§2.11.13ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔσται γε κατὰ τὸ φιλητὸν ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία.
But such friendship will indeed not be in accordance with the lovable.
φιλητὸν γὰρ ἦν τἀγαθὸν, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος οὐ φιλητός· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ φιλητέον·
For the lovable was the good, but the bad man is not lovable; no, on the contrary, it is in accordance with the lovable [for someone].
εἰσὶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς παντελοῦς φιλίας, τῆς ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις, καὶ αὗται αἱ φιλίαι, ἥ τε κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον.
For indeed these friendships, both that in accordance with the pleasant and that in accordance with the useful, are derived from the complete friendship, that among the good.
§2.11.14— ὁ οὖν κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ φιλῶν οὐ φιλεῖ τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλίαν, οὐδὲ ὁ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον· §2.11.15εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, ἥ τε κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον, οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ μέν, οὐ παντελῶς δὲ οὐδὲ ἀλλότριαι ἀλλήλων, ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ πως ἠρτημέναι εἰσίν.
— Therefore he who loves because of the pleasant does not love in accordance with the friendship based on the good, nor does he who loves because of the useful; and indeed these friendships also exist, both that in accordance with the good and that in accordance with the pleasant and that in accordance with the useful; they are not indeed the same, but neither are they completely foreign to one another, but are in a way dependent on the same thing.
οἷον φαμὲν ἰατρικὸν τὸ μαχαίριον, ἰατρικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μαχαίριον τῷ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς ἰατρικὴν ἰατρικὸν λέγεται, ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος τῷ ποιητικὸς εἶναι ὑγιείας, ἡ δʼ ἐπιστήμη τῷ αἰτία εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή.
For instance, we call a scalpel medical, a man medical, and knowledge medical; these are not called so in the same way, but the scalpel is called medical by being useful for medicine, the man by being productive of health, and the knowledge by being the cause and principle.
§2.11.16ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ φιλίαι οὐχ ὡσαύτως, ἥ τε τῶν σπουδαίων ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον.
Similarly also friendships are not in the same manner, both that of the good because of the good, and that in accordance with the pleasant, and that in accordance with the useful.
οὐδὲ δὴ ὁμωνύμως λέγονται, ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἰσὶν μὲν αἱ αὐταί, περὶ ταὐτὰ δέ πως καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσίν.
Nor indeed are they called so homonymously, but while they are not the same, they are in a way about the same things and from the same things.
§2.11.17εἰ δή τις λέγοι “ὁ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ φιλῶν οὐκ ἔστιν φίλος τούτῳ· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φίλος ἐστίν”, βαδίζει ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν σπουδαίων φιλίαν, τὴν ἐξ ἇπάντων τούτων οὖσαν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος, ὥστʼ ἀληθῶς οὐκ ἔστιν [κατʼ] ἐκείνην γε τὴν φιλέαν φίλος, ἀλλὰ τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον.
If indeed someone should say, "he who loves because of the pleasant is not a friend to this man; for he is not a friend in accordance with the good," such a person proceeds toward the friendship of the good, which is from all of these, both from the good and from the pleasant and from the useful, so that in truth he is indeed not a friend in accordance with that friendship, but with that in accordance with the pleasant or in accordance with the useful.
§2.11.18πότερον οὖν ἔσται ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ σπουδαίῳ φίλος, ἢ οὔ;
Will then the good man be a friend to the good man, or not?
οὐδὲν γὰρ προσδεῖται, φησίν, ὁ ὅμοιος τοῦ ὁμοίου. ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος ζητεῖ τὴν κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον φιλίαν· ᾗ γὰρ προσδεῖται ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου, ταύτῃ ὄντες φίλοι ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον φιλίᾳ εἰσίν.
"For the similar," someone says, "has no need of the similar." Indeed such an argument seeks the friendship in accordance with the useful; for in so far as the one has need of the other, being friends in this respect they are in the friendship in accordance with the useful.
§2.11.19ἀλλὰ ἑτέρα διώρισται ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον φιλία καὶ ἡ κατʼ ἁρετὴν καὶ ἡδονήν.
But the friendship in accordance with the useful has been defined as different from that in accordance with virtue and pleasure.
εἰκὸς δὴ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον τούτους· πάντα γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει, τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον.
It is indeed reasonable that these [the good] should be [friends] much more; for all things belong to them, the good, the pleasant, and the useful.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ φαύλῳ· §2.11.20γὰρ ἴσως ἡδύς, ταύτῃ καὶ φίλος.
But also the good man [is a friend] to the bad; for [in so far as the bad man] is perhaps pleasant, in this respect he is also a friend.
καὶ ὁ φαῦλός γε τῷ φαύλῳ· γὰρ ἴσως τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρει, ταύτῃ φίλοι.
And indeed the bad man [is a friend] to the bad; for [in so far as] perhaps the same thing is useful to them, in this respect they are friends.
ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοῦτο γινόμενον, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ᾖ τὸ συμφέρον, φίλους τούτους διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ὥστʼ οὐδὲν κωλύσει καὶ φαύλοις οὖσιν ταὐτόν τι συμφέρειν.
For we see this happening, when the same is the useful, that these are friends because of the useful, so that nothing will prevent the same thing being useful also to those who are bad.
§2.11.21βεβαιοτάτη μὲν οὖν καὶ μονιμωτάτη καὶ καλλίστη ἡ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις φιλία, ἡ κατʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ τἀγαθὸν οὖσα, εἰκότως.
Most stable, then, and most permanent and most beautiful is the friendship among the good, which is in accordance with virtue and the good, and reasonably so.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀμετάπτωτον, διʼ ἣν ἡ φιλία, ὥστε εἰκὸς τὴν φιλίαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμετάπτωτον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον οὐδέποτε ταὐτόν· διὸ ἡ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον φιλία οὐ βεβαία, ἀλλὰ τῷ συμφέροντι συμμεταπίπτει· §2.11.22ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν.
For virtue, because of which the friendship exists, is unchanging, so that it is reasonable that such friendship is unchanging, but the useful is never the same; therefore the friendship because of the useful is not stable, but changes along with the useful; and similarly also that in accordance with pleasure.
ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν βελτίστων φιλία ἡ κατʼ ἀρετὴν γινομένη ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν τοῖς φορτικοῖς καὶ τυχοῦσιν.
The friendship of the best, then, is that which arises in accordance with virtue, but that of the many is in accordance with the useful, and that in accordance with pleasure is among the vulgar and ordinary people.
§2.11.23συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ ἀγανακνεῖν, ὁταν φαύλοις ἐν??χωσιν τοῖς φίλοις, καὶ θαυμάζειν· ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον.
And it also happens that people are vexed and wonder when they meet with bad men as their friends; but it is nothing absurd.
ὕταν γὰρ ἡ φιλία λάβῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχήν, διʼ ἣν φίλοι εἰσίν, ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, ἅμα ταῦτʼ ἀπολείπει καὶ ἡ φιλία οὐ διαμένει.
For when friendship has received pleasure as its principle, because of which they are friends, or the useful, as soon as these fail, the friendship also does not remain.