§1.9.1μετὰ τοίνυν τοῦτο. ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἴσως ῥηθῆναι τί τῇ μεσότητι ἀντίκειται, πότερον ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἡ ἔνδεια.
Now, after this, it is perhaps necessary to state what is opposed to the mean, whether excess or deficiency.
ἐνίαις μὲν γὰρ μεσότησιν ἔνδεια ἐναντίον, ἐνίαις δὲ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα, ἀλλ᾿ δειλία ἔνδεια οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ μεσότητι οὔσῃ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας τῆς περὶ ἡδονὰς οὐ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα, ἀλλ᾿ ἡ ἀκολασία οὖσα ὑπερβολή.
For to some means deficiency is contrary, and to others excess; for example, to courage it is not rashness, which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency, that is contrary, while to temperance, which is a mean between self-indulgence and insensibility concerning pleasures, insensibility, which is a deficiency, does not seem to be contrary, but self-indulgence, which is an excess.
§1.9.2ἔστι δ᾿ ἀμφότερα ἐναντία τῇ μεσότητι, καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔνδεια· ἡ γὰρ μεσότης τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς ἐνδεέστερον, τῆς δ᾿ ἐνδείας ὑπερβάλλον.
But both are contrary to the mean, both excess and deficiency; for the mean is deficient in relation to excess, and excessive in relation to deficiency.
διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄσωτοι τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἀνελευθέρους φασὶν εἶναι, οἱ δ᾿ ἀνελεύθεροι τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἀσώτους, καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς καὶ προπετεῖς τοὺς ἀνδρείους καλοῦσι δειλούς, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους προπετεῖς καὶ μαινομένους.
Therefore also the prodigal say that the liberal are illiberal, while the illiberal say that the liberal are prodigal, and the rash and headlong call the courageous cowardly, while the cowardly call the courageous headlong and mad.
§1.9.3διὰ δὴ δύο αἰτίας δόζαιμεν ἂν ἀντιτιθέναι τῇ μεσότητι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἔνδειαν.
Indeed, for two reasons we might seem to oppose excess or deficiency to the mean.
ἢ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος σκοποῦσιν πότερον ἐγγύτερόν ἐστι τοῦ μέσου ἢ πορρώτερον, οἷον ἐλευθεριότητι πότερον ἀσωτία ἢ ἀνελευθερία πορρώτερον.
For either people examine from the thing itself which of the two is closer to the mean or further from it, as in the case of liberality, whether prodigality or illiberality is further.
μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν ἐλευθεριότης ἡ ἀσωτία ἢ ἡ ἀνελευθερία· πορρώτερον ἄρα ἡ ἀνελευθερία.
For prodigality would seem to be more like liberality than illiberality; therefore illiberality is further.
§1.9.4τὰ δὲ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι.
And those things which are further removed from the mean would seem to be more contrary.
ἐκ μὲν ἄρα αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἡ ἔνδεια ἐναντιώτερον φαίνεται· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, οἷον πρὸς ἃ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ.
From the thing itself, then, deficiency appears to be more contrary; but there is also another way, namely, toward whatever things we are by nature more inclined, these are more contrary to the mean.
οἷον πεφύκαμεν μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστοι ἢ κόσμιοι εἶναι· ἡ οὖν ἐπίδοσις γίνεται μᾶλλον πρὸς ἃ πεφύκαμεν· πρὸς ἃ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιδίδομεν, ταῦτα καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία· ἐπιδίδομεν δὲ πρὸς ἀκολασίαν μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα· ὥστ᾿ ἐναντιώτερον ἂν εἴη ὑπερβολὴ μεσότητος· ἡ γὰρ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ σωφροσύνης.
For example, we are by nature more inclined to be self-indulgent than orderly; therefore, the progress occurs more toward those things to which we are by nature inclined; and toward whatever things we progress more, these are also more contrary; and we progress more toward self-indulgence than toward orderliness; so that excess would be more contrary to the mean; for self-indulgence is the excess of temperance.
