§2.11.24πολλάκις δὲ μένε μὲν ἡ φιλία, κακῶς δʼ ἐχρήσα τῷ φίλῳ, διὸ ἀγανακτοῦσιν· ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄλογον.
But often while friendship remains, one treats the friend badly, which is why people are vexed; and yet this is not irrational.
οὐ γὰρ διʼ ἀρετὴν ἡ φιλία σοι πρὸς τοῦτον ὑπῆρχεν, διὸ οὐδʼ ἄτοπον μηδὲν ποιεῖν αὐτὸν τῶν παθʼ ἀρετήν.
For your friendship toward this person did not exist because of virtue, which is why it is not absurd that he does nothing in accordance with virtue.
ἀγανακτοῦσιν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς διʼ ἡδονὴν γὰρ ποιησώαενοι τὴν φιλίαν, τὴν διʼ ἀρετὴν οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν· τὸ δʼ οὺ δυνατόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ διʼ ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἀρετῆς ἐχομένη.
People are vexed, therefore, incorrectly; for having made their friendship because of pleasure, they think they ought to have the friendship because of virtue; but this is not possible; for the friendship because of pleasure and the useful does not hold onto virtue.
§2.11.25κοινωσάμενοι οὖν ἡδονῇ ἀρετὴν ςητοῦσιν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἡδονῇ καὶ τῷ πυμφέρονα ἡ ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἀπολουθτῖ.
Therefore, having associated in pleasure, they seek virtue, incorrectly; for virtue does not follow pleasure and the useful, but both of these follow virtue.
ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ μὴ τις οἰήσεται τοὺς σπουδαίους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς ἡδίενους εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι, ὥς φησιν Εὁριπίδης, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἡδεῖς εἰσίν· “κακὸς κακῷ” γὰρ “συντέτηκεν. ” οὐ γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἡδονῇ ἡ ἀρετή, ἀλλὼ τᾖ ἀρετῇ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀκολουθεῖ.
For it would be absurd if someone did not think that the good are more pleasant to one another; for even the bad, as Euripides says, are pleasant to themselves; for "bad has dissolved into bad." For virtue does not follow pleasure, but pleasure follows virtue.
§2.11.26εἶναι, ἢ οὐ δεῖ ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ μὴ φάναι δεῖν.
To be [pleasant], or ought they not? For it is absurd to say they ought not.
εἰ γὰρ 1210a ἀφελεῖς αὐτῶν τὸ ἡδεῖ εἷναι ἀλλήλοις, ἄλλους ποριοῦνται φίλους εἰς τὸ συζῆν, τρὺς ἡδεῖς· εἰς γὰρ τὸσυ ζῆν οὐδὲν μεῖζόν ἐστι τοῦ ἡδεῖςςἶναι·
For if you take away from them being pleasant to one another, they will procure other friends to live with, those who are pleasant; for for living together, nothing is greater than being pleasant.
§2.11.27ἄτοπον οὖν τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι δεῖν τοὺς σπουδαίους μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις συζῆν· τοῦτο δʼοὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέος· δέοι ἂν ἂρα, ὡς ἔυικεν, μάλιστκ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἡδέσιν εἶναι.
It is absurd, then, not to think that the good should live together most of all; but this is not without the pleasant; it would be necessary then, as it seems, that being pleasant should belong most of all to these.
§2.11.28ἐπεὶ δὲ διῄρηνται αἱφιλἰαι είς τρία εἴδη, καὶ ἐν ταύταις ἡπορεῖτο, πότερον ἐν ἰσότητι ἡ φιλία ἐγγίνεται ἢ ἐν ἀνισότητι· ἔστιν οὐν κατʼ ἀμφότερα.
But since friendships are divided into three kinds, and in these it was questioned whether friendship arises in equality or in inequality; it exists then in both ways.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθʼ ὁμοιότητα ἡτῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἡ τελεία φιλία· ἡ δὲ κατʼ ἀνομοιότητα ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον.
For that in accordance with similarity is the friendship of the good and the complete; while that in accordance with dissimilarity is that in accordance with the useful.
