§2.11.1ἐφʼ ἄπασι δὲ τ??πς ὑπὸρ φιλίας ἀναυχαῖόν ἔσαιν εἰπεν, τί ἐστν παὶ ὅν πίσι κνὶ π??ρὶ vέ· ἐ??ὴ γὰρ????ρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον oαρρατεάνονσων?? ἐν παν?? καὶ οὖσαν ἀγκθόν,?? ἂν εἔ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαμουίαν.
After all these things it would be necessary to speak about friendship, what it is and in what things and about what; for since we see it extending through the whole of life and being a good on every occasion, there would be a need [for it] with a view to happiness.
§2.11.2πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἃ??πορεῖται καὶ ζητεῖται, βἐλτιον διελθεῖυ πέτεραν γάρὐσσσττιν ἡ φιλίαἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὥσπςρ δοχεῖχαὶ λέμεται;
First, then, it is perhaps better to go through the difficulties and questions; for is friendship among similar people, as it seems and is said?
καὶ γὰρ ‘‘??ςʼʼ φαει “παρὰ κυλοιὸν??άνειʼ᾿, καὶ
?? τοι τὸν ὅμοιον???? ὡς τὸν ὅμοε??ν. φασὶν δὲ καὶ κυνός ποτε ἂεὶ καθευδο-σης ἔπὶ τῆς ἄτης κεραμἴδος, ἐρωτηθέντα τὸν μπrδοκλέα, διὰ τί ποτε?? κύων ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κεραμῖδος καθεύδει, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔχει τ κεραμῖδι ὃμοιον ἡ κύων, ὡς διὰ τὸ ὅμοιον τὴν κὑνα φοιτῶσαν.
For they say 'jackdaw sits by jackdaw' and 'how indeed [God always leads] the similar to the similar.' And they also say that when a dog was once always sleeping on the same tile, and Empedocles was asked why indeed the dog sleeps on the same tile, he said that the dog has something similar to the tile, so that the dog resorts [there] because of the similarity.
§2.11.3πάλιν δʼ αὗ δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἐν τοῖς ἐνανύοις μᾶλλον ἔγγῖνεsθι ἡ φιλία.
Again, on the other hand, it seems to some others that friendship rather arises among opposites.
“ἐρ μὲτή” γάρ, φασίν,??βρου γαῖα, ὅταν ξηρὸν πἐδον’ τὸ δ ἐναντῖον, φασίν, τῷ ἐνανι??ῳ βσὐλεσθαι φίλον εἶναι.
For they say 'parched earth loves rain when the ground is dry,' and they say the opposite wishes to be a friend to the opposite.
ἔν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ὁμοίοις οὐδὲ ἐνδέχεσθαι γίνεσθαι.
For they say that among similar people it is not even possible [for friendship] to arise.
τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον, φασίν, τοῦ ὁμοίου οὐδὲν προσδεῖται, καὶτὰτοιαῦτα ὅἡ.
For the similar, they say, has no need of the similar, and other things of this sort.
§2.11.4— ἔτι δὲ πὐτερον ἔργον ἐστὶ φίλον γενέσθαι ἢ ῥάδιον γενέσθαι;
— Furthermore, is it a difficult task to become a friend, or is it easy to become [one]?
οἱ γοῦν κόλακες ταχέως προσεδρεύσαντες φίλοι μὲν οὐκεἰσίν, φαίνονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι.
At any rate, flatterers, having quickly paid court, are not friends, though they appear to be friends.
§2.11.5— ἔ??ι δὲκαὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπορεῖται, πότρρον ἔσταε ὁ σχο??δαῖος τῷ φαύὰῳε φέλος;
— And furthermore such things are also puzzled over: whether the good man will be a friend to the bad, or not?
'οὔ; ?? κὲν γὰρ φιλία ἐν πίστα κνὶ βεθeαrέπτηπ, ὁ ἀὲ φαῦλος ἥκιστα τοιοῦτυς· καὶ δ φφαῦὶς?? φαύλων, ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο;
For friendship is in trust and stability, but the bad man is least of all such; and is the bad man [a friend] to the bad, or not even this?
§2.11.6πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐιοριστέον ἄ εὔη ὑ??ὲρ πλίας πόπας σκοποῦμεν.
First, then, we should define what sort of friendships we are considering.
