§2.6.1ὑπὲρ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ ἐγκρατείας πρῶτον 〈ἂν〉 δέοι εἰπεῖν τὰ ἀπορούμενα καὶ τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους λόγους τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅπως ἐκ τῶν ἀπορουμένων καὶ ἐναντιουμένων λόγων συνεπισκεψάμενοι καὶ ταῦτα ἐξετάσαντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἴδωμεν·
But regarding incontinence and continence, it would first be necessary to state the difficulties and the arguments opposed to the appearances, so that, by jointly investigating and examining these starting from the difficulties and opposing arguments, we may see the truth about them as far as possible; for it will be easier to see the truth in this way.
ῥᾷον γὰρ οὕτως ἰδεῖν τἀληθὲς ἔσται. §2.6.2Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ἀνήρει ὅλως καὶ οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὅτι οὐθεὶς εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά εἰσιν ἕλοιτʼ ἄν· ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς δοκεῖ, εἴδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα εἰσίν, αἱρεῖσθαι ὅμως, ἀγόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους.
Socrates the elder, then, rejected this entirely and denied that incontinence exists, saying that no one who knows that bad things are bad would choose them; yet the incontinent person seems, although knowing that they are bad, to choose them nevertheless, being led by passion.
διὰ δὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ᾤετ᾿ εἶναι ἀκρασίαν· §2.6.3οὐ δὴ ὀρθῶς.
On account of this argument, then, he did not think that incontinence exists; But this is not correct.
ἄτοπον γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πεισθέντας ἀναιρεῖν τὸ πιθανῶς γινόμενον· ἀκρατεῖς γὰρ εἰσὶν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰδότες ὅτι φαῦλα ὅμως ταῦτα πράττουσιν.
For it is absurd to reject what convincingly happens by being persuaded by this argument; for there are incontinent people, and they themselves, though knowing that things are bad, nevertheless do them.
§2.6.4ἐπεὶ δ᾿ οὖν ἔστιν ἀκρασία, πότερον ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, θεωρεῖ καὶ ἐξετάζει τὰ φαῦλα;
But since, in any case, incontinence exists, does the incontinent person possess some knowledge when he contemplates and examines bad things?
ἀλλὰ πάλιν οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν.
But on the other hand, this would not seem to be so.
ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ πρότιστον καὶ βεβαιότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡττᾶσθ ὑπὸ τινός· ἐπιστήμη γὰρ πάντων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μονιμώτατόν ἐστι καὶ βιαστικώτατον·
For it is absurd for the primary and most secure thing in us to be defeated by anything; for knowledge is the most stable and most compelling of all things in us.
ὥστε πάλιν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἐναντιοῦται ∗∗τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην.
Thus, this argument in turn opposes the view that there is no knowledge.
§2.6.5ἀλλʼ ἆρά γε ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὔ, δόξα δέ;
But is it then not knowledge, but belief?
ἀλλʼ εἰ δόξαν ἔχει ὁ ἀκρατής, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψεκτ??ς.
Yet if the incontinent person has belief, he would not be blameworthy.
εἰ γὰρ φαῦλόν τι πράττει μὴ ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς ἀλλὰ δοξάξων, συγγνώμην ἄν τις ἀποδοίη προσθέσθαι τῇ ἡδον καὶ πρᾶξαι τὰ φαῦλα, μὴ ἀκριβῶς εἰδότα ὅτι [οὐ] φαῦλα εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντα·
For if he does something bad, not knowing it precisely but believing it, one might grant forgiveness for yielding to pleasure and doing bad things, since he does not know precisely that they are bad, but only believes it.
οἷς δὲ γε συγγνώμην ἔχομεν, τούτους οὐ ψέγομεν· ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατής, εἴπερ δόξαν ἔχει, οὑν ἔσται ψεκτός.
And those for whom we have forgiveness, we do not blame; therefore, the incontinent person, if indeed he has belief, will not be blameworthy.
§2.6.6ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ψεκτός.
But he is blameworthy.
οἱ δὴ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦσιν.
These arguments, then, produce a difficulty.
