§2.3.9ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος δόξκεν ἂν εἶναι παράδοξος τοῖς πολλοῖς· πάντες γὰρ οἴονται καὶ ὡρχῇ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ πλούτῳ δυνατοὶ εἶναι χρῆσθαι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνοντες.
Such an argument would indeed seem paradoxical to the many; for they all think they are capable of using rule, power, and wealth, conceiving this incorrectly.
§2.3.10δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ νομοθέτου· ὁ γὰρ νομοθέτης οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπιτρέπει τὸ ἄρχειν, ἀλλʼ ὤριστται καὶ ἡ ἡλικία καὶ ἡ εὐπορία ἢν δεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ μέλλοντι ἄρχειν, ὡς οὐ δυνατὸν ὂν παντὶ ἄρχιν ὑκάρξαι.
And this is clear also from the lawmaker; for the lawmaker does not permit everyone to rule, but has defined both the age and the wealth that must belong to the one who is going to rule, on the ground that it is not possible for ruling to belong to everyone.
εἰ δή τις ἀγανακτοίη ὅτι οὐκ ἄρχει ἢ οὐδεὶς αὐτὸν ἐᾷ κυβερνᾶν, “οὐ γὰρ ἔχεις” εἴποι ἄν τις “οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ δυνήσῃ καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ κυβερνᾶν”. §2.3.11ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ σώματος ὁρῶμεν οὐ δυναμένους ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ προσφερομένους, ἀλλʼ εἰ μέλλει τις ὑγιαίνεον τὸ σῶμα τὸ φαῦλον, ὕδωρ αὐτῷ πρότερον καὶ ὀλίγα σιτία προσενεκτέον·
If, then, someone should be angry because he does not rule, or because no one permits him to steer a ship, one might say: "For you do not have in your soul any such thing as will enable you both to rule and to steer." Or, in the case of the body, do we not see that those who take what is simply good are unable to be healthy, but if a man with a bad body is to be healthy, we must first administer to him water and a little food?
τῷ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν φαύλην ἔχοντι πρὸς τὸ μηθὲν κακὸν ἐργάζεσθαι οὐκ ἀφεκτέον καὶ πλούτου καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσσῳ εὐκινητότερον καὶ εὐμεταβολώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος;
And for the man who has a bad soul, so that he may work no evil, must he not be kept away from wealth, rule, power, and simply such things, in proportion as the soul is more easily moved and more changeable than the body?
ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος τὸσᾶμια οὔτως ἦν ἐπιτήδειος διαιτᾶσθαι, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτως ἐπιτήδειος διάγειν, μηθὲν τῶν τοιούτων ἔχων.
For just as it was fitting for the man with a bad body to be dieted in that way, so it is fitting for the man with a bad soul to live in this way, possessing none of such things.
§2.3.12ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπορίαν, οἷον ἐπειδὰν μὴ ᾖ ἅμα πρᾶξαι τἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια, πότερʼ ἄν τις πράξειεν;
And such a question also presents a difficulty, as when it is not possible to do at the same time both brave and just actions, which of the two should one do?
ἐν μὲν δὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀρεταῖς ἔφαμεν τὴν ὁρμὴν μόνον [δεῖν] τὴν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ λόγου· ὁ δʼ ἐστὶν αἵρεσις, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι ἐστίν.
Now in the natural virtues, we said that only the impulse towards the noble must exist without reason; but that which is choice, exists in reason and in that which possesses reason.
ὥστε ἅμα τὸ ἑλέσθαι [καἴ] παρέσται καὶ ἡ τελεία ἀρετὴ ὑπάρξει, ἣν ἔφαμεν μετὰ φρονήσεως εἶναι, οὑκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ καλόν.
So that choosing will be present at the same time and perfect virtue will exist, which we said exists with prudence, but not without the natural impulse towards the noble.
§2.3.13οὐδʼ ἐναντιώσεται ἀρετὴ ἀρετῇ.
Nor will virtue be contrary to virtue.
πέφυκεν γὰρ ὑπείκειν τῷ λόγῳ, [ἢ] ὡς οὗτος προστάττει, ὥστ᾿ ἔφʼ ὃ ἂν οὗτος ἄγη, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀποκλίνει.
