§2.3.1ἡ δέ γε εὐβουλία ἐστὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ φρονήσει (περὶ γὰρ τὰ πρακτά ἐστι τὰ περὶ αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ὄντα), ἔστιν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως.
On the other hand, good deliberation is concerned with the same things as prudence is (for it is concerned with doable things which involve choice and avoidance), but it does not exist without prudence.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ τούτων ἐστί, ἡ δὲ εὐβουλία ἕξις ἢ διάθεσις ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἡ ἐπιτευκτικὴ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς βελτίστων καὶ συμφορωτάτωον.
For while prudence is practical in these matters, good deliberation is a habit or disposition or something of the sort that is capable of attaining the best and most advantageous things among doable things.
§2.3.2διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐβουλίας ἂν δόξειεν, τὰ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου συμβαίνοντα κατὰ τρόπον·
Therefore, even such things as happen by chance in a fitting manner would not seem to be the result of good deliberation.
οἷς γὰρ μή ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὁ σκοπῶν τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐκέτι ἂν εἴποις, ᾧ συνέβη τι κατὰ τρόπον, τοῦτον εὔβουλον, ἀλλʼ εὐτυχῆ· τὰ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ κρίνοντος γινόμενα κατορθώματα εὐτυχήματα ἐστίν.
For in those who do not possess the reason that aims at the best, you would no longer call a man who happens upon something in a fitting manner well-deliberated, but fortunate; for successes that occur without the judging reason are pieces of good fortune.
§2.3.3πότερον δέ ποτε τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶν τὸ τῇ ἐντεύξει τὸ ἴσον ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι (λέγω δέοἷον, ὁποῖος ἂν ᾖἕκαστος, τοιοῦτονγινόμενον ἐντυγχάνειν);
But is it ever the characteristic of the just man to render to each person what is equal in social intercourse (I mean, for instance, behaving in intercourse in such a way as each person happens to be)?
ἢ οὔ;
Or is it not?
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ κόλακος καὶ ἀρέσκου δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι· ἀλλὰ τὸ κεπʼ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳἀποδιδόναι τὴν ἔντευξιν, τοῦτο καὶ δικαίου καὶ σπουδαίου ἀπλῶς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι.
For this would seem to be the mark of a flatterer and a people-pleaser; whereas to render to each in social intercourse according to their worth would seem to be the characteristic of both a just and simply excellent man.
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις καὶ τοῦτο.
One might also raise a difficulty on this point.
§2.3.4εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα καὶ εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ὡς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἔστι δʼ ἡ βλάβη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία ἐν ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ περὶ ἀγαθά, ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄρα καὶ ὁ ἄδικος εἰδείη ἂν ὁποῖα ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὁποῖα κακά·
If indeed to do injustice is to harm voluntarily and knowingly whom, how, and for what purpose, and if harm and injustice lie in and are concerned with goods, then the man who does injustice, that is, the unjust man, would know what kinds of things are goods and what kinds are evils.
τὸ δέ γε ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἴδιον τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως·
But to know about such things is peculiar to the prudent man and to prudence.
ἄτοπον δὴ συμβαίνει τὸ τῷ ἀδίκῳ συμπαρακολουθεῖν τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τὴν φρόνησιν.
Therefore, a strange conclusion results: that prudence, the greatest good, accompanies the unjust man.
§2.3.5ἢ οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν παρακολουθεῖν τῷ ἀδίκῳ ἡ φρόνησις;
Or would prudence not seem to accompany the unjust man?
οὐ γὰρ σκοπεῖ ὁ ἄδικος οὐδὲ δύναται κρίνειν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν,· ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνει.
For the unjust man does not aim at nor is he able to judge the simply good and the good for himself, but he errs.
§2.3.6τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ ὀρθῶς δύνασθαι ταῦτα θεωρεῖν, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κατʼ ἰατρικὴν τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγιείας ποιητικὸν οἴδαμεν ἅπαντες, ὅτι ἐλλέβορος καὶ τὸ ἐλατήριον καὶ αἱ τομαὶ καὶ αἱ καύσεις ὑγιεινά εἰσιν καὶ ὑγιείας ποιητικά, ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐκ ἔχομεν τὴν ἰαπτρικὴν ἐπιστήμην·
But this is the characteristic of prudence, namely, to be able to contemplate these things rightly; just as in medical matters, we all know what is simply healthy and productive of health—that hellebore, purgatives, surgery, and cautery are healthy and productive of health—but nevertheless we do not possess the medical science.
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οἴδαμεν τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἰατρὸς οἶδεν τίνι ἐστὶ τοῦτʼ ἀμαθὸν καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς διακειμένῳ· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἤδη ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη.
For we do not further know the good in each particular case, just as the physician knows for whom this is good, and when, and in what condition; for it is in this that medical science already consists.
τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς. ὑχπιεινὰ εἰδότες ὅμως οὐκ ἔχομεν οὐδὲ παρακολουθεῖ ἡμῖν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη·
Therefore, though we know what is simply healthy, we nevertheless do not possess, nor does there accompany us, the medical science.
§2.3.7ὡς δʼ αὕτως ὁ ἄδικος.
In the same way also the unjust man.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς 1159b καὶ ἡ τυραννὶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία, οἶδεν· ἀλλʼ εἰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μή, ἢ πότε, ἢ πῶς διακειμένῳ, οὐκέτι οἷδεν.
For indeed he knows that simply tyranny, rule, and power are good; but whether they are good for him or not, or when, or in what condition, he no longer knows.
τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν μάλιστα τῆς φρονήσεως, ὥστε τῷ ἀκίκῳ οὐ παρακολουθεῖ ἡ φρόνησις.
And this is preeminently the function of prudence, so that prudence does not accompany the unjust man.
αἱρεῖται γὰρ τἀγαθά, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀδικεῖ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, οὐ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθά.
For he chooses the goods for the sake of which he does injustice as being simply goods, not as being goods for himself.
ὁ γὰρ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἁπλῶς μὲν ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ μέντοι ἴσως οὐκ ἀγαθόν· εὐπορήσας γὰρ καὶ ἄρξας πολλὰ κακὰ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ποιήσει καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ἀρχῇ ὀρθῶς χρήσασθαι.
For wealth and rule are simply goods, but to him they are perhaps not good; for having acquired wealth and having ruled, he will do many evils to himself and to his friends, since he will not be able to use rule rightly.
§2.3.8ἔχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀπορίαν καὶ σκέψιν, πότερόν ἐστι πρὸς τὸν φαῦλον ἀδικία, ἢ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀδικία ἐστὶν ἔν βλάβῃ, ἡ δὲ βλάβη ἐν στερήσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν βλάπτειν·
And this also presents a difficulty and inquiry, whether there is injustice towards a base man, or not.
τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ οἴεται εἶναι ἀγαθά, οὐκ ἀγαθὰ εἰσίν·
For if injustice consists in harm, and harm consists in the deprivation of goods, it would not seem to harm him; for the goods which he thinks are goods for him are not goods.
ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος τὸν φαῦλον οὐ δυνάμενον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι ὀρθῶς βλάψει·
For rule and wealth will harm the base man who is unable to use them rightly.
εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν βλάψει παραγενόμενα, ὁ τούτων στερίσκκων οὐπ ἂν δόξειεν ἀδικεῖν.
If, therefore, they will harm him when present, he who deprives him of these would not seem to do injustice.