§1.34.14ἡ δὲ σοφία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νσῦ συγκειμένη.
And wisdom is composed of science and intellect.
ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ σοφία καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἤδη δεικνύμενα, περὶ ἂ ἡ ἐπιστήμη· μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τοῦ νοῦ αὐτὴ μετέχει, ῇ δὲ περὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς μετ᾿ ἀποδείξεως ὄντα, τῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἔκ τε νοῦ καὶ ἐπισπτήμης συγκειμένη, ὥστʼ εἴη ἂν περὶ ταὐτά, περὶ ἃ καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη.
For wisdom is concerned both with the principles and with the things that are already demonstrated from the principles, which are the concern of science; therefore, insofar as it is concerned with the principles, it participates in intellect, and insofar as it is concerned with the things after the principles which exist with demonstration, it participates in science; so that it is clear that wisdom is composed of both intellect and science, and thus it would be concerned with the same things with which both intellect and science are concerned.
§1.34.15ἡ δὲ ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν, ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων ἐπαμφοτερίζομεν, πρὸς τὸ καὶ εἶναι ταῦτα οὕτω καὶ μὴ εἶναι.
And opinion is that by which we waver concerning all those things which can both be so and not be so.
§1.34.16πότερον δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία ταὐτόν;
But are prudence and wisdom the same?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία ἐστὶν περὶ τὰ μετʼ ἀποδείξεως καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις οὐ περὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολ ὄντα.
For wisdom is concerned with things that exist with demonstration and are always in the same state, whereas prudence is not concerned with these, but with things that are in change.
λέγω δὲ οἷον εὐθὺ μὲν ἢ καμπύλον καὶ κοῖλον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτώ ἐστιν ἀεὶ τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ συμφέροντα οὐκέτι οὕτως ἔχουσιν τὸ μὴ εἰς ἄλλο τι μεταβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλουσιν, καὶ νῦν μὲν συμφέρει τοῦτο, αὔριον δʼ οὔ, καὶ τῷ μέν, τῷ δʼ οὔ, καὶ οὕτω μὲν συμφέρει, ἐκείνως δὲ οὐ συμφέρει.
And I mean, for example, that the straight, the curved, the concave, and such things are always as they are, whereas beneficial things no longer have this character of not changing into something else, but they change, and now this is beneficial, but tomorrow it is not, and to one person it is, but to another it is not, and in this way it is beneficial, but in that way it is not.
περὶ δὲ τὰ συμφέροντά ἐστιν ἡ 1197b φρόνησις, ἡ δὲ σοφία οὔ.
And prudence is concerned with beneficial things, but wisdom is not.
ἕτερον ἄρα ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ φρόνησις.
Therefore, wisdom and prudence are different.
§1.34.17πότερον δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία ἀρετὴ ἢ οὔ;
But is wisdom a virtue or not?
διὰ τοῦτο δῆλον ἂν γένοιτο, ὅτι ἐπτὶν ἀρετή, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φρονήσεως.
That it is a virtue would become clear from prudence itself.
εἰ γὰρ ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τοῦ μαρίου τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, ἔστιν δὲ χείρων ἡ φρόνησις τῆς σοφίας (περὶ χείρω γὰρ ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία περὶ τὸ ἀίδιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον, ὡς φαμέν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἀνθρώπῳ), εἰ οὖντὸ χεῖρον ἀρετὴ ἐστί, τό γε βέλτιον εἰκός ἐστιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἀρετὴ ἐστίν.
For if, as we say, prudence is a virtue of one of the two parts possessing logos, and prudence is inferior to wisdom (for it is concerned with inferior things; for wisdom is concerned with the eternal and the divine, as we say, while prudence is concerned with what is beneficial to man), if therefore the inferior is a virtue, it is reasonable that the better is at least a virtue, so that it is clear that wisdom is a virtue.
§1.34.18καὶ ἡ φρόνησις, περὶ τὰ πρακτά.
And prudence also is concerned with things to be done.