For it is natural for it to yield to reason, or to yield as this prescribes, so that to whatever this leads, to that it inclines.
τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ αἱρούμενος.
For it is this that chooses the better.
οὔτε γὰρ ἄνευ τῆς φρονήσεως αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ γίνονται, οὔθʼ ἡ φρόνησις τελεία ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, ἀλλὰ συνεργοῦσί πως μετ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἐπακολουθοῦσαι τ φρονήσει.
For neither do the other virtues come to be without prudence, nor is prudence perfect without the other virtues, but they cooperate in some way with one another, following upon prudence.
§2.3.14οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήσεται, πότερόν ποτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν τʼ ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν περὶ σῶμα.
No less will such things be doubted, whether in the case of virtues it is as it is in the case of other goods, both external ones and those of the body.
ταῦτα γὰρ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν γινόμενα χείρους ποιεῖ, οἷον πλοῦτος πολὺς γενόμενος ὑπερόπτας καὶ ἀηδεῖς ἐποίησεν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ἀρχῆς τιμῆς κάλλου μεγέθους.
For these, when they come to excess, make men worse; for instance, much wealth when it comes has made men proud and unpleasant; and similarly in the case of the other goods, rule, honor, beauty, stature.
§2.3.15πότερον οὖν καὶ ἐπʼ ἀρετῆς οὕτως ἔχει, ὥστε ἐάν τινι δικαιοσύνη ἢ ἀνδρεία εἰς ὁπερβολὴν παραγένηται, χείρων ἔσται, ἢοὔ;
Is it then the case also with virtue that, if justice or bravery comes to someone in excess, he will be worse, or not?
〈οὔ,〉φησίν.
"No," he says.
ἀλλ᾿ ἀπτὸ μὲν τῆς ἀρετῆς τιμὴ γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τιμὴ μεγάλη γινομένη χείρους ποιεῖ ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι, φησίν, ἀρετὴ εἰς ἐπίδοσιν βαδίζουσα μεγέθους χείρους ποιήσει·
But from virtue comes honor, and honor when it becomes great makes men worse; so that it is clear, he says, that virtue, proceeding to an increase of size, will make men worse.
τῆς γὰρ τιμῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιοίη ἂν χείρους μείζων γινομένη.
For virtue is the cause of honor, so that virtue too would make men worse by becoming greater.
§2.3.16ἢ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀληθές;
Or is this not true?
τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς εἰ καὶ ἄλλα πολλά ἐστιν ἔργα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα, τὸ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τούτοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις δύνασθαι ὀρθῶς παραγενομένοις χρῆσθαι·
For even if there are many other works of virtue, as indeed there are, this is preeminently among them: to be able to use rightly these goods and such things when they are present.
εἰ δὴ ὁ σπουδαῖος παραγενομένης αὐτῷ ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ἀρχῆς μεγάλης μὴ χρήσεται ὀρθῶς τούτοις, οὐκέτι ἂν εἴη σπουδαῖος·
If indeed the excellent man, when great honor or rule is present to him, does not use them rightly, he would no longer be excellent.
οὔτε δὴ ἡ τιμὴ οὔτε ἡ ἀρχὴ ποιήσει τὸν σπουδαῖον χείρω, ὥστε οὐδʼ ἡ ἀρετή.
Therefore, neither honor nor rule will make the excellent man worse, so that neither will virtue.
§2.3.17τὸ δʼ ὅλον ἐπειδήπερ ἡμῖν ἐν ἀρχ διώρισται, ὅτι εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταῖ μεσότητες, καὶ ἡ μᾶλλον ἀρετὴ μᾶλλόν ἐστι μεσότης· ὥστʼ οὐχ ὅτι χείρω ποιήσει εἰς μέγεθος ἡ ἀρετὴ ἰοῦσα, ἀλλὰ βελτίω· ἡ γὰρ μεσότης ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς τῆς τῶν παθῶν ἦν μεσότης.
On the whole, since we defined at the beginning that the virtues are mean states, and the greater virtue is more of a mean state; so that it is not that virtue by going into greatness will make a man worse, but better; for the mean state was a mean of the deficiency and excess of passions.