§2.2.1ἡ δὲ εὐγνωμοσύνη καὶ ὁ εὐγνώμων ἐστὶν περὶ ταὐτὰ περὶ ἃ καὶ ἡ ἐπιείκεια, περὶ τὰ δίκαια [καὶ] τὰ ἐλλελειμμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου τῷ μῆ ἀκριβῶς διωρίσθαι, κριτικὸς ὢν τῶν ἐλλελειμμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου, καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐλλέλειπται, ἔστι μέντοι δίκαια, ὁ τοιοῦτος εὐγνώμων.
And good sense and the man of good sense are concerned with the same things as equity is, namely, with those just things which have been omitted by the lawgiver because they were not precisely defined. A person who is capable of judging the things omitted by the lawgiver, and who recognizes that although they have been omitted by the lawgiver, they are nevertheless just—such a person is a man of good sense.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιεικείας ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρῖναι τοῦ εὐγνώμονος, τὸ δὲ δὴ πράττειν [καὶ] κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς.
Therefore, good sense does not exist without equity; for to judge is the characteristic of the man of good sense, but to act in accordance with that judgment is the characteristic of the equitable man.