§1.34.24εἰσὶ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔθει καὶ προαιρέσει.
And there are indeed also those by habit and choice.
αἱ δὲ δὴ μετὰ λόγου οὖσαι τελέως ἀρεταί εἰσιν ἐπαινεταὶ ἐπιγινόμεναι.
On the other hand, those accompanied by logos are complete virtues, which are praiseworthy and arise later.
ἔστιν οὖν ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ αὕτη ἡ ἄνευ λόγου χωριζομένη μὲν τοῦ λόγου μικρὰ καὶ ἀπολειπομένη τοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν προστιθεμένη τελείαν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀρετήν.
Therefore, this natural virtue without logos, when separated from logos, is of little account and falls short of being praised, but when added to logos and choice, it makes virtue complete.
διὸ καὶ συνεργεῖ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου ἡ φυσικὴ ὁρμὴ πρὸς ἀρετήν.
Therefore, the natural impulse toward virtue also cooperates with logos and does not exist without logos.
§1.34.25οὐδʼ αὖ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ πάνυ τελειοῦται τῷ εἶναι ἀρετὴ ἄνευ τῆς φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς.
Nor, on the other hand, are logos and choice at all perfected in being virtue without the natural impulse.
διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, φάσκων εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν λόγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄφελος εἶναι πράττειν τὰ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια, μὴ εἰδότα καὶ προαιρούμενον τῷ λόγῳ.
Therefore Socrates did not speak rightly when he claimed that virtue is logos; for he held that there is no benefit in doing courageous and just things without knowing and choosing them by logos.
διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔφη λόγον εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλʼ οἱ νῶν βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν τὰ καλὰ, τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι ἀρετήν·
Therefore he said that virtue is logos, which is not right, but the moderns speak better; for they say that doing noble things in accordance with right logos, this is virtue.
§1.34.26ἀρθῶς μὲν οὐδʼ οὗτοι.
But not even these speak entirely rightly.
πράξαι μὲν γὰρ ἄν τις τὰ δίκαια προαιρέσει μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ, οὐδὲ γνώσει τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλʼ ὁρμῆ τινι ἀλόγῳ, ὀρθῶς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (λέγω δέ, ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς κελεύσειεν, οὕτως ἔπραξεν)·
For a man might perform just deeds with no choice, nor with knowledge of noble things, but by some irrational impulse, and perform these rightly and in accordance with right logos (and I mean, he acted in such a way as right logos would command); nevertheless, such an action does not possess that which is praiseworthy.
ἀλλ᾿ ὅμως ἡ τοιαύτη πρᾶξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐπαινετόν. ἀλλὰ βέλτιον, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν, τὸ μετὰ λόγου εἶναι τὴν ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὸ καλόν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐπαινετόν.
Rather, as we define it, it is better that the impulse toward the noble should be accompanied by logos; for such a state is both virtue and praiseworthy.
§1.34.27πότερον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ ἢ οὔ, ἀπορήσειεν ἄντις.
But one might wonder whether prudence is a virtue or not.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον ὅτι ἀρετή.
Nevertheless, it would become clear from the following that it is a virtue.
εἴπερ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία κε αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταί, διότι τῶν καλῶν πρακτικαί, καὶ ἐπαινεταὶ εἰσίν, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἄν τι εἴη καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀρετῆς τάξει ὄντων.
For if justice, courage, and the other virtues are praiseworthy because they are productive of noble things, it is clear that prudence also would be one of the praiseworthy things and of those which are in the class of virtue.
ἐφʼ ἃ γὰρ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὁρμᾷ πράττειν, ἐπὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ φρόνησις.
For towards the things which courage impels one to do, towards these prudence also impels.
τὸ γὰρ ὅλον ὡς ἂν αὕτη προστάττῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία πράττει, ὥστε εἰ αὐτὴ ἐπαινετὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν ἡ φρόνησις προστάττῃ, ἥ γε φρόνησις τελείως ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐπαινετὴ καὶ ἀρετῶ.
For in general, in whatever way prudence commands, in that way courage also acts, so that if courage is praiseworthy by doing what prudence commands, prudence itself would completely be both praiseworthy and a virtue.
§1.34.28πότερον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ ἢ οὔ, ἴδοι ἄν τις ἐντεῦθεν, ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐπιβλέψας, οἷον ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκοδομικήν.
But whether prudence is practical or not, one might see from this, by looking at the sciences, for example, at building.
ἔστιν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, ἐν οἰκοδομικᾖ ὃ μὲν ἀρχιπέκτων τις καλούμενος, ὃ δὲ ὑπηρετῶν τούτῳ οἰκοδόμος· οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν ποιητικὸς οἰκίας.
For there is, as we say, in building one who is called a master-builder, and another who is a builder serving him; and the latter is productive of a house.
ἐστὶν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων, καθὸ οὗτος ἐποίει οἰκίαν, ποιητικὸς οἰκίας.
But the master-builder also, insofar as the builder produced the house, is productive of the house.
ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιητικῶν ἔχει, ἐν αἷς ἔστιν ἀρχιτέκτων καὶ ὑπηρέτης τούτου.
And it is likewise in the case of the other productive arts in which there is a master-builder and his servant.
ποιητικὸς ἄρα τινὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέτων ἔσται, καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου 〈οὗ〉 ποιητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπηρετικός.
Therefore the master-builder also will be productive of something, and productive of this same thing of which the servant also is productive.
§1.34.29εἰ τοίνυν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει, ὅπερ εἰκὸς καὶ εὔλογον, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη πρακτική.
If, then, it is likewise in the case of the virtues, which is likely and reasonable, prudence also would be practical.
αἱ γὰρ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι πρακτικαὶ εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἀρχιτέκτων τις αὐτῶν ἐστίν· ὅπως γὰρ αὕτη προστάξει, οὕτως αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ οἳ κατʼ αὐτὰς πράττουσιν· ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ πρακτικαί, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ ἂν εἴη.
For all the virtues are practical, and prudence is like a master-builder of them; for in whatever way this commands, so the virtues and those who act according to them perform; since therefore the virtues are practical, prudence also would be practical.
§1.34.30πότερον δὲ αὕτη πάντων ἄρχει τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ καὶ ἀπορεῖται;
But does this rule over all things in the soul, as is thought and questioned?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
τῶν γὰρ βελτιόνων οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν, οἷον τῆς σοφίας οὐκ ἄρχει.
For it would not seem to rule over the better things, for example, it does not rule over wisdom.
ἀλλά, φησίν, αὕτη ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων, καὶ κυρία ἐστὶ προστάττουσα.
But, someone says, it takes care of all things, and is sovereign in commanding.
§1.34.31ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ ὁ ἐπίτροπος.
But perhaps it is like the steward in a household.
οὗτος γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διοικεῖ ἀλλʼ οὔπω οὗτος ἄρχει πάντων, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζει τῷ δεσπότῃ σχολήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐκεῖνος μὴ κωλυόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκκλείηται τοῦ τῶν καλῶν τι καὶ προσηκόντων πράττειν.
For he is sovereign over all things and administers everything; yet he does not on that account rule over everyone, but provides leisure for his master, so that the master, not being hindered by necessary things, may not be excluded from performing any of the noble and fitting things.
§1.34.32οὕτω καὶ ὁμοίως τούτῳ ἡ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἐπίτροπός τίς ἐστι τῆς σοφίας, καὶ παρασκευάζει ταύτῃ σχολὴν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον, κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ ταῦτα σωφρονίζουσα.
In this way and likewise to this, prudence is like a certain steward of wisdom, and provides leisure for it and for the doing of its own work, by holding back the passions and keeping them temperate.