§1.5.1πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λεκτέον ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐγγίνετκι, οὐ τί ἐσπτιν ἡ ψυχὴ (ὑπὲρ μὲν γὰρ τούτου ἄλλος λόγος), ἀλλʼ ὡς τύπῳ. διελέσθαι.
First, then, we must speak about the soul in which [virtue] arises, not what the soul is (for about this there is another discussion), but rather so as to divide it in outline.
ἔστιν δʼ ἡ ψυχή, ὡς φαμέν, εἰς δύρ μέρη διῃρημένη, εἴς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον.
The soul is, as we say, divided into two parts, the rational and the irrational.
ἐν μὲν δὴ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις ἀγχίνοια σοφία εὐμάθεια μνήμη καὶ τὰ τοιοῦτα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀλόγῳ αὗται αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεγόμεναι, σωφροσύνη δικαιοσύνη ἀνδρεία ὅσαι ἄλλαατοῦἤθους δοκοῦσιν ἐππαινεταὶ εἶναι.
In the rational part, there arise prudence, quickness of mind, wisdom, readiness to learn, memory, and the like, while in the irrational part arise these so-called virtues of character: temperance, justice, courage, and all others that seem to be praiseworthy of character.
§1.5.2κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα· κατὰ δὲ τὰς τοῦ [τὸν] λόγον ἔχοντος οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται.
For we are called praiseworthy according to these; but according to the virtues of the rational part, no one is praised.
οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι σοφός, οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται, οὔτε ὅτι φρόνιμος, οὐδʼ ὅλως κατά τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν.
For no one is praised because they are wise, nor because they are prudent, nor indeed in general according to any such thing.
οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἄλογον, εἰ μὴ ὑπηρετικόν ἔστιν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι μορίῳ.
Nor indeed is the irrational part [praised], unless it is subservient and submits to the rational part.
§1.5.3ἔστιν δʼ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθειρομένη.
Now ethical virtue is destroyed by deficiency and excess.
ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἔνδεια καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τοῦτʼ ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν (δεῖ δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεραῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι).
And that deficiency and excess destroy it can be seen from ethical matters (for concerning obscure things we must use manifest testimonies).
εὐθέως γὰρ ἐπὶ γυμνασίων ἴδοι ἄν τις· πολλῶν γὰρ γινομένων φθείρεται ἡ ἰσχύς, ὀλίγων τε ὡσαύτως.
For one might see this immediately in the case of gymnastic exercises; for if they are excessive, strength is destroyed, and likewise if they are too few.
ἐπὶ τε ποτῶν καὶ σιτίων ὡσ??ύτως· πολλῶν τε γὰρ δὴ γιν??μένων φθείρεται ἡ ὑγίε??, ἀλέγων τε ὡσαύτως, συμμέτρων δὲ γινομένων σῴζεται ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ ἡ ὑγί??α.
And likewise in the case of drinks and foods; for if they are excessive, health is destroyed, and likewise if they are too few, but if they are moderate, both strength and health are preserved.
§1.5.4ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.
And similarly to these, it happens also in the case of temperance, courage, and the other virtues.
ἐὰν μὲν γάρ τινα λέαν ποιήσῃς ἄφοβον ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺ θεοὺς φοβεῖσθαι, σὐκ ἀνδρεῖος ἀλλὰ μαινόμενος, ἂν δὲ φαβούμενον πάντα, δειλός· ἀνδρεῖος ἄρα ἔσται οὔτε ὁ φοβούμενος πάντα οὔτε ὁ μηθέν.
For if you make someone too fearless so that they do not even fear the gods, they are not brave but mad, whereas if they fear everything, they are cowardly; therefore, the brave person will be neither the one who fears everything nor the one who fears nothing.
ταὔτ᾿ ἄρα καὶ αὔξει καὶ φθείρει τὴν ἀρετήν.
The same things, therefore, both increase and destroy virtue.
§1.5.5καὶ γὰρ οἱ λίαν φέβοι καὶ πάντες φθείρου??, καὶ οἱ περὶ μηθὲν δὲ ὁμοίως.
For indeed, excessive fears and all fears destroy, and likewise the absence of fear about anything.
ἔστιν δ᾿ ἡ ἀνδρεία περὶ φόβ:??υς, ὥσν οἱ μέτριοι φ?? αὔξουσι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.
And courage is concerned with fears, so that moderate fears increase courage.
ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὤρα καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται ἡ ἀνδρεία· ὑπὸ φέβων γὰρ τοῦτο πάσχ??.
By the same things, therefore, courage is both increased and destroyed; for it experiences this because of fears.
ὁμείως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὠρεταί.
And similarly also the other virtues.