§1.4.1μετὰ τοίνυν τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν ὅτι οὐθενὶ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ ζῶμεν· ἐν ψνχῇ δέ ἐστιν ἀρετή·
After this, then, we see that we live by nothing other than the soul; and in the soul there is virtue.
τὸ αὐτό γέ τοί φαμεν τή τε ψυχὴν πειεῖν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψαχῆς ἀρετήν.
Indeed, we say that the soul and the virtue of the soul do the same thing.
ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν ἀριτὴ ἐν ἑκώστῳ τοῦτο ποιεῖ 〈εὖ〉 οὗ ἐστιν ἀρετή, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ παὲ τἆλλα μέν, ψμνχῇ δὲ ξῶμεν· λιὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν ἄρα εὖ ζήσ??μεν.
But virtue does this 〈well〉 in each thing of which it is the virtue, and the soul (other things aside), we live by the soul; therefore, through the virtue of the soul, we shall live well.
§1.4.2τὸ δέ γε εὗ ζῆν καὶ εὗ πράττειν οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγομεν.
And indeed living well and acting well we say is nothing other than being happy.
τὸ ἄρα εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν νῷ?? ζῆν ἐστίν, τὸ δʼ εὖ ζῆν ἐν τὸ κακὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν.
Therefore, being happy and happiness consist in living well, and living well consists in living according to the virtues.
τοῦτʼ ἄρʼ ἐστὶν τέλος κα ἡ εὐδαμονία καὶ τὸ ἄμσστονν.
This, then, is the end and happiness and the best.
§1.4.3ἐν χρώσει τοίνυν τινὶ ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐνεργείῳ ἡ εὐδαιμονία.
Happiness, therefore, would consist in a certain use and activity.
ὧν γὰρ ἦν ἕξις καὶ χρῆσις, ἡ χρῆτις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τέλος· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις ἐστίν· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐνέργνα καὶ [ἡ] χρῆσις αὐτῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν· ὥστς τέλος ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς· ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄρʼ ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν.
For in those things where there was a state and a use, the use and the activity are the end; and the virtue of the soul is a state; but there is also an activity and use of it, namely of the virtues; so that the activity and use of it would be the end; therefore, happiness would consist in living according to the virtues.
§1.4.4ἐπαδήπερ οὖν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ αὕτη τέλος καὶ τέλειον τέλος ἐνεργείᾳ, ζῶντες ἂν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς εὐδαίμονες εἴημεν καὶ ἔχοιμεν τὸ ὥριστον ἀγαθόν,
Since, then, happiness is the best good, and this is the end and the complete end in activity, by living according to the virtues we should be happy and should possess the best good.
§1.4.5—ἐπεὶ δʼ οὖν ἐστιν ἡ εὐδευιμ??νία τέλειεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλος, οὐδὲ τοῦτο δεῖ λανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τελείῳ ἔστε.
――Since, then, happiness is a complete good and end, it must not escape our notice that it will also be in what is complete.
οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἐν παιδί (οὐ γάρ ἐσα παῖς ὐδαίμων), ἀλλʼ ἐν ἀνδρί· οὗτος γὰρ τέλειρς. — οὐδʼ ἐν χρύνῳ γε ἀιελεῖ, ἀλλʼ ἐν τελείῳ.
For it will not be in a child (for a child is not happy), but in a man; for he is complete. ――Nor indeed in an incomplete time, but in a complete one.
τέλιος δʼ ἂν εἴη χρόνος, ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ.
And a complete time would be as long as a human being lives.
καὶ γὰρ λέγεται ὁρθῶς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὅτι δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμιονα ἐν τῷ κεγίστῳ χρένῳ τοῦ βίον κρίνεν, ὡς δέον τὸ τέλειον εἶναι καὶ ἐν χρένῳ τελείῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ.
For indeed it is rightly said among the many that one must judge the happy person in the longest time of his life, as it is necessary that what is complete should be both in a complete time and in a complete human being.
§1.4.6— ὅτι δὲ ἐνέργεια ἐστίν, ἔδοι ἄν τις καὶ ἐντεῦθεν.
――And that it is an activity, one might also see from this.