§1.9.5ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, ἐπέσκεπται (μεσότης γὰρ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι τῶν παθῶν, ὥστε δέοι ἂν τὸν μέλλοντα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος εὐδοκιμήσειν τὴν μεσότητα τῶν παθῶν ἑκάστου διατηρεῖν· διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶν σπουδαῖον εἶναι· §1.9.6ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλον μὲν γράψαι παντὸς ἐστί, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη λαβεῖν χαλεπόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὀργισθῆναι μὲν ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον δὲ τούτῷ, τὸ δὲ μέσως ἔχειν χαλεπόν· ἁπλῶς δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν παθῶν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ὅτι τὸ ἐμπεριέχον τὸ μέσον ῥᾴδιον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ μέσον χαλεπόν, καθ᾿ ὃ ἐπαινούμεθα· διὸ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ σπουδαῖον)· §1.9.7ἐπεὶ δ᾿ οὖν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς εἴρηται**, μετὰ τοῦτ᾿ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον πότερον δυνατὴ παραγενέσθαι ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἢ φαύλους.
What virtue is, then, has been investigated (for it seems to be a certain mean of the passions, so that it would be necessary for one who intends to be well-reputed in character to preserve the mean of each of the passions; therefore also it is a major task to be excellent; for in each case to grasp the mean is a major task, just as to draw a circle is within everyone's power, but to grasp the center in it is already difficult; similarly also, to get angry is easy, and also the contrary to this, but to be in a mean state is difficult; and simply in each of the passions one can see that what contains the mean is easy, but the mean is difficult, in respect of which we are praised; therefore also the excellent is rare); Since, then, virtue has been spoken of, after this it would be necessary to consider whether it is possible for it to come to be present or not, or whether, as Socrates said, it is not in our power to be excellent or base.
εἰ γάρ τις, φησίν, ἐρωτήσειεν ὁντιναοῦν πότερον ἂν βούλοιτο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἄδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν ἕλοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν.
For if, he says, one should ask anyone whomsoever whether he would wish to be just or unjust, no one would choose injustice.
§1.9.8ὁμοίως δ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἀνδρείας καὶ δειλίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως.
And similarly in the case of courage and cowardice and the other virtues always in the same way.
δῆλον δ᾿ ὡς εἰ φαῦλοί τινες εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἑκόντες εἴησαν φαῦλοι· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σπουδαῖοι.
And it is clear that if some are base, they would not be base voluntarily; so it is clear that neither are they excellent.
§1.9.9— ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής.
But such an argument is not true.
διὰ τί γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐκ ἐᾷ τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα κελεύει;
For why does the legislator not allow one to do base deeds, but orders beautiful and excellent ones?
καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς φαύλοις ζημίαν τάττει, ἂν πράττῃ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς, ἂν μὴ πράττῃ;
And upon the base deeds he appoints a penalty, if one does them, and upon the beautiful ones, if one does them not?
καίτοι ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη ταῦτα νομοθετῶν, ἃ μὴ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν ἐστι πράττειν.
Yet he would be absurd in legislating these things which it is not in our power to do.
§1.9.10ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν τὸ σπουδαίοις εἶναι καὶ τὸ φαύλοις.
But, as it seems, it is in our power to be excellent and to be base.
— ἔτι δὲ μαρτυροῦσιν οἵ τ᾿ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ψόγοι γινόμενοι.
And further, the praises and blames that occur bear witness to this.
ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀρετῇ ἔπαινος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ κακίᾳ ψόγος· ἔπαινος δὲ καὶ ψόγος οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ὡσαύτως ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖά ἐστι πράττειν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα.
For upon virtue there is praise, and upon vice blame; and praise and blame are not upon involuntary things; so it is clear that in the same way it is in our power to do both excellent and base deeds.
§1.9.11— ἔλεγον δὲ καὶ τοιαύτην τινὰ παραβολὴν, βουλόμενοι δεικνύναι ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον.
And they also used to tell some such comparison, wishing to show that it is not voluntary.
διὰ τί γάρ, φασίν, ὅταν νοσῶμεν ἢ αἰσχροὶ ὦμεν, οὐδεὶς ψέγει τοὺς τοιούτους;
For why, they say, when we are sick or ugly, does no one blame such people?
τὸ δ᾿ οὐκ ἀληθές· ψέγομεν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους, ὅταν αὐτοὺς οἰηθῶμεν αἰτίους εἶναι τοῦ νοσεῖν ἢ τοῦ κακῶς ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα, ὡς ὃν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἑκούσιον.
But this is not true; for we do blame even such people, when we think that they themselves are the causes of being sick or of having their body in a bad state, on the ground that the voluntary is present here too.
ἔοικεν οὖν ἐν τῷ κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν εἶναι τὸ ἑκούσιον.
It seems, therefore, that the voluntary is present in being virtuous and vicious.