οἳ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔφασαν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην, ἄτοπόν τι γὰρ συμβαίνειν ἐποίουν· οἳ δὲ πάλιν οὐδὲ δόξαν, καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἄτοπόν τι πάλιν [ἐποίουν] συμβαίνειν.
For those who denied that it is knowledge made an absurd consequence follow; and those, on the other hand, who denied that it is belief, also made an absurd consequence follow.
§2.6.7— ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ταῦτʼ ἂν τις ἀπορήσειεν· ἐπε γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι, πότερον τῷ σώφρονί τι ποιήσει σφοδρὰς ἐπιθυμίας;
— But indeed, one might also raise this difficulty: since the temperate person seems also to be continent, will the temperate person have intense desires?
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔσται ἐγκρατής, σφοδρὰς δεήσει αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἐπιθυμίας (οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴποις ἐγκρατῆ, ὅστις μετρίων ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖ)· εἰ δὲ γε σφοδρὰς [μὴ] ἕξει ἐπιθυμίας, οὐκέτι ἔσται σώψρων (ὁ γὰρ σώφρων ἐστὶν ὁ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν μηδὲ πάσχων μηθέν).
If, on the one hand, he is to be continent, he will need to have intense desires (for you would not call someone continent who controls only moderate desires); but if, on the other hand, he does not have intense desires, he will no longer be temperate (for the temperate person is one who does not desire or suffer anything).
§2.6.8— ἔχει δέ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάλιν ἀπορίαν, συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ποτε ἐπαινιτὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ ψεκτόν.
— And such things also in turn involve a difficulty, for it follows from the arguments that the incontinent person is sometimes praiseworthy and the continent person blameworthy.
ἔστω γάρ τις, φησίν, ἀιημαρτηκὼς τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ δοκείτω αὐτῷ λογιζομένῳ τὰ καλὰ εἶναι φαῦλα, ἡ δʼ ἐπιθυμία ἀγέτα ἐπὶ τὰ καλά· οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν λόγος οὐκ ἐάσει πράττειν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀγόμενος πράσσει (τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ ἀκρατής)· πράξει ἄρα τὰ καλά, ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἀγέτω (ὁ δὲ λόγος κωλύσει· διαμαρτανέτω γὰρ τῷ λογισμῷ τῶν καλῶν)· οὐκοῦν οὗτος ἀκρατὴς μὲν ἔσται, ἐπαινετὸς μέντοι· γὰρ πράττει τὰ καλὰ, ἐπαινετός.
For let someone, they say, have erred in his reasoning, and let it seem to him in his reasoning that noble things are bad, while his desire leads him toward noble things; then, his reason will not allow him to act, but being led by desire, he acts (for such was the incontinent person); he will therefore do noble things, for let his desire lead him to these (while his reason will prevent him; for let him err in his reasoning about noble things); therefore, this person will be incontinent, yet praiseworthy; for since he does noble things, he is praiseworthy.
ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ συμβαῖνον.
What follows is indeed absurd.
§2.6.9πάλιν δʼ αὗ διαμαρτανέτω τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ τὰ καλὰ αὐτῷ μὴ δοκείτω καλὰ εἶναι, ἡ δʼ ἐπιθυμία ἀγέτω ἐπὶ τὰ καλά· ἐγκρατὴς δέ γέ ἐστιν ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν μέν, μὴ πράττων δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τὸν λόγον· οὐκοῦν ὁ διαμαρτάνων τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν κωλύσει ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ πράττειν, κωλύει ἄρα τὰ καλὰ πράττειν (ἐπὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἤγαγεν)· ὁ δέ γε τὰ καλὰ μὴ πράττων δέον πράττειν ψεκτός· ὁ ἄρα ἐγκρατὴς ἔσται ποτε ψεκτός.
And again, on the other hand, let him err in his reason, and let noble things not seem to him to be noble, while his desire leads him toward noble things; but the continent person is one who, though desiring, does not do these things because of his reason; therefore, the one who errs in his reason will prevent himself from doing what he desires, and so he prevents himself from doing noble things (for his desire led him toward these); but the one who does not do noble things when he ought to do them is blameworthy; therefore, the continent person will sometimes be blameworthy.
ἄτοπον δὴ καὶ οὕτω τὸ συμβαῖνον.
What follows is indeed absurd in this way too.