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις, οἷον εἴ τις καθεύδοι διὰ βίου, τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ πάνυ βουλόμεθα λέγειν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ὃ ἦν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
For in sleep, for instance if someone were to sleep through life, we would not at all wish to say that such a person is happy; for living indeed belongs to him, but living according to the virtues does not belong to him, which was according to the activity.
§1.4.7μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέλλον λέγεσθαι οὔτε λίαν δόξειεν ἂν οἰκεῖον εἶναι τούτων οὔτε μακρὰν ἀπέχον.
After this, what is going to be said would seem to be neither too closely related to these nor far removed.
οἷον ἐπειδήπερ ἔστιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, μόριόν τι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ τρεφόμεθα, ὃ καλοῦμεν θρεπτικόν (τοῦτο γὰρ εὔλογόν ἐστιν εἶναι· τοὺς γοῦν λίθους ὁρῶμεν ἀδυνάτους τρέφεσθαι ὄντας, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἐμψύχων ἐστὶ τὸ τρέφεθαι· §1.4.8εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐνψύχων, ἡ ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη αἰτία· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τούτων μὲν τῶν μορίων οὐθὲν αἴτιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ τρέφεσθαι, οἷον τὸ λογιστικὸν ἢ τὸ θυμικὸν ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἄλλο δέ τι παρὰ ταῦτα, ᾧ οὐθὲν ἔχομεν οἰκειότερον ὄνομα ἐπιθεῖναι ἢ θρεπτικόν)· §1.4.9τί οὖν, ἂν τις εἴποι, πότερον καὶ τούτου τοῦ μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς ἔστιν ἀρετή;
For instance, since there is, as it seems, some part of the soul by which we are nourished, which we call the nutritive part (for it is reasonable that this exists; at least we see that stones are unable to be nourished, so that it is clear that being nourished belongs to animate things; and if of animate things, the soul would be the cause; and of the soul, none of these parts would be the cause of being nourished, such as the rational, the spirited, or the appetitive, but some other part besides these, to which we have no more appropriate name to apply than "nutritive"); what then, someone might say, is there also a virtue of this part of the soul?
εἰ γὰρ ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτῃ δεήσει ἐνεργεῖν· τῆς γὰρ τελείας ἀρετῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια εὐδαιμονία.
For if there is, it is clear that this too will need to be active; for the activity of complete virtue is happiness.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τούτου ἢ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄλλος λόγος· εἰ δʼ ἄρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ταύτης ἐνέργεια.
Now, whether there is a virtue of this part or not is another discussion; but if indeed there is, there is no activity of it.
ὧν γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν ὁρμή, οὐδʼ ἐνέργεια τούτων ἔσται· οὐκ ἔοικεν δὲ εἶναι ὁρμὴ ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τούτῳ, ἀλλʼ ὅμοιον ἔοικεν εἶναι τῷ πυρί.
For of things in which there is no impulse, there will be no activity either; and there does not seem to be an impulse in this part, but it seems to be similar to fire.
καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ὅ τι ἂν ἐμιβάλῃς καταναλώσει, κἂν μὴ ἐμβάλῃς, οὐκ ἔχει ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν.
For that too will consume whatever you cast in, and if you do not cast in, it has no impulse to take it.
οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχει· ἂν μὲν γὰρ ἐμβάλῃς τροφήν, τρέφει, ἂν δὲ μὴ ἐμβάλῃς τροφήν, οὐκ ἔχει ὁρμὴν τοῦ τρέφειν.
Thus also this part of the soul is: for if you cast in food, it nourishes, but if you do not cast in food, it has no impulse to nourish.
διὸ οὐδὲ ἐνέργεια οὗ μηδὲ ὁρμή.
Hence, there is no activity where there is not even an impulse.
ὥστʼ οὐδὲν συνεργεῖ τὸ μόριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.
So this part contributes nothing to happiness.
§1.4.10μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν λεκτέον ἂν εἴη τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, ἐπείπερ ἡ ταύτης ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία.
After this, then, it would be necessary to say what virtue is, since its activity is happiness.
ὡς μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις ἡ βελτίστη· ἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐχ ἱκανὸν οὕτως ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον διορίσαι δεῖ.
To speak simply, then, virtue is the best state; but perhaps it is not enough to speak so simply, but it is necessary to define it more clearly.