Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Great Ethics §2.5.1-2.5.3

Brutality as an Extreme Vice and Divine Virtue

Passage 48 of 71 · Greek

Summary

The passage defines 'brutality' as an extreme vice and opposes it to a superhuman, divine virtue; it explains that this counterpart virtue is nameless because god transcends virtue itself.

§2.5.1ἔστιν δὲ ἡ θηριότης ὑπερβάλλουσά τις κακία.
Brutality is a sort of excessive vice.
ὅταν γάρ τινα παντελῶς ἔδωμεν φαῦλον, οὐδʼ ἄνθρωπὸν φαμεν εἶναι ἀλλὰ θηρίον, ὡς οὖσαν τινὰ κακίαν θηριότητα.
For when we see someone who is utterly bad, we say that he is not even human but a beast, implying that brutality is a certain kind of vice.
§2.5.2ἡ δὲ ἀντικειμένη ἀρετὴ ταύτῃ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμος, ἔστιν δʼ ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον οὖσα, οἷον ἡρωϊκὴ τις καὶ θεία.
And the virtue opposed to this is nameless, but such a virtue is one that is beyond human, like a sort of heroic and divine virtue.
ἀνώνυμος δέ ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀρετή, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν θεοῦ ἀρετή· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς βελτίων τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ οὐ κατʼ ἀρετήν ἐστι σπουδαῖος· οὕτω μὲν γὰρ βέλτιον ἔσται ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦ θεοῦ.
And this virtue is nameless because it is not the virtue of a god; for god is better than virtue, and is not good in accordance with virtue; for in that case, virtue will be better than god.
§2.5.3διὸ ἀνώνυμος ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ τῇ κακίᾳ τῇ θηριότητι ἀντικειμένη.
Therefore the virtue opposed to the vice of brutality is nameless.
θέλει δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀντικεῖσθαι ἡ θεία καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον· ὥσπτερ γὰρ καὶ ἡ κακία ἡ θηριότης ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἀντικειμένη.
And the divine and superhuman virtue is meant to be opposed to such a vice; for just as the vice of brutality is beyond human, so also is the virtue opposed to it.

Notes

  1. 1200b10ὡς οὖσαν τινὰ κακίαν θηριότητα — A construction similar to an accusative absolute with ὡς followed by the participle οὖσαν, expressing a subjective reason or interpretation ('treating brutality as a certain kind of vice'). θηριότητα acts as the subject of the participle, and τινὰ κακίαν is its complement.
  2. 1200b14οὕτω μὲν γὰρ — οὕτω ('in this way') refers back hypothetically to the contrary of the preceding statement ('for if God were good in accordance with virtue'). Together with the following future indicative ἔσται, it introduces a logically absurd consequence.
  3. 1200b17θέλει δὲ — When the verb θέλω is used with an inanimate or abstract subject (here, the virtue) and an infinitive, it expresses an objective tendency, natural propensity, or necessity ('tends to', 'is meant to') rather than a personal desire.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Great Ethics §2.5.1-2.5.3. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg022.humanitext-grc1:2.5.1-2.5.3

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