§2.11.33ἐν δὲ φιλίᾳ μὴ διὰ ταὐτὸ φίλοι ἐσμέν, μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραί.
But in friendship where we are not friends for the same reason, differences arise all the more.
ἄδηλος γὰρ ἡ ἔλλεωψις παρʼ ἑκατέρου.
For the deficiency on either side is non-evident.
οἷον εἰ ὃ μὲν διʼ ἡδονὴν φίλος ἐστὶν ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ τῷ συμφέροντι ὑπερέχων ἀξίαν οἴεται τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος, οὔτε ὁ τῇ ἡδονῇ ὑπερέχων ἀξίαν τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐν τῷ συμφέροντι χάριν ἀπολαμβάνειν.
For example, if one is a friend because of pleasure and the other because of the useful, there is dispute; for neither does the one who excels in the useful think that pleasure is a worthy exchange for the useful, nor does the one who excels in pleasure think he receives a gratitude in the useful that is worthy of the pleasure.
διὸ μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις φιλίαις γίνονται.
Therefore, differences arise all the more in such friendships.
§2.11.34πλούτῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τοιούτῳ οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοὶ φιλεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνδεεστέρων οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοὶ φιλεῖσθαι·
[Those who excel] in wealth or some other such thing do not think they themselves ought to love, but think they themselves ought to be loved by those who are more in need.
§2.11.35ἔστιν δὲ βέλτιον τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι.
But to love is better than to be loved.
— τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖν ἐνέργειά τις ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι οὐδεμία τῷ φιλουμένῳ ἐνέργεια γίνεται.
For loving is a certain activity of pleasure and a good, whereas from being loved no activity arises for the one who is loved.
§2.11.36— ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον τὸ γνωρίζειν ἢ τὸ γνωρίζεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γνωρίζεσθαι καὶ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ γνωρίζειν καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις.
Furthermore, to know is better than to be known; for to be known and to be loved belong even to inanimate things, but to know and to love belong to animate things.
§2.11.37— ἔτι τὸ εὐποιητικὸν εἶναι βέλτιον ἢ τὸ μή· ὁ μὲν οὖν φιλῶν εὐποιητικός, φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλούμενος, φιλεῖται, οὔ.
Furthermore, to be beneficent is better than not; therefore, the one who loves is beneficent, since he loves, whereas the one who is loved, being loved, is not.
§2.11.38— ἀλλʼ οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον βούλονται ἢ φιλεῖν, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπεροχήν τινα εἶναι· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὁ φιλούμενος ὑπερέχει ἡδονῇ ἢ εὐπορίᾳ ἢ ἀρετῇ, ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ὀρέγεται.
But people, because of love of honor, wish to be loved rather than to love, because in being loved there is a certain superiority; for the loved one always excels in pleasure or abundance or virtue, and the lover of honor reaches out for superiority.
§2.11.39καὶ οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοὶ φιλεῖν οἱ ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ὄντες· ἀντιδιδόναι γὰρ ἐν οἷς ὑπερέχουσιν τοῖς φιλοῦσιν αὐτούς.
And those who are in superiority do not think they themselves ought to love; for they give in return in those things in which they excel to those who love them.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἥττους αὐτῶν εἰσίν· διὸ οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν φιλεῖν ἀλλὰ φιλεῖσθαι.
Furthermore, [those who love them] are also inferior to them; which is why they do not think they ought to love but to be loved.
ὁ δʼ ἐνδεὴς χρημάτων ἢ ἡδονῶν ἢ ἀρετῆς θαυμάζει τὸν ὑπερέχονται τούτοις, καὶ φιλεῖ διὰ τὸ τούτων ἢ τυγχάνειν ἢ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι.
On the other hand, the one who is in need of money or pleasures or virtue admires the one who excels in these, and loves because of either obtaining them or thinking he will obtain them.
§2.11.40εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ἐξ ὁμοιοπαθείας, ἐκ τοῦ τἀγαθὸν βούλεσθαί τινι εἶναι.
There are also such friendships from similarity of feeling, from wishing good to be for someone.
οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ ἡ ἐπὶ τούτων γινομένη φιλία πάντα ταῦτα ἔχουσα· πολλάκις γὰρ ἄλλῳ μὲν εἶναι βουλόμεθα τἀγαθά, συζῆν μέντοι μετʼ ἄλλου.
But the friendship arising in these cases does not have all these things; for often we wish good things to be for one person, yet we wish to live together with another.
§2.11.41ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πότερον φιλίας δεῖ εἰπεῖν, ἢ τῆς τελείας φιλίας τῆς κατʼ ἀρετὴν πάθη;
But should we say these belong to friendship, or are they passive states of the complete friendship in accordance with virtue?
ἐν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ τῇ φιλίᾳ πάντα ταῦτα ἐνυπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ συζῆν μετʼ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἂν θέλοιμεν (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον, καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχει) καὶ τἀγαθὰ τούτῳ μάλιστα βουλοίμεθʼ ἂν, καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ τούτῳ.
For in that friendship all these things are present; for indeed we would wish to live together with no other (for both the pleasant and the useful, and virtue belong to the good man), and we would wish good things most of all for this person, and living and living well for no other than this one.
§2.11.42πότερον δʼ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ [φιλία] καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλία, ἢ οὔ, νῦν μὲν ἀφείσθω, ὕστερον δʼ ἐροῦμεν.
But whether there is [friendship] for one also toward oneself, or not, let it be dismissed for now, and we shall speak of it later.
πάντα δὲ βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς· καὶ γὰρ συζῆν μεθʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βουλόμεθα (ἴσως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀναγκαῖον) καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινί.
But we wish all things for ourselves; for indeed we wish to live together with ourselves (and perhaps this is even necessary) and to live well, and to live, and to wish good, for no other than ourselves.
§2.11.43ἔτι ὁμοιοπαθεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἐσμέν· ἂν γὰρ προσπταίσωμεν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ περιπέσωμεν τῶν τοιούτων, εὐθὺς λυπούμεθα.
Furthermore, we share feelings most of all with ourselves; for if we stumble or fall into some other such thing, we are immediately pained.
διὸ δόξειεν ἂν οὕτως εἶναι αὑτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία.
Therefore, it would seem in this way that there is friendship for one toward oneself.
§2.11.44τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα, οἷον τὴν ὁμοιοπάθειαν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἤτοι εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς φιλίαν ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν ἢ εἰς τὴν τελείαν· ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ [καὶ] τὸ συζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι βούλεσθαι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἐν ταύταις ἐστίν.
Therefore, such things, such as sharing feelings and living well and the others, we speak of either by referring them to the friendship toward ourselves or to the complete friendship; for in both all these things belong; for indeed living together, wishing to be, and well-being, and all other things are in these.