobeys such reason, while the continent person is the one who obeys it and is not led by desires.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ᾦ τινι οὐ δοκεῖ τὸν πατέρα τύπτειν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ τύπτειν, ὁ τούτου ἀπεχόμενος ἐγκρατής ἐστι·
For neither is the one for whom it does not seem shameful to strike their father, yet who desires to strike him but abstains from this, a continent person.
§2.6.19στε εἰ μή ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων μήτε ἐγκράτεια μήτε ἀκρασία, οὐδʼ ἂν ἔπαινετὴ εἴη ἡ ἀκρασία οὐδὲ ψεκτὴ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ὥσπτερ ἐδόκει.
Therefore, since there is neither continence nor incontinence in such cases, neither would incontinence be praised nor continence blamed, as was thought.
§2.6.20εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν αἳ μὲν νοσηματικαὶ αἳ δὲ φύσει.
And of incontinences, some are morbid and others are by nature.
οἷον νοσηματικαὶ μὲν αἱ τοιαῦται· εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ τίλλοντες τρίχας διατρώγουσιν.
For example, the morbid ones are of this kind: for there are some who pluck out their hair and chew it.
εἰ οὖν τις ταύτης τῆς ἡδονῆς κρατεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινετός, οὐδὲ ψεκτός, εἰ μὴ κρατεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα γε.
If, then, someone controls this pleasure, they are not praised; nor are they blamed, if they do not control it, or at least not very much.
φύσει δέ, οἷον υἱόν ποτέ φασ κρινόμενον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ, ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι, ἀπολογεῖσθαι λέγονθʼ ὅτι “καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα”, καὶ ἀποφυγεν δή·
And by nature, as they say a son once, when on trial in court for striking his father, defended himself by saying, "For this man too struck his own father," and was indeed acquitted; for it seemed to the judges that the error was natural.
δοκεῖν γὰρ τοῖς δικασταῖς φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, εἰ δή τις τοῦ τὸν πατέρα τύπτειν κρατοίη, οὐκ ἐπταινετός.
If, then, someone should control themselves from striking their father, they are not praised.
§2.6.21οὐ δὴ τὰς τοιαύτας ζητοῦμεν νῦν ἀκρκσίας οὐδʼ ἐγκρατείας, ἀλλὰ καθʼ ἃς ψεκτοὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα.
Indeed, we are not now seeking such incontinences or continences, but those according to which we are called simply blameworthy and praiseworthy.
ἔστιν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐκτός, οἷον πλοῦτος ἀρχὴ τιμὴ φίλοι δόξα, τὰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ περὶ σῶμα ἐστίν, οἷον ἁφή τε καὶ γεῦσις [ὁ οὖν περὶ ταῦτα ἀκρατής,οὗτος ἀπλῶς ἂν [καὶ] ἀκρατὴς δόξειενεἶναι,] καὶ ἡδοναὶ σωματικαί· ∗καὶ ἣν ζητοῦμεν ἀκρασίαν, ἤδη περὶ ταῦτα δόξειεν 〈ἂν〉 εἶναι.
And of goods, some are external, such as wealth, office, honor, friends, reputation, while others are necessary and concern the body, such as touch and taste [the one, then, who is incontinent concerning these, this person would seem to be simply incontinent,] and bodily pleasures; and the incontinence which we are seeking would seem to be precisely about these.
§2.6.22ἠπορεῖτο δὲ περὶ τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία.
But it was a difficulty as to what incontinence is about.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τιμὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής· ἐπαινεῖται γάρ πως ὁ περὶ τιμὴν ἀκρατής· φιλότιμος γάρ τις [ἐστίν].
Concerning honor, then, one is not simply incontinent; for the one who is incontinent concerning honor is in a way praised; for he is a lover of honor.
τὸ δʼ ὅλον λέγομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων τὸν ἀκρετῆ προστιθέντες, περὶ τιμὴν ἀκρατὴς ἢ δόξαν ἢ ὀργήν.
On the whole, we speak of the incontinent person in such cases too by adding the qualification: incontinent concerning honor, or reputation, or anger.
ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατεῖ οὐ προστίθεμεν περὶ ἅ, ὡς ὑπάρχοντος αὐτῷ καὶ φανεροῦ ὄντος ἄνευ τῆς προσθέσεως, περὶ ἐστίν· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικὰς ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής.
But to the simply incontinent person we do not add what it is about, since it is already inherent and clear without the addition what it is about; for the simply incontinent person is concerned with bodily pleasures and pains.
§2.6.23— δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι περὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἀκρασία·
— This is also clear from the following, that incontinence is about these things.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψεκτὸς ὁ ἀκρατής, ψεκτὰ εἶναι δεῖ τὰ ὑποκείμενα·
For since the incontinent person is blameworthy, the underlying subjects must be blameworthy.
τιμὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ δόξα καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ χρήματα καὶ περὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται, οὐκ εἰσὶν ψεκτά, αἱ δʼ ἡδοναὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ ψεκταί· διὸ εἰκότως ὁ περὶ ταύτας ἂν μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος, οὗτος ἀκρατὴς τελέως λέγεται.
Now, honor, reputation, office, wealth, and all the other things concerning which people are said to be incontinent, are not blameworthy, but bodily pleasures are blameworthy; therefore, reasonably, the one who is concerned with these more than is proper is called completely incontinent.
§2.6.24ἐπειδὴ δέ ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀκρασιῶν λεγομένων ἡ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν οὖσα ἀκρασία ψεκτοτάτη, πότερον ψεκτοτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἢ ἡ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς;
And since, of the incontinences spoken of regarding other things, the one concerning anger is the most blameworthy, is the one concerning anger or the one concerning pleasures more blameworthy?
ἔστιν οὖν ἡ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἀκρασία ὁμοία τῶν παίδων τοῖς πρὸς τὸ διακονεῖν προθύμως ἔχουσιν· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, ὅταν εἴπῃ ὁ δεσπότης ‟δός μοι”, τῇ προθυμίᾳ ἐξενεχθέντες, πρὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι ὃ δεῖ δοῦναι, ἔδωκαν, καὶ ἐν τῇ δόσει διήμαρτον· πολλάκις γὰρ δέον βιβλίον δοῦναι γραφεῖον ἔδωκαν.
Now, incontinence concerning anger is like those of the servants who are eager to serve; for these, when the master says "give me," carried away by their eagerness, before hearing what they ought to give, give it, and err in the giving; for often, when they ought to give a book, they give a writing-stylus.
§2.6.25ὅμοιον δὲ πέπονθε τούτῳ ὁ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀκρατής· ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούσῃ τὸ πρῶτον ῥῆμα ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὥρμησεν ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τὸ τιμωρήσασθαι, οὐκέτι ἀναμείνας ἀκοῦσαι πότερον δεῖ ἢ οὐ δεῖ, ἢ ὅτι γε οὐχ οὕτω σφόδρα.
And the person incontinent in anger suffers something similar to this; for as soon as they hear the first word, that they have been wronged, their anger rushes toward taking revenge, no longer waiting to hear whether they ought to or not, or at least not so violently.

