§1.34.1ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν καὶ ἐν τίσιν καὶ περὶ ποῖα, καὶ περὶ ἑκάστης αὐτῶν, ὅτι εἰ πράττοιμεν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τὸ βέλτιστον, τὸ μὲν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴπτοι ὅτι ὑγίεια ἄριστʼ ἂν μένοιτο, εἴ τις τὰ ὑγιεινὰ προσφέροιτο.
Since it has been said concerning the virtues, both what they are and in what parts they reside and about what sort of things, and also concerning each of them, that if we act according to the right logos we act best—to speak thus, namely "to act according to the right logos," is similar to as if someone were to say that health would be best maintained if one were to take healthy things.
τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἀσαῳές· ἀλλʼ ἐρεῖ μοι, τὰ ποῖα διασάφησόν ἔστιν ὑγιεινά. §1.34.2οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου, τί ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ τίς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος;
Such a statement is indeed obscure; but someone will say to me, "Clarify what sort of things are healthy." So also in the case of the logos: what is the logos, and what is the right logos?
ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ἐστὶν πρῶτον μέν, ἐν ὁ λόγος ἐγγίνεται, ὑπὲρ τούτου διελέσθαι.
It is perhaps necessary, first of all, to discuss that in which the logos arises.
§1.34.3διωρίσθη μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς ὡς τύπῳ καὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἐστι λόγον ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἄλογαν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς·
Now, concerning the soul, a definition was given in outline even before, namely that one part of it possesses logos, and the other is the part of the soul without logos.
ἔστιν δʼ εἰς δύο τὴν διαίρεσιν ἔχον τὸ λόγον ἔχον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν ἐστι τὸ μὲν βουλευτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἐπιστημονικόν.
But the part of the soul possessing logos is divided into two, of which one is the deliberative and the other is the scientific.
ὅτι δὲ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν.
That these are different from each other would become clear from their underlying subjects.
§1.34.4ὥσπερ γὰρ δὴ ἕτερά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων χρῶμά τε καὶ χυμὸς καὶ ψόφος καὶ ὀσμή, ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑτέρας αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἀπέδωκεν (ψόφον μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῇ, χυμὸν δὲ γεύσει γνωρίζομεν, χρῶμα δὲ ὄψει), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τἄλλο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν· ἐπεὶ δὴ ἕτερα τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐστίν, ἕτερα καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι μέρη οἷς ταῦτα γνωρίζομεν.
For just as color, taste, sound, and smell are indeed different from one another, in the same way nature also assigned different senses to them (for we recognize sound by hearing, taste by taste, color by sight), and in like manner one must assume the same for the rest: since the underlying subjects are different, the parts of the soul by which we recognize them must also be different.
§1.34.5ἕτερον δʼ ἔτι τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῇ γνωρίζομεν· ἕτερον ἄῥ ἂν εἴη τὸ μόριον τὸ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ νοητά.
And furthermore, the object of thought and the object of sense are different; and we recognize these by the soul; therefore, the part concerned with objects of sense and the part concerned with objects of thought must be different.
τὸ δὲ βουλευτικὸν καὶ προαιρετικὸν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ ἐν κινήσει καὶ ἀπλῶς ὅσα ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ φθορᾷ ἐστίν.
But the deliberative and choice-making part is concerned with objects of sense, and those in motion, and simply all that are in generation and corruption.
§1.34.6βουλευόμεθα γὰρ ὑπὲρ τούτων ἃ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστιν καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι προελομένοις, περὶ ἅ ἐστιν καὶ] βουλὴ καὶ προαίρεσις τοῦ πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστιν αἰσθητὰ καὶ ἐν κινήσει τοῦ μεταβάλλειν· ὥστε τὸ προαιρετικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστίν.
For we deliberate about those things which are up to us both to do and not to do once we have chosen them, about which there is deliberation and choice of doing or not doing; and these things are objects of sense and in the motion of change; so that the choice-making part of the soul corresponds to the realm of objects of sense.
§1.34.7τούτων δὴ διωρισμένων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὲρ τἀληθοῦς ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ τἀληθὲς ὡς ἔχει σκοπούμεθα, ἔστιν δʼ ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις νοῦς σοφία ὑπόληψις, περὶ τί δὴ ἕκαστον τούτων ἐστίν.
Now that these things have been defined, after this it should be stated, since our discourse is about truth and we are examining how truth is, and since there are science, prudence, intellect, wisdom, and opinion, what indeed each of these is concerned with.
§1.34.8ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ περὶ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ τοῦτο μετʼ ἀποδείξεως καὶ λόγου διατεινόμενον, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ἐν οἷς αἵρεσις καὶ φυγὴ καὶ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστιν πρᾶξαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι.
Now, science is concerned with the object of science, and this is pursued with demonstration and logos; whereas prudence is concerned with matters of action, in which there is choice and avoidance, and it is up to us to act or not to act.
§1.34.9ἔστιν δὴ τῶν ποιουμένων καὶ πραττομένων οὐ ταὐτὸ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν.
Indeed, among things made and things done, the productive and the practical are not the same.
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐστί τι παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος, οἷον παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, ἐπειδή ἐστιν ποιητικὴ σἰκίας, οἰκία αὐτῆς τὸ τέλος παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τεκτονικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιητικῶν·
For in the case of productive things, there is some other end besides the production itself; for example, in the case of housebuilding, since it is productive of a house, the house is its end besides the production; and similarly in carpentry and the other productive arts.
§1.34.10ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐθὲν τέλος παῥ αὐτὴν τὴν πρᾶξιν, οἷον παρὰ τὸ κιθαρίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος οὐθέν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τέλος, ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις.
But in the case of practical things, there is no other end besides the action itself; for example, besides playing the cithara there is no other end, but this very thing is the end, the activity and the action.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ τὰ πρακτὰ ἡ φρόνησις, περὶ δὲ τὴν ποίησιν καὶ τὰ ποιητὰ ἡ τέχνη· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ποιητοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐστι τὸ τεχνάζειν.
Therefore, prudence is concerned with action and practical things, while art is concerned with production and productive things; for exercising art is found in productive things rather than in practical things.
§1.34.11ὥστε ἡ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη ἕξις τις προαιρετικὴ καὶ πρακτικὴ τῶν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ὄντων καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι, ὅσα εἰς τὸ συμφέρον ἤδη συντείνει.
So prudence would be a certain choice-making and practical disposition concerning those things which are up to us both to do and not to do, as many as already contribute to what is beneficial.
§1.34.12ἔστιν δʼ ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετή, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη. ἐπαινετοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οί φρόνιμοι, ὁ δʼ ἔπαινος ἀρετῆς·
And prudence is a virtue, as it would seem, not a science.
ἔτι δʼ ἐπιστήμης μὲν πάσης ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, φρονήσεως δὲ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτό τί ἐστιν ἀρετή.
For those who are prudent are praised, and praise is of virtue; moreover, while there is a virtue of every science, there is no virtue of prudence, but rather, as it seems, it is itself a certain virtue.
ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐστι περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ντων· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετʼ ἀποδείξεως ὄντων ἐστίν, αἱ δʼ ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, ὥστʼ οὐκ ἂν εἴη περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλʼ ὁ νοῦς.
But intellect is concerned with the principles of objects of thought and of beings; for while science is of things that exist with demonstration, the principles are indemonstrable, so that science would not be concerned with the principles, but intellect would.