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Aristotle · Great Ethics §1.7.1-1.7.4

Three Phenomena of the Soul and Virtue as a Mean of States

Passage 9 of 71 · Greek

Summary

In order to define virtue, the text classifies the phenomena of the soul into passions, capacities, and states, demonstrating through the examples of anger and boastfulness that virtue consists in maintaining the proper mean of states.

§1.7.1μετὰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ βουλομένους εἰπεῖν τὸ τέ ἐστιν ἡ ὠριτή, εἰδῆσαι τίνα ἐστὶν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γικόμενα.
Therefore, after this, those who wish to say what virtue is must know what the things that arise in the soul are.
ἔστιν δ᾿ ἃ γίκεται ταῦτα, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις·
And these things which arise are: passions, capacities, and states.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτε τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἀρετή.
So it is clear that virtue would be one of these.
§1.7.2πάθη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὀργὴ φόβος μῖσος πόθος ζῆ λος ἔλεος τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷς εἴωθεν παρακολουθεῖν λύπη καὶ ἡδονή·
Passions, then, are anger, fear, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and the like, which pain and pleasure usually accompany.
δυνάμεις δὲ καθ᾿ ἂ παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ᾿ ἃς δυναταί ἐσμεν ὁργισθῆναι λυπηθῆναι ἐλεῆσαι, [καὶ]τὰ τοιαῦτα·
Capacities are those in respect of which we are said to be susceptible to these, for example, those in respect of which we are capable of being angry, pained, feeling pity, and the like.
§1.7.3ἕξεις δ᾿ εἰσὶν καθ᾿ ἃς πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν λίαν ἀργίλως, κακῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ὀργήν, εἰ δ᾿ ὅλως μὴ ὀργιζόμεθα ἐφ᾿ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ σὕτως κακῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ὁργήν.
And states are those in respect of which we are well or badly disposed toward these; for example, toward being angry, if we are too prone to anger, we are badly disposed toward anger, but if we are not angry at all at things we ought to be, in this way too we are badly disposed toward anger.
τὸ ἄρα μέσως ἔχειν τὸ μήτε λίαν ὑπεραλγεῖν μήτε παντελῶς ἀναλγήτως ἔχειν.
To be in a mean, therefore, is neither to feel excessive pain nor to be entirely insusceptible to pain.
§1.7.4ὅταν οὖν οὕτως ἔχωμεν, εὖ διακείμεθα.
Whenever, therefore, we are in this state, we are well disposed.
ὁμείως δὲ [καὶ] πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ὅμοια.
And likewise also toward other similar things.
τὸ γὰρ εὐόργητον καὶ τὸ πρᾶον ἐν μεσότητί ἐστιν ἀργῆς καὶ ἀναλγησέως τῆς πρὸς ὀργήν.
For being appropriately-tempered and being mild are in a mean between anger and insensibility to anger.
ὁμοίως [καὶ] ἐπ᾿ ἀλαζονείως καὶ κς.
Likewise also in the case of boastfulness and self-depreciation.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλείω προσποιεῖσθαι τῶν ὑπερχόντων ἔχειν ἀλαζονείας, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττω εἰρωνείας·
For pretending to have more than what one actually has belongs to boastfulness, and pretending to have less belongs to self-depreciation.
ἡ ἄρα μεσότης ἡ τούτων ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐστίν.
The mean between these, therefore, is truthfulness.

Notes

  1. 1.7.1βουλομένους — An accusative participle serving as the subject of the infinitive εἰδέναι in the accusative-and-infinitive construction governed by the impersonal verb δεῖ. The preceding phrase βουλομένους εἰπεῖν likewise functions within this subject relation.
  2. 1.7.2καθ᾿ ἃ — A relative phrase. Although the antecedent δυνάμεις is feminine plural, some manuscripts transmit the neuter plural καθ' ἃ, referring generally to the capacities' function or relationship to the passions. Standard critical editions sometimes emend or read this as καθ' ἅς to match the gender.
  3. 1.7.4ἀλαζονείας — A predicative genitive of characteristic or belonging. It takes the infinitive clause τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλείω ... ἔχειν (pretending to have more than what actually exists) as its subject, denoting that such behavior 'belongs to' or 'is characteristic of' boastfulness.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Great Ethics §1.7.1-1.7.4. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg022.humanitext-grc1:1.7.1-1.7.4

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