§2.4.1ταῦτα μὲν μέχρι τούτου·
These things, then, up to this point.
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν ποιησαμένοις λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.
After this, it is necessary for us, having made another beginning, to speak about self-control and lack of self-control.
ὥσπερ δὲ [καὶ] ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία αὗταί εἰσιν ἄτοποι, ὡσαύτως ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς περὶ τούτων λόγους λεχθησομένους ἀτόπους γίνεσθαι·
And just as these states, though called virtue and vice, are peculiar, in the same way it is necessary that the arguments to be spoken about them also become peculiar.
§2.4.2οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία ἡ ἀρετὴ αὕτη ἐστὶν ταῖς ἄλλαις.
For this virtue is not like the others.
ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη ὁρμῶσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐναντιοῦνται ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτης ἐναντιοῦνται ἀλλήλοις ὅ τε λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη.
For in the others both reason and passions urge towards the same things and do not oppose each other, but in this one both reason and passions oppose each other.
§2.4.3— ἔστι δὲ τρία τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχ γινόμενα, καθʼ ἃ φαῦλοι λεγόμεθα, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης.
And there are three things that come to be in the soul, according to which we are called bad: vice, lack of self-control, and brutality.
ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τίσιν, εἴρηται ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω· νῦν δὲ ὑπὲρ ἀκρασίας καὶ θηριότητος λεκτέον ἂν εἴη.
Now, concerning what vice and virtue are, and in what things they consist, has been stated by us in the preceding parts; but now we must speak about lack of self-control and brutality.