§2.6.10— πότερον δʼ ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐν ἅπασίν ἐστιν καὶ περὶ πάντα, οἷον περ χρήματα καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ δόξαν (περὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα δοκοῦσιν ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι), ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ περί τι ἀφωρισμένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία, ἀπερήσειεν ἄν τις.
— But one might raise the difficulty whether incontinence and the incontinent person exist in all cases and concerning everything, such as wealth, honor, anger, and reputation (for people seem to be incontinent concerning all these), or not, but incontinence is about some limited matter.
τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν παρέχοντα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ λῦσαι τὰς ἀπορίας.
¦1201b These, then, are the things that present the difficulty; and it is necessary to solve the difficulties.
§2.6.11πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἐδόκει εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα ταύτην ἀποβάλλειν ἢ μεταπίπτειν.
First, then, let us address the difficulty concerning knowledge; for it seemed absurd that someone possessing knowledge should discard it or fall away from it.
§2.6.12ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης· οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει δόξαν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην·
And the same argument applies also to belief; for it makes no difference whether it is belief or knowledge.
εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ δόξα σφοδρὰ τῷ βέβαιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμετάπειστον, οὐθὲν διοίσει τῆς ἐπιστήμης, δόξης ἐχούσης τὸ πιστεύειν οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς δοξάζουσιν, οἷον Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος τοιαύτην ἔχει δόξαν ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.
For if belief is intense by being firm and unpersuadable, it will not differ at all from knowledge, since belief involves the conviction that things are just as they believe them to be, as Heraclitus of Ephesus had such a belief concerning the things that seemed to him.
§2.6.13οὐθὲν δὲ ἄτοπον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ, οὔτʼ εἰ ἐπιστήμην ἔχει οὔτʼ εἰ δόξαν οἵαν λέγομεν, πράττειν τι φαῦλον.
But there is nothing absurd, whether the incontinent person has knowledge or belief of the kind we describe, in his doing something bad.
ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι διττόν, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν (ἐπίστασθαι γάρ φαμεν τότε, ὅταν τις ἐπιστήμην ἔχῃ), τὸ δʼ ἕτερον τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.
For "knowing" is twofold: one is possessing knowledge (for we say someone knows when they possess knowledge), and the other is already acting in accordance with that knowledge.
ἀκρατὴς οὖν ἐστιν ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῶν καλῶν, οὐκ ἐνεργῶν δὲ αὐτῇ·
The incontinent person, then, is one who possesses the knowledge of noble things but does not act in accordance with it.
§2.6.14ὅταν οὖν μὴ ἐνεργῇ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ταύτῃ, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον αὐτόν ἐστιν πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην.
Therefore, when he does not act in accordance with this knowledge, there is nothing absurd in his doing bad things while possessing knowledge.
ὅμοιον γάρ ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν καθευδόντων.
For it is similar to the case of those who are asleep.
οὗτοι γὰρ ἔχοντες τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὅμως ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ πολλὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ πράττουσι καὶ πάσχουσιν.
For these people, although possessing knowledge, nevertheless do and suffer many unpleasant things in sleep.
οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ ἐπιστήμη.
For knowledge does not act in them.
ὡσαύτως δʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.
It is the same with the incontinent person.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καθεύδοντι ἔοικεν, καὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ.
For he is like one asleep, and does not act in accordance with his knowledge.
§2.6.15λύεται δὴ ἀπορία οὕτως.
Thus indeed is the difficulty solved.
ἠπορεῖτο γὰρ πότερον ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐκβάλλει τότε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ μεταπίπτει. ἄτοπον γὰρ ἀμφότερα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
For the question was raised whether the incontinent person at that moment casts out his knowledge or falls away from it.
— ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, ὥσπερ ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς, ἐκ δύο προτάσεων γίνεσθαι τὸν συλλογισμόν, καὶ τούτων εἶναι τὴν μὲν πρώτην καθόλου, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν ὑπὸ ταύτην τε καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους.
For both seemed to be absurd. — But on the other hand, it would become clear from this: just as we said in the *Analytics*, the syllogism arises from two premises, and of these, the first is universal, while the second is subordinate to this and is particular.
οἷον ἐπίσταμαι πάντʼ ἄνθρωπον πυρέττοντα ὑγιῆ ποιῆσαι· οὑτοσὶ δὲ πυρέττει· ἐπίσταμαι ἄρα καὶ τοῦτον ὑγιῆ ποιῆσαι. ἔστιν οὖν ὃ τῇ μὲν καθόλου ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπίσταμαι, τῇ δʼ ἐπὶ μέρους οὔ.
For example: "I know how to make every person with a fever healthy"; "this person has a fever"; "therefore, I know how to make this person healthy." There is, then, that which I know by universal knowledge, but do not know by particular knowledge.
§2.6.16γίνεται οὖν ἁμαρτία τῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντι καὶ ἐνταῦθα, οἷον ἅπαντα μὲν τὸν πυρέττοντα ὑγιῆ ποιῆσαι 〈ἐπίσταμαι〉, εἰ μέντοι οὗτος πυρέττει, οὐκ οἶδα. ὡσαύτως τοίνυν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς τοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντος ἡ αὐτὴ ὡμαρτία συμβήσεται.
An error, therefore, arises for the one possessing knowledge in this case too, as in: "I know how to make everyone with a fever healthy, but whether this person has a fever, I do not know." In the same way, then, for the incontinent person who possesses knowledge, the same error will occur.
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν ἀκρατῆ τὴν μὲν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα φαῦλα καὶ βλαβερά, μὴ μέντοι γε ὅτι ἐστὶν ταῦτα φαῦλα ἐπὶ μέρους εἰδέναι, ὥστε οὕτως ἔχων τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἁμαρτήσεται· ἔχει γὰρ τὴν καθόλου, τὴν δʼ ἐπὶ μέρους οὔ.
For it is possible for the incontinent person to possess the universal knowledge that such things are bad and harmful, but not to know that these things are bad in the particular case; so that, possessing knowledge in this way, he will err; for he possesses the universal knowledge, but not the particular.
§2.6.17οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον οὐδʼοὕτορ συμβήσεται ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς, τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην φαῦλόν τι πράττειν.
Therefore, not even in this way will anything absurd follow concerning the incontinent person, that the one possessing knowledge should do something bad.
ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν μεθυόντων.
For it is as in the case of those who are drunk.
οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἡ μέθη ἀπαλλαγῇ, πάλιν οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσίν· οὐκ ἐξέπεσεν δʼ αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος οὐδʼ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλʼ ἐκρατήθη ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης, ἀπαλλαγέντες δὲ τῆς μέθης πάλιν οἱαὐτοίεἰσὶν.
For those who are drunk, when they are rid of their drunkenness, are the same people again; their reason and knowledge did not fall away from them, but were overpowered by the drunkenness, and when they are rid of their drunkenness, they are the same again.
ὁμοίως οὖν ἔχει ὁ ἀκρατής πάλιν].
Thus it is likewise with the incontinent person.
ἐπικρατῆσαν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ὴρεμεῖν ἐποίησε τὸν λογισμόν· ὅταν δʼ ἀπαλλαγῇ τὸ πάθος ὥσπερ ἡ μέθη, πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστίν.
For his passion, having overpowered him, has caused his reasoning to be inactive; and when his passion is removed, just like drunkenness, he is the same person again.