τῷ γὰρ εὐπόρῳ ὁ πένης διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν ὧν ὁ πλούσιος εὐπορεῖ φίλος ἐστί, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῷ ὁ φαῦλος διὰ ταὐτό δι?? γὰρ τὴν ἓνδειαν τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς, παῤ οὗ οἴ?? αὑτῷ??εσθαι, διὸ τοῦτο τούτῳ φίλος.
For the poor man is a friend to the wealthy because of the lack of those things which the rich man has in abundance, and the bad man is a friend to the good for the same reason; for because of the lack of virtue, [seeking it] from whom he thinks it will come to him, for this reason he is a friend to this man.
§2.11.29γίνεται οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἀνομοίοις φιλία πατὰ τὸ συμφέρον· διὸ καὶ Εὐριπίδης
“ἐρᾷ μὲν ἔμβρο γαῖ᾿, ὅταν ξηρὸν πέδον
ὡς ἐναντίοις οὖσιν τούτοις ἐγγίγνεται φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ συμφέρρον.
Friendship, then, arises in dissimilar people in accordance with the useful; which is why Euripides also says, "The earth loves the rain, when the dry plain [needs moisture]," pointing out that friendship because of the useful arises in these since they are opposites.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ θέλεις τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ποιῆσεαι πῦρ καὶ??δωρ, ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις χρέσιμα εἰσίν.
For indeed if you wish to consider the most opposite things, fire and water, these are useful to one another.
§2.11.30τὸ γὰρ πῦρ φασίν, ἐὰν μἡ ἔχῃ ὑγρόν, φθείρεσθαι, ὡς τοῦτʼ αὐτῷ παραοκευάζον ὥσπερ τροφὴν τινά, ταθτην δὲ τοσαύτην, ὅσης πρατήσειεν〈ἄν〉· ἂν μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον ποιήσῃς τὸ ὑγρόν, ἐπικρατῆσαν〈ποιήσει〉 φθτίρεσθαι τὸ πῦρ, ἐὰν δὲ σύμμετρον, συνοίσει.
For they say that fire, if it does not have moisture, is destroyed, as this provides for it a kind of nourishment, and this only in such an amount as it can master; for if you make the moisture more, it will dominate and cause the fire to be destroyed, but if it is moderate, it will be beneficial.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντιωτάτοις φιλία ἐγγίνεται διὰ τὸ συμφέρον.
It is clear, then, that even in the most opposite things friendship arises because of the useful.
§2.11.31ἀνάγονται δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ φιλίαι, καὶ αἱ ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ αἱ ἐν ἀνισότητι, εἰς τὰς διῃρημένας τρεῖς. — ἔστιν δʼ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς φιλίαις διαφορὰ γινομένη πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως φιλῶσιν ἢ εὖ ποιῶσιν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἢ ὃ τι ἂν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὃ μὲν ἐπτενῶς ποιῇ ὃ δʼ ἐλλείτῃ, κατὰ τὰν ἔλλειψιν τὸ ἔγκλημα καὶ ἡ μέμψις.
And all friendships, both those in equality and those in inequality, are referred to the three kinds that have been divided. — But in all friendships a difference arises between them when they do not love similarly, or do good, or serve, or whatever of such things; for when one does it eagerly and the other falls short, the accusation and blame are in accordance with the deficiency.
§2.11.32οὐ κὴν ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων ὧν τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τέλος τῆς φιλίας, οἶυν εἰ ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον ἀλλήλοις φίλοι ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ κατʼ?? ἔλλειψις ἡ παρὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἐὰν οὖν πλείω ἀγαθὰ σύ μοι ποιῇς ἢ ἐγὼ σοί, οὐδʼ ἀμφισβητῶ ἔτι μὴ οὐ δεῖν σε μᾶλλον ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ φιλεῖσθαι·
Indeed, on the one hand, in those friendships where the end of the friendship is the same, as if both are friends to one another because of the useful or because of the pleasant, and there is a deficiency from one side, if you do more good things for me than I for you, I do not dispute any further that you ought to be loved more by me;