§1.8.1ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων.
The same holds also in the case of all the others.
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τῆς ἕξεως, τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχειν, τὸ δ᾿ εὖ ἔχειν πρὸς ταῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν τὸ μήτε πρὸς τὴν ὑπερβολἦν ἔχειν μήτε πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειαν·
For this is characteristic of a state, namely, to be well or badly disposed toward these; and to be well disposed toward these is to be disposed neither toward excess nor toward deficiency.
§1.8.2πρὸς μεσότητα ἄρα τῶν τοιούτων καθ᾿ ἃ ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα ἡ ἕξις ἐστὶ τοῦ εὖ ἔχειν, τοῦ δὲ κακῶς πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔνδειαν.
A state of being well disposed, therefore, is one directed toward a mean of such things, in respect of which we are called praiseworthy, whereas a state of being badly disposed is directed toward excess and deficiency.
ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ τῶν παθῶν τούτων μεσότης, τὰ δὲ πάθη ἤτοι λῦπαί εἰσιν ἢ ἡδοναὶ ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἡδονῆς· ἡ ἄρα ἀρετή ἐστιν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ ἐντεῦθέν ἐστι δῆλον.
Since, then, virtue is a mean of these passions, and passions are either pains or pleasures, or not without pain or pleasure, it is therefore clear from this also that virtue is concerned with pains and pleasures.
§1.8.3ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν τινι, ἐφ' ὧν ἡ κακία οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει τινί, οἷον μοιχεία καὶ ὁ μοιχός· οὐκ ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ μᾶλλον τὰς ἐλευθέρας διαφθείρων.
But there are also other passions, as it might seem to someone, in the case of which vice does not consist in a certain excess and deficiency, such as adultery and the adulterer; for the latter is not someone who seduces free women more.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτόν ἐστίν, ὃ περιέχεται ἡδονῇ τῇ κατ᾿ ἀκολασίαν, ἢ καὶ ὃ ἐν ἐλλείψει καὶ ὃ ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τὸ ψεκτὸν ἔχει.
Rather, both this and whatever else of this kind exists are enveloped in the pleasure associated with self-indulgence, or rather, it is that which has its blameworthiness in deficiency or in excess.