Notes

  1. §2.6.18ὡς ἐπαινετοῦ ποτε τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς ἐσομένου — The conjunction ὡς is followed by a genitive absolute with the future participle (ἐπαινετοῦ ... ἐσομένου and the subsequent ψεκτοῦ ... [with ἐσομένου understood]). It is used to present the content of someone else's argument (λόγος) subjectively or hypothetically.
  2. §2.6.18οὐδὲ γὰρ ᾧ τινι οὐ δοκεῖ τὸν πατέρα τύπτειν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ τύπτειν, ὁ τούτου ἀπεχόμενος ἐγκρατής ἐστι — The relative pronoun ᾧ τινι contains its antecedent ("to anyone who") and serves as the dative complement of οὐ δοκεῖ. The main subject of the sentence is ὁ ἀπεχόμενος (the one who abstains), located outside the relative clause. The infinitive phrase τὸν πατέρα τύπτειν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι (that striking one's father is shameful) is the subject of δοκεῖ, and ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ τύπτειν is a participle phrase meaning "though desiring to strike."
  3. §2.6.24τῶν παίδων — The noun παῖς (normally "child") is used here in the sense of "servants" or "slaves," as indicated by the relationship with the subsequent δεσπότης (master) and the context of serving and carrying out orders.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Great Ethics §2.6.18-2.6.25. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg022.humanitext-grc1:2.6.18-2.6.25

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