§1.6.1ἔτε σὐ μόνον τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν ἀρετήν ἀφορίσειεν ὤν τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ λύπῃ καὶ ἡδονῇ διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα·
Furthermore, one would define virtue not only by such things, but also by pain and pleasure; for because of pleasure we do base things, and because of pain we abstain from noble things.
ὅλως τε οὐκ ἔστιν λαβεῖν ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἡδονῆς.
And in general, it is not possible to conceive of virtue and vice without pain and pleasure.
§1.6.2ἔστιν οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ περῖ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.
Virtue, therefore, is concerned with pleasures and pains.
ἡ δ᾿ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἐντεῦθεν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει, εἰ δεῖ παρὰ γράμμα λέγοντα τὴν??λήθει?? ὡς ἔχει. σκεπεῖν (δεῖ δ᾿ ἴσως).
And ethical virtue has its name from this, if one must examine the truth as it is by speaking letter by letter (and perhaps one must).
τὸ γὰρ ἦθος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους ἔχει τῆν ἐπωνυμίαν·
For character has its name from habit.
§1.6.3ἠθικὴ γὰρ καλεῖται διὰ τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι.
For it is called ethical because of being habituated.
ᾧ καὶ δῇλον ὅτι οὐδεμία ἡμῖν τῶν ἀρετῶν τῶν τοῦ ἀλόγον μέρους φύσει ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων φύσει ἔθει ἄλλως γίνεται.
By which indeed it is clear that none of the virtues of the irrational part arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature is made otherwise by habit.
οἷον ὁ λίθος καὶ ὅλως τὰ βαρέα πέφυκε κάτω φέρεσθαι· ἄν τις οὖν· ἄνω ῥίπτῃ πολλάκις καὶ ἐθίζῃ ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ὅμως οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄνω ἐνεχθείη, ἀλλ᾿ ἀεὶ κάτω.
For example, a stone and in general heavy things are by nature carried downward; if therefore one throws it upward many times and habituates it to be carried upward, nevertheless it would never be carried upward, but always downward.
ὁμ??ίως [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.
And likewise also in the case of other such things.