ἔστι γάρ, ὡς οἴνταr, φιλία καὶ χροσιε θεὸν καὶ τὰ ἄυρυχα, οὐκ ὀρθῶρ.
For there is, as they think, a friendship also toward God and toward inanimate things, but not rightly.
τὴν γὰρ φmίαυ ἐνταῦθά φαμεν εἷναι οὗ ἐστι τὸ ἀναφώλεῖσᾶαε, ἡ δὲ πρὸς θεὸν φριλία οὔτε ὡτιφιλεῖσθαι δέχεται, οὔθʼ ὅλως vὸ φλεῖν· ἄxοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἴ τις φαίη φελεῖν τὸν Δία
For we say that friendship is in that place where there is being loved in return, but friendship toward God admits of neither being loved in return, nor of loving at all; for it would be absurd if anyone should say that he loves Zeus.
§2.11.7οὐδὲ δὴ παρὰ τῶν ἀρύχων ἐνδέχεται ἀντπφιλεῖσθαι.
Nor indeed is it possible to be loved in return by inanimate things.
φιλία μέντοε καὲ ρὸς τὰ ἄψυφa ἐαύάν, οἷον οἶνον ἢ ἄλλο δὴ τῶν τοιούτωπ.
Yet there is a friendship toward inanimate things, such as wine or some other such things.
διὸ ὀὴ οὔτε τὴν mρὸς τὸν θεὸν φιλίαν ἐαζητeῦμεν οὔτε τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄμυγα, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἔeεψυχκ, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἐν οἷς ἐστι τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν.
Therefore indeed we do not seek the friendship toward God nor that toward inanimate things, but that toward animate things, and among these, toward those in which there is being loved in return.
§2.11.8εἰ δή τις μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπισσκέραιτο τί ἐφτι τὸ φιλητόν, ἔστιν οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τἀγαθόν.
If indeed someone after this should examine what is the lovable, it is indeed nothing other than the good.
ἕτερον μὲν οὖν ἐοπτι τὸ φιλητὸν καὶ τὸ φιλητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ βυυὲητὸν χαὶ τὸ βουλητέον.
Now, the lovable and the lovable [for someone] are different, just as the wishable and the wishable [for someone] are.
§2.11.9βουλητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, βουλητέον δὲ τὸ ἔκάστῳ ἀγαθόν· οὕτωο καὶ φφιλητὺν μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἄμαθόν, φιλητέον δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγκθόν, ἅστε τὸ μὲν φιλητέον καὶ φιλητόν, τὸ δὲ φιλ??τὸν οὐκ ἔστι πτὲητέον.
For the wishable is the absolute good, but the wishable [for someone] is the good for each; so too the lovable is the absolute good, but the lovable [for someone] is the good for himself, so that while the lovable [for someone] is also lovable, the lovable is not always lovable [for him].
§2.11.10ἐνταῦθα οὖν ἔστιν καὶ διὰ ψὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ ἀπορία, πύτερόν ἐστιν ὁ??πουδνῖος τῷ φαύλῳ φίλος ἢ οὔ.
Here then indeed and because of such a thing is the difficulty, whether the good man is a friend to the bad or not.
συν??παι γάρ ππως τἀγαθῷ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ φιλητέον τῷ φιλητῷ, ἔχεται δὲ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμφέρον.
For in a way the good for himself and the lovable [for someone] are joined with the good and the lovable; and to the good there also attach and follow being pleasant and being useful.
§2.11.11ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν σπουδαίων φιλία ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀντιφιλῶσιν ἀλλήλους· φιλοῦσι δὲ ἀλλήλους, φιλητοί· φιλητοὶ δέ, ἀγαθοί.
The friendship of the good, then, is when they love each other in return; and they love each other in so far as they are lovable; and they are lovable in so far as they are good.
§2.11.12οὐκοῦν ὁ σπουδαῖος, φησίν, τῷ φαύλῳ οὐκ ἔσται φίλος;
Will the good man, then, someone says, not be a friend to the bad?
ἔσται μὲν οὖν.
On the contrary, he will be.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τἀγαθῷ ἠκολούθει τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ᾗ ἐστιν φαῦλος ὢν ἡδύς, ταύτῃ φίλος· πάλιν αὖ συμφέρων, συμφέρων, ταύτῃ φίλος.
For since the useful and the pleasant followed the good, in so far as the bad man is pleasant, in this respect he is a friend; and again in so far as he is useful, in this respect he is a friend.