ὁ γὰρ συνετός που λέγεται τῷ δυνατὸς βουλεύεσθαι 〈εἶναι〉 καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀρθῶς τι κρῖναι καὶ ἰδεῖν· περὶ μικρῶν δὲ καὶ ἐν μικροῖς ἡ κρίσις αὐτοῦ.
For the understanding man is presumably so called by being able to deliberate, and in judging and seeing something rightly; but his judgment is about small things and in small matters.
ἔστιν οὖν ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ὁ συνετὸς μέρος τι φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ φρονίμου, καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ τούτων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν χωρίσαις τὸν συνετὸν τοῦ φρονίμου.
Therefore, understanding and the understanding man are a certain part of prudence and of the prudent man, and not without them; for you could not separate the understanding man from the prudent man.
§1.34.19γὰρ δεινότης καὶ ὁ δεινὸς οὐκ ἔστι μὲν οὔτε φρόνησις οὔτε φρόνιμος, ὁ μέντοι φρόνιμος δεινός, διὸ καὶ συνεργεῖ πως τῇ φρονήσει ἡ δεινότης· §1.34.20ἀλλὰ δεινὸς μὲν καὶ ὁ φαῦλος λέγεται, οἷον Μέντωρ δεινὸς μὲν ἐδόκει εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οὐ φρόνιμος ἦν.
For cleverness and the clever man are indeed neither prudence nor the prudent man, yet the prudent man is clever, wherefore cleverness also cooperates in a way with prudence; But even the base man is said to be clever; for example, Mentor was thought to be clever, but he was not prudent.
τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου καὶ τῆς 'φρονήσεώς ἐστι τὸ τῶν βελτίστων ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τούτων προαιρετικὸν εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν ἀεί, τῆς δὲ δεινότητος καὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ σκέψασθαι ἐκ τίνων ἂν ἕκαστον γένοιτο τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὸ ταῦτα πορίσαι.
For to aim at the best things and to be always choice-making and practical of these is the property of the prudent man and of prudence, whereas to consider from what means each of the things to be done could come about, and to provide these, is the property of cleverness and of the clever man.
δόξειεν ἂν οὖν εἶναι ὁ δεινὸς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις τε καὶ περὶ ταῦτα·
So the clever man would seem to exist in such things and to be concerned with them.
§1.34.21ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις καὶ θαυμάσειε, διὰ τί ὑπὲρ ἠθῶν λέγοντες καὶ πολιτικῆς τινος πραγματείας ὑπὲρ σοφίας λέγομεν.
But one might be puzzled and wonder why, when speaking about ethics and a certain political inquiry, we speak about wisdom.
ὅτι ἴσως γὲ πρῶτον μὲν οὐδʼ ἀλλοτρία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ἡ σκέψις ἡ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὡς φαμέν.
Because, perhaps first of all, the inquiry concerning it would not seem to be foreign, if indeed it is a virtue, as we say.
ἔτι δʼ ἴσως ἐστὶν φιλοσόφου καὶ περὶ τούτων παρεπισκοπεῖν ὅσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντα.
And furthermore, it is perhaps characteristic of a philosopher to investigate also along with these all things that happen to exist in the same subject.
§1.34.22καὶ ἀναγκαῖον δέ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομεν, περὶ ἀπάντων λέγειν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σοφία ἐν ψυχῇ· ὥστε οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ὑπὲρ ∗∗ψυχῆς ποιούμεθα τοὺς λόγους.
And it is also necessary, since we are speaking about the things in the soul, to speak about all of them; and wisdom also is in the soul; so that we are not making our arguments about the soul in an irrelevant way.
§1.34.23ὥσπερ δʼ ἔχει ἡ δεινότης πρὸς φρόνησιν, οὕτως δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀπασῶν.
And as cleverness is related to prudence, so it would seem to be in the case of all the virtues.
λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ καὶ φύσει ἐν ἑκάστοις ἐγγινόμεναι, οἷον ὁρμαί τινες ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἄνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καθʼ ἑκάστην πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα·
And I mean, for example, that there are virtues that arise in each of us even by nature, such as certain impulses in each without logos towards courageous and just things, and towards such things according